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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters concerning the consequences of incar-
ceration and performance pay for the modern US economy. The first two chapters
consider the impact of the spatial location of prisons on two relevant groups: state
prisoners and rural counties hosting state and federal prisons. The third chapter ex-
amines the relation between the incidence of performance pay in the labor market
and the gender wage gap.
The first chapter estimates the causal impact of offenders’ distance from home
during incarceration on later recidivism using a two-sample instrumental variables
strategy. I instrument for an inmate’s distance from home with the average or min-
imum distance to state facilities from their home county, which varies across county
and within county over time due to prison openings and closures. Doubling an in-
mate’s distance from home decreases the rate of 1-year recidivism by approximately
3 percentage points. Inmates convicted of a crime associated with membership in a
criminal network experience the greatest decline in recidivism with distance.
The second chapter assesses the effect of prisons on rural employment using a gen-
eralized difference-in-difference approach. The principal employment effect of prison
openings and closures is a one-for-one gain or loss in public sector jobs. Prisons do not
exert a local multiplier effect: employment in the private sector is generally unaffected
v
by prison presence. Prisons thus appear to have little utility as a local development
strategy and not to induce a county-level economic decline upon closure.
The third chapter uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 to show
that women are less likely to be in performance-pay jobs and experience a smaller
earnings increase from participating in such jobs. I compare these findings with the-
oretical predictions of differing tastes for competition or biased subjective evaluation
but find limited support that either factor explains most of the gender difference in
performance pay. However, bonus-awarding jobs also demonstrate a higher elasticity
of earnings with respect to weekly hours than other jobs do, and thus some of the
wider wage gap is explained by gender differences in time at work.
vi
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Chapter 1
The Big House Far from Home: Spatial
Distance and Criminal Recidivism
1.1 Introduction
Criminal behavior is highly persistent, with 40% of offenders released from state or
Federal United States prisons returning to incarceration within 3 years (Yang, 2017b).
Several prior studies have shown that the specific circumstances of an inmate’s in-
carceration are likely to have a causal effect on ongoing criminal activity (Kuziemko,
2012; Mueller-Smith, 2015; Chen and Shapiro, 2007). One less-studied aspect of in-
carceration is the spatial separation between inmates and their home communities.
Distance from home has the potential to impact recidivism propensity on a broad
scale, because state prisoners in the United States are located an average of 100 miles
from home (Vigne, 2014). Imprisonment farther from home may impact a released
inmate’s likelihood of re-offending by affecting the perception of the harshness of
incarceration or the strength of social or criminal ties to home.
Estimating the effect of distance is impeded by the limited availability of historical
data on the location of inmates during incarceration and the need for a source of exoge-
nous variation in inmates’ distances from home. In this paper, I employ a two-sample
instrumental variables strategy using time and spatial variation in the distribution of
prison facilities to instrument for offenders’ distance from home during incarceration,
an approach which addresses both of the above issues. With this strategy, I provide
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new causal estimates of inmates’ distance from home on post-incarceration outcomes.
My results suggest that being incarcerated farther from home reduces an inmate’s
likelihood to engage in criminal behavior after release.
I construct a novel instrument for an inmate’s distance from home during incarcer-
ation using the average distance to state correctional facilities from his or her county
of conviction at the time of admission. This instrument varies across space within
a state depending on the geographic distribution of prisons and across time within
a single county upon the opening or closure of state prison facilities. Using cross-
sectional data containing facility assignments, I confirm that the average log distance
is a strong predictor for inmates’ actual log distance. Then, using a separate dataset
which allows me to observe recidivism but not facility assignment, I estimate the
effect of this instrument in reduced-form regressions both with and without county
fixed effects and find consistent evidence that the average or minimum distance to
facilities is associated with reduced recidivism for men. Finally, I combine these two
estimates in a Two-Sample Two-Stage Least Squares framework to obtain point esti-
mates and confidence intervals which account for the noise in my proxy for distance.
My conclusions from the reduced form analysis continue to hold. I estimate that
doubling an inmate’s expected distance from home during incarceration leads to a
3.3 percentage point fall in the probability of returning to incarceration within one
year.
I explore heterogeneous treatment effects to explore which specific mechanisms
generate the overall relationship between distance and recidivism. I rule out general
deterrence as the sole explanation for the estimated negative relationship, which sug-
gests that my results reflect the direct impact of distance on inmates who experience
being incarcerated farther from home, rather than an indirect effect on all potential
offenders. Inmates originally convicted of crimes requiring membership in a crimi-
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nal network experience a greater negative treatment effect, indicating that a large
portion of the decline in recidivism with distance arises because distance weakens an
offender’s relationships with his or her criminal ties. Even so, a negative relationship
exists for inmates not associated with such crimes. Therefore, other explanations,
most notably a specific deterrent effect, may be important.
This project contributes to the nascent literature examining a relationship between
the locations of prison facilities and criminal behavior. Bedard and Helland (2004)
show that an increased average distance between a city and its state’s women’s prisons
decreases the overall female crime rate, presumably through a general deterrent effect.
While they do not consider recidivism specifically or use individual-level data, more
recent studies by sociologists and criminologists have done so. Most notably, a series
of related studies (Cochran et al. 2016; Lindsey et al. 2017; Cochran et al. 2018)
examine the effect of distance on Florida inmates in the 2000s. In these studies,
increased distance from home is associated with fewer visits and increased inmate
misconduct and recidivism. However, their study does not account for the fact that
inmates may be assigned facilities endogenously; for example, inmates more likely to
be visited may be sited closer to home. I build upon these prior findings by conducting
the first national-level study of a relationship between distance and recidivism and
employing an empirical strategy which accounts for the possibility of some forms
of endogenous assignment. I also consider mechanisms for a relationship besides
visitation alone.
I also contribute to the broader economic literature studying the causal effects
of incarceration. Mueller-Smith (2015) has established a causal relationship between
incarceration itself and a long-term increase in criminal behavior and a decline in
employment and earnings. Further, studies by Kling (2006), Kuziemko (2012), Drago
et al. (2011), and Chen and Shapiro (2007) show that the circumstances of incar-
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ceration, such as the time served, the quality of the facility, and the possibility of
parole, can affect post-release outcomes. By showing that the distance an inmate is
held from home has a causal effect on later recidivism, I contribute to the growing
understanding that incarceration has a causal impact on later behavior and that the
particular nature of the incarceration experience matters for these outcomes.
My results also shed light on the interdisciplinary literature considering the ag-
gregate impact of rural prisons. While the methods of determining the location of
prison sites in the US vary across states, the choice of location is a function of many
factors including the presence of a disused facility suitable for conversion, proximity
of an appropriate work force, and local unemployment and poverty. These policies
have resulted in prisons being disproportionately located in rural areas, despite the
fact that the majority of the offender population originates from urban areas (Ea-
son, 2010). Studies such as Glasmeier and Farrigan (2007), Eason (2017), Chirakijja
(2018), and Chapter 2 of this dissertation have found that prisons do provide a small,
short-term economic benefit in poor, rural places. The results of this paper provide
another information point in the calculus of where to site new prisons or the choice
of which institution to close, as these decisions have implications for recidivism along
with local economic considerations.
While the impact of distance specifically on post-incarceration outcomes is less
studied, the three mechanisms I consider for a relationship between distance and re-
cidivism are supported by prior evidence. First, I consider the effect on the perceived
disutility of punishment arising from being incarcerated far from home. The theory
of “specific deterrence” purports that the severity of punishment may deter future
criminal behavior if the experience is worse than the offender expected (Doleac, 2019).
Some studies have successfully isolated this specific deterrence channel. For exam-
ple, Bushway and Owens (2013) exploit changes to recommended–but not realized–
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sentences for certain crimes in Maryland to show that recidivism increases as the gap
between a longer recommended sentence and a shorter realized sentence increases.
Empirical findings regarding the effects of a harsher punishment broadly defined are
more mixed, and generally are not able to separate a specific deterrent effect from a
criminogenic effect of worse peers or a rehabilitative effect from exposure to institu-
tional programs (Chen and Shapiro 2007, Drago et al. 2011, Kuziemko 2012, Kling
2006).
My second proposed channel for a relationship between spatial distance and out-
comes is an effect on social ties. As discussed previously, a number of studies have
established economic constraints as an important driver of re-offending after incarcer-
ation (Yang 2017b, Yang 2017a, Agan and Makowsky 2018 Tuttle 2019). Increased
distance from home, to the extent that it impedes visitation and communication, likely
weakens an offender’s social ties to their home community. Social networks from the
home county can impact ex-offenders’ financial status in two main ways. Social net-
works are often direct providers of housing and resources upon re-introduction to the
community, with work by Western et al. (2015) suggesting that as many as 2/3 of
released offenders receive financial or housing assistance from family. Social ties may
also be sources of job networks which allow ex-offenders to overcome barriers to em-
ployment. Young, low education individuals are likely to use informal contacts to find
a job (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004), and referrals may also provide employers
with information about the productivity of referred hires (Dustmann et al., 2015).
The stigma of a criminal record is the dominant barrier to employment for many
ex-offenders (Finlay, 2009). However, study of Ohio’s “Certificate of Qualification for
Employment” suggests that positive signals of job-readiness can help counteract this
stigma even in situations where they can not address legal concerns (Leasure and
Andersen 2016, Leasure and Martin 2017).
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Finally, distance may impact the strength of criminal ties. Studies such as Glaeser
et al. (1996) establish that social interactions play an important role in explaining
overall patterns of crime. Two competing potential stories for a relationship between
distance and criminal networks are suggested by the literature. First, distance from
home and thus weakened home social networks may reinforce the formation of crim-
inal networks during institutionalization. For example, Bayer et al. (2009) find an
increase in juvenile recidivism when an offender shares a facility with many others
with the same type of prior offense. On the other hand, separation from home crimi-
nal networks may make an offender less likely to re-integrate with a criminal network
on release and thus make crime related to the network less profitable. Along these
lines, Kirk (2015) provides evidence that geographically separating ex-offenders upon
release may reduce recidivism.
1.2 Policy Context
The distance between US inmates and their home communities arises from the inter-
section of two features of the criminal justice system: the location of facilities and the
assignment mechanisms attaching inmates to these facilities. The exact process by
which prison locations are chosen varies widely across states (Ammons et al., 1992),
but location choice is often motivated by a desire to stimulate the hosting area’s
economy as much or more than considerations for proximity to the offender popu-
lation (Glasmeier and Farrigan, 2007; Eason, 2010). These considerations lead to a
geographic disconnect between the distribution of offender populations and of prison
locations, with prisons disproportionately located in rural areas while offenders are
disproportionately from urban areas. An extreme example can be found in the case of
New York, where approximately 45% of inmates are from the five counties comprising
New York City (United States Department of Justice., 2017), but over two-thirds of
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the state’s prison capacity is located more than 150 miles away from New York City,
especially in rural counties in the northern and western regions of the state (United
States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics., 2017). The decision to open or close a state prison is typically made at the state
level in response to state-level trends in the inmate population, and thus the location
of an opening or closing prison within a state is unlikely to be related to crime trends
in the hosting county.
The other factor causing prisoners to be located far from home is how prisoners
are assigned to facilities within a state. In 2005, 20 states or over 35% of institutions
with available data had more inmates in their correctional institutions than the rated
capacity (United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of
Justice Statistics., 2017), suggesting that the distribution of available spaces is likely
a binding constraint on facility assignment in many cases. Cochran et al. (2018)
suggest that in Florida, the initial assignment of inmates to facilities is essentially a
random process. However, this might not be true across all states. For example, in
Texas, those convicted of less severe “state jail” crimes are explicitly located in the
nearest state jail facility, and even the general inmate population might be assigned
to facilities according to rehabilitative needs (Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
2017). In this paper I will treat the assignment of prisoners to facilities as an empirical
question, and my empirical strategy is robust to the potentially endogenous relation-
ship between the distance between an inmate’s home and their assigned facility and
later recidivism.
Visitation is likely a key, but potentially not the only, driver of a relationship be-
tween distance and offender outcomes. Characterizing visitation policy for the United
States is not a trivial task, given the interplay between separate state-wide guidelines
or policies and the implementation of these policies, which may vary considerably by
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facility. An informative review of official state policies by Boudin et al. (2013) reveals
the following commonalities: 1) inmates are generally permitted visits on a regular
basis, such as weekly; 2) the amount of permissible visitation is generally lower for
inmates held at higher levels of security or who have violated prison rules or policies;
3) visitors are generally background checked, thus excluding recent felons, and visitors
may not visit multiple inmates unless immediate family; and 4) nearly all states pro-
vide some leniency in the length of an individual visit for visitors who have traveled
an especially great distance. Visitors are generally not provided with assistance with
transportation to facilities; a notable exception was New York, which provided free
bus transportation between major cities and most correctional institutions between
1973 and 2010 (Associated Press, 2012).
I generally ignore the case of video visitation in this paper, but acknowledge
that the presence of video visitation would likely lead distance to have a smaller
in magnitude effect on later outcomes. Video visitation first became available in
the mid-1990s and became relatively widespread across at least 20 states by 2012,
though the lack of any centralized record makes timing this spread more precisely
difficult (Emmanuel, 2012). While the increased use of video visitation may seem an
appealing mechanism through which to increase inmates’ contact with family, video
visitation often replaces, rather than supplements, in-person visitation. Video calls
may be prohibitively expensive for “visitors”, and visitation software may suffer from
technological problems (Fulcher 2013, Lee 2018). Furthermore, some forms of video
visitation may still require visitors to travel to visitation centers or other facilities to
access the service (Emmanuel 2012, Fulcher 2013).
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1.3 Data Description
My primary source of offender microdata is the National Corrections Reporting Pro-
gram. I rely on the 2000-2015 term records file, supplemented by the 2000-2014
records file for the following states with incomplete data in the 2015 file: AK, IL,
ND, OK, PA, RI, SC, WA, WV, WI, and WY. The NCRP contains a broad range of
variables characterizing both the offender and the convicted crime including gender,
race, age, education, veteran status, prior felony status, convicted offense, state and
county of conviction, sentence length, dates of admission and release, and whether
an inmate was released on probation or parole. Inmates can be linked across prison
spells within a state in these term records files, and therefore a measure of within-
state criminal recidivism can be calculated as whether the individual re-appears in
the dataset within a given time frame.
Table 1.1 shows summary characteristics of offenders in this dataset at a per-
observation and per-offender basis. The left panel contains all offenders, and the right
panel includes only inmates with a prison opening or closure in their state during the
sample period. Within each panel, the left column includes all releases and the right
column includes only one release per inmate. The right-most column reflects the set
of inmates identifying my main results. Within this sample, 16.6% of inmates will
recidivate within one year. Inmates are overwhelmingly male, non-white, and only
about half have a high school level education. Approximately 70% of inmates are
released on either probation or parole. Table 1.2 shows average rates of recidivism
by inmate type. Female, black, less educated, and older inmates have slightly lower
rates of recidivism.
The NCRP does not directly contain information on either individual’s home
county or on the actual facility or facilities in which an offender served his or her
sentence. Consistent with other work using this data source (Schnepel 2018, Yang
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Table 1.1: National Corrections Reporting Program Summary Statis-
tics
All State-Gender Cells State-Gender Cells with Events
All First Commit All First Commit
Observations Per Inmate Observations Per Inmate
1-Year Recidivism 0.268 0.169 0.273 0.166
3-Year Recidivism 0.452 0.331 0.460 0.331
Female 0.115 0.130 0.096 0.115
White Non-Hispanic 0.368 0.368 0.344 0.344
Black 0.395 0.373 0.416 0.388
Hispanic 0.188 0.211 0.197 0.221
HS Degree 0.489 0.474 0.485 0.471
Age at Release 34.702 33.393 34.743 33.244
Sentence in Months 53.259 51.438 53.830 51.728
Time Served in Months 16.221 20.382 16.291 20.463
Conditional Release 0.678 0.649 0.683 0.636
Violent Offense 0.311 0.327 0.318 0.334
Property Offense 0.372 0.328 0.380 0.333
Drug Offense 0.420 0.413 0.421 0.411
Technical Offense 0.112 0.106 0.108 0.107
Total Observations 8,018,196 3,608,556 6,796,170 3,055,385
Observations with Education Info 4,828,979 2,329,412 4,039,151 1,992,631
Notes: Summary statistics from the National Corrections Reporting Program. The mean value of
the listed characteristic is shown. The sample is limited to releases between 2000 and 2014
associated with releases after 1995. The left panel contains all offenders, and the right panel
includes only inmates with a prison opening or closure in their state during the sample period.
Within each panel, the left column includes all releases and the right column includes only one
release per inmate. For each inmate, the first observation associated with a new conviction, rather
than a revocation of conditional release, is chosen.
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Table 1.2: 1-Year Recidivism by Inmate Category,
National Corrections Reporting Program
All State-Gender Cells State-Gender Cells with Events
All First Obs All First Obs
Observations Per Inmate Observations Per Inmate
Male 0.275 0.175 0.279 0.171
Female 0.210 0.132 0.212 0.127
White Non-Hispanic 0.269 0.169 0.279 0.167
Black 0.263 0.173 0.265 0.169
Hispanic 0.279 0.163 0.289 0.166
No HS Degree 0.201 0.146 0.192 0.139
HS Degree 0.200 0.137 0.190 0.128
30 or Under 0.278 0.199 0.280 0.196
Over 30 0.261 0.143 0.269 0.139
Served at Least 1 Year 0.195 0.152 0.193 0.148
Served at Least 3 Years 0.153 0.124 0.147 0.116
Conditional Release 0.318 0.203 0.329 0.204
Violent Offense 0.267 0.165 0.270 0.162
Property Offense 0.316 0.208 0.324 0.205
Drug Offense 0.254 0.149 0.263 0.147
Technical Offense 0.259 0.166 0.248 0.156
Notes: Summary statistics from the National Corrections Reporting Program. The rate of 1-year
recidivism for the specified group is reported. Recidivism as measured as a re-incarceration within
the same state for any reason within one year. The sample is limited to releases between 2000 and
2014 associated with releases after 1995. The left panel contains all offenders, and the right panel
includes only inmates with a prison opening or closure in their state during the sample period.
Within each panel, the left column includes all releases and the right column includes only one
release per inmate. For each inmate, the first observation associated with a new conviction, rather
than a revocation of conditional release, is chosen.
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2017b, Agan and Makowsky 2018), I will use the county of conviction as a proxy
for the offender’s home county. The overwhelming majority of released offenders do
return to their county of sentencing, and those released on parole are often required to
do so (Yang, 2017b). Therefore, the county of conviction is highly correlated with the
inmate’s actual home county. To address the absence of exact facility assignments, I
will proxy for inmates’ distance from home using the distribution of available prison
facilities. This empirical strategy is described in detail in the following section.
I supplement the NCRP with data from Oklahoma and Florida containing cross-
sectional samples of all current inmates at a point in time, including current facility
assignments. The Oklahoma data was obtained via public records request by The
Center for Investigative Reporting and subsequently published online (The Reveal,
2017). The Oklahoma data reflects the inmate population as of July 2017. Informa-
tion from Florida was obtained via the Offender Based Information System (OBIS),
publicly available at the Department of Corrections website (Florida Department of
Corrections, 2019). The Florida data reflects the most recent facility assignment of
inmates as April 2019. The data from Oklahoma are only complete for current of-
fenders, and the data from Florida contain information about only the most recent
facility assignment across all of an individual’s spells of incarceration. Therefore, the
relationship between distance to the assigned facility and later recidivism cannot be
measured directly in either of the datasets.
Table 1.3 shows summary statistics for the cross-sectional samples in these datasets,
compared to the data in the NCRP. Offenders are generally demographically similar
across data sources in terms of age, gender, and race among non-Hispanics. Notably,
any sample of current inmates will mechanically over-represent inmates with longer
sentences then the sample of releases I will use to estimate recidivism. Violent crimes
are thus over-represented, and drug offenses are under-represented; however, this is
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similarly true across cross sectional samples from all data sources. The measures of
sentence length and Hispanic have different distributions across the datasets which
may indicate that these variables are differently measured across data sources.
Table 1.3: National Corrections Reporting Program and State Data
Summary Statistics
National Offenders Florida Offenders Oklahoma Offenders
Releases Current Pop Releases Current Pop Current Pop Releases Current Pop Current Pop
NCRP NCRP NCRP NCRP FL OBIS NCRP NCRP OK State
Female 0.115 0.075 0.111 0.072 0.068 0.153 0.112 0.100
White Non-Hispanic 0.369 0.364 0.424 0.395 0.470 0.573 0.546 0.526
Black 0.397 0.396 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.266 0.261 0.268
Hispanic 0.182 0.186 0.098 0.123 0.047 0.061 0.074 0.086
Age at Admission (Years) 33.318 33.396 32.955 33.889 33.769 32.959 33.992 34.346
Sentence Length (Months) 52.518 161.589 37.537 230.476 308.065 78.976 156.560 356.304
Finciancially-Motivated 0.353 0.285 0.386 0.334 0.308 0.364 0.337 0.342
Violent Offense 0.268 0.558 0.265 0.503 0.592 0.219 0.445 0.488
Property Offense 0.302 0.193 0.338 0.285 0.215 0.282 0.212 0.180
Drug Offense 0.349 0.181 0.268 0.146 0.149 0.454 0.303 0.287
Technical Offense 0.067 0.055 0.102 0.059 0.044 0.037 0.031 0.045
Observations 8,508,884 1,134,967 489,048 94,039 94,323 105,871 26,799 22,721
Notes: The mean values of the specified variables are shown. The columns labeled NCRP are
measured from the sample of inmate records in the National Corrections Reporting Service, which
reflects admissions, releases, and the prison population through December 2015. The column
labeled FL OBIS is sourced from the OBIS database publicly available from the Florida
Department of Corrections and reflects the inmate population in April 2019. The column labeled
OK Data is sourced from data obtained by the Center for Investigative Reporting via public
records requests and reflects in the inmate population in July 2017. Columns labeled “Releases”
reflect a sample of all releases from 2000-2014. Columns labeled “Current Pop” reflect the stock of
inmates in prison at the end of the data’s coverage period.
My empirical strategy makes use of the geographic distribution of institutions
holding state inmates from 2000-2015, along with the timing of state facility open-
ings and closures. My primary sources for the set of state prisons are the 2000 and
2005 Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities (United States De-
partment of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2005c,
United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice
Statistics. 2017). This prison census contains a large number of prison characteris-
tics including the opening year; capacity and population size; and the sex, security
level, and jurisdiction of inmates. I compare the 2000 set of institutions to the 2005
institutions and the set of 2005 institutions to current lists from state government
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websites to establish the set of institutions opened or closed 2000 through the present.
The timing of opening or closure is obtained from these government sources or from
public news coverage of the prison event. For prisons opened since 2005, I obtain the
capacity and the sex of the inmate population from similar sources.
In some specifications, I rely on additional county-level control variables. Gen-
eral demographic and geographic information for counties is obtained from the 2000
Decennial Census. Annual county-level unemployment rates are from the Bureau of
Labor Statistic’s Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Quarterly county-level mea-
sures of employment levels and earnings by education and sex are obtained from the
Quarterly Workforce Indicators compiled by the US Census Bureau.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
To measure the marginal effect of inmate’s actual experience from home on later
criminal behavior, I would like to estimate the equation
Recidivismi =βDistActDisti +Xiγ + ui (1.1)
within a sample of inmates for whom actual distance from home is exogenous con-
ditional on observable characteristics (cov(ActDisti, ui) = 0). In practice, I do not
observe the actual distance an inmate is incarcerated from home and his recidiviating
behavior in the same dataset. Instead, I instrument for an inmate’s distance from
home with either the average log distance to available facilities from their county of
conviction or the log distance to the closest prison facility to their county of convic-
tion. These distance proxies vary across counties at a point in time. These measures
also change within a county over time when a state prison opens or closes; further,
counties within the same state are differentially affected by the prison event depend-
ing on whether the closing or opening prison is closer or farther away to that county
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than other state facilities. Using these proxies for distance as my source of variation,
I consider the two equation model
Recidivismi =βDistActDisti +Xiγ + ui (1.2)
ActDisti =ΠDistProxyDisti +Xiγ + ui. (1.3)
I also show the result of the reduced-form version of this model, estimating
Recidivismi =βRedFormProxyDisti +Xiγ + εi. (1.4)
In my most preferred specifications, I include state-time fixed effects, county fixed
effects, and individual demographic and crime-type controls, thus exploiting differ-
ential changes in the average distance to facilities between two counties in the same
state.
1.4.1 Instrumenting for Distance
My preferred choice of instrument is the average of the log distance to available
facilities at the time of the inmate’s admission, weighted by the share of inmates in
each facility. Thus, for an inmate from county c in state s(c), of gender g, admitted










The average distance to facilities in the state is likely to be a strong predictor of the
actual distance from home an inmate experiences if inmate facility assignments do
not generally take into account siting inmates close to their home counties. Prior
studies of individual states, such as Florida in Cochran et al. (2018), suggest this is
likely to be the case. However, I also consider using the log of the distance to the
15
closest available facility at the time of admission, which will be a strong predictor if
inmates are likely to be assigned to the facility closest to their home. My choice to
use the log of distance reflects an assumption that distance from home likely has a
diminishing effect on outcomes such as visitation and behavior.
I measure distance to each state facility as the linear distance between the internal
point of the offender’s county of conviction and the location of the facility. For
approximately 40% of facilities, I am able to identify the exact location of the address
as provided in the Census of Adult Correctional Facilities. For an additional 55% of
facilities, I use the location of the prison’s hosting town or city. For the remaining
5% of facilities, the location could only be identified to the county level, and so
the distance to the internal point of the hosting county was used. An alternative
approach to using linear distance, which would more directly capture the time and
transportation cost of visitation from the inmate’s home county, would be to use the
driving time or driving distance between the home county and the prison. However,
the high degree of correlation between these measures nationally suggests that this
distinction is unlikely to affect my main conclusion (Boscoe et al., 2012).
These distance proxies vary across counties and within counties over time, allowing
me to use these instruments in practice. Figure 1·1 shows the geographic variation of
the average and minimum distance to state facilities by county in 2005. For the ease
of interpretation, I do not take the log of distance here. Much of the variation arises
from being a geographically central as opposed to an outlying county. I will include
the average log distance to the rest of the state’s population in all of my regressions
to control for this mechanical center vs outlying county variation. The distance to
the minimum prison for men has the most apparently arbitrary geographic variation
among these distance proxies.
Prison openings and closures, the events which will induce changes within a county
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Figure 1·1: Cross-Sectional Variation in Distance to State Prison
Facilities in 2005
Notes: Each county is colored with the average distance to state prison facilities or the distance to
the closest facility. Average distance is weighted by facility capacity.
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over time in the average or minimum distance, are distributed geographically. 38 state
prisons opened and 98 state prisons closed over the course of 2001-2013, the window
of time for which I can construct a before and after comparison of one-year recidivism.
These openings and closures induce 89 state-year events for men and 24 events for
women. Figure 1·2 shows the directional changes in average distance induced by
these prison events. For states with multiple events of a particular type, I show the
changes induced by the event associated with the largest prison. From these graphs
we can see that these events are not isolated to a particular region of the US, and that
every event induces change in the distance proxy variable in both directions within
the state.
Figure 1·2: Changes in Average Distance Induced by Prison Events
Notes: Each county is colored with the directional change in average distance to state prison
facilities induced by a prison event of the specified type. Average distance is weighted by facility
capacity. Grey states have no events of the specified type. In states with more than one event of
the specified type, the change induced by the event associated with the largest prison is shown.
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Regressing the actual distance on my constructed county-gender level instrument
among the population of inmates from Florida and Oklahoma at a single point in
time confirms that my constructed proxy variables are strong predictors of inmates’
actual distance from home. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report these results. Each column
represents a regression of the actual log distance between an inmate and his or her
county of conviction on the distance proxy variables as noted in the rows, assigned at
the county-sex-admit year level. The county level controls are the log distance to the
state’s most populous county; the log average distance to the state’s population; log
county population; the county unemployment rate; and the employment to population
ratio and average log earnings among the full population of workers and the non-high
school educated. The individual controls are age and age-squared at admission; race-
ethnicity category dummy variables; violent, property, or drug offense indicators; a
prior felony indicator; and the log of the sentence length.
The results from both states in Table 1.4 and 1.5 generally support average dis-
tance as a strong, nearly one-for-one predictor of the actual distance from home
inmates experience. Encouragingly, all but one of the point estimates are positive,
and the instruments have a high degree of explanatory power, as evidenced by the
F-statistic. Including both the average and the minimum in the same regression gen-
erally suggests that the average log distance is a better proxy for the actual distance,
though the minimum distance still has some incremental predictive power. For men,
controlling for county characteristics does appear relevant to understanding facility
assignment, as both the point estimates and the R-squared of the overall regression
are affected by their inclusion. Individual controls don’t affect the point estimates
much, suggesting little selection into the distance of the facility assigned based on
observable characteristics. For women, the R-squared is quite high and the point
estimates are consistent across the levels of controls, suggesting that the distribution
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Table 1.4: Florida First-Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Men Only
Average Log Distance 0.712∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0228) (0.0232) (0.0227) (0.0231)
Minimum Log Distance 0.0790∗∗∗ 0.0806∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗∗ 0.0958∗∗∗ 0.0670∗∗∗
(0.00369) (0.00364) (0.00414) (0.00418) (0.00414) (0.00418)
Observations 82070 82070 82070 82070 82070 82070 82070 82070 82070
F-Statistic 2512.3 458.0 1509.5 1572.4 493.3 901.8 1634.7 537.0 948.4
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0297 0.00554 0.0355 0.0391 0.0265 0.0417 0.0491 0.0364 0.0520
Women Only
Average Log Distance 0.946∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0200) (0.0244) (0.0371) (0.0244) (0.0371)
Minimum Log Distance 0.282∗∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.00891 0.288∗∗∗ 0.00956
(0.00904) (0.00954) (0.00953) (0.0137) (0.00957) (0.0138)
Observations 6271 6271 6271 6111 6111 6111 6111 6111 6111
F-Statistic 3279.0 977.3 1652.7 1746.4 912.4 873.3 1736.2 905.8 868.3
Adjusted R-Squared 0.343 0.135 0.345 0.357 0.280 0.357 0.358 0.282 0.358
County Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column in this table represents the result of a linear regression of the log distance
between an inmate’s county of conviction on average log distance to state prison facilities, along
with individual controls and county controls as indicated in the bottom panel. Average log distance
to facilities is weighted by facility capacity. Regressions are estimated among the sample of
inmates in Florida prisons as of April 2019, using data from the OBIS database publicly available
from the Florida Department of Corrections. The county characteristics are log distance to the
largest county in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to other counties in the
state; the log county population; the quarterly employment to population ratio and log earnings
for the relevant gender across all education levels and for the non-high school educated; and county
unemployment. The following individual controls are included in all regressions: race; Hispanic;
age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction; violent, property, or drug offense type;
and the log of the sentence length. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses,
with stars indicating statistical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Oklahoma First-Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Men Only
Average Log Distance 1.144∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0290) (0.0389) (0.0408) (0.0390) (0.0408)
Minimum Log Distance 0.0855∗∗∗ 0.00237 0.0392∗∗∗ -0.0143∗ 0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗
(0.00330) (0.00382) (0.00746) (0.00772) (0.00748) (0.00773)
Observations 18539 18539 18539 18539 18539 18539 18523 18523 18523
F-Statistic 2252.5 672.4 1126.4 548.7 27.64 276.1 536.6 22.61 270.8
Adjusted R-Squared 0.108 0.0350 0.108 0.114 0.0893 0.114 0.117 0.0927 0.117
Women Only
Average Log Distance 0.972∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.0236) (0.104) (0.0370) (0.150) (0.0371) (0.151)
Minimum Log Distance 0.640∗∗∗ 0.0874 0.562∗∗∗ 0.172∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.160∗
(0.0161) (0.0700) (0.0222) (0.0897) (0.0222) (0.0899)
Observations 2356 2356 2356 2356 2356 2356 2356 2356 2356
F-Statistic 1691.7 1584.3 846.8 664.4 643.4 334.4 667.9 644.4 335.8
Adjusted R-Squared 0.418 0.402 0.418 0.423 0.419 0.424 0.427 0.423 0.428
County Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column in this table represents the result of a linear regression of the log distance
between an inmate’s county of conviction on average log distance to state prison facilities, along
with individual controls and county controls as indicated in the bottom panel. Average log distance
to facilities is weighted by facility capacity. Regressions are estimated among the sample of
inmates in Oklahoma prisons as of July 2017, using data obtained by the Center for Investigative
Reporting via public records requests. The county characteristics are log distance to the largest
county in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to other counties in the state; the
log county population; the quarterly employment to population ratio and log earnings for the
relevant gender across all education levels and for the non-high school educated; and county
unemployment. The following individual controls are included in all regressions: race; Hispanic;
age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction; violent, property, or drug offense type;
and the log of the sentence length. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses,
with stars indicating statistical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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of prisons is the best predictor of the realized distance.
1.4.2 Identification
First, I discuss the necessary assumptions to interpret my results as the causal effect
of the average distance between prisons and an inmate’s home, focusing on the esti-
mation of βRedForm. Mathematically, I must assume that Cov(ProxyDisti, εi). When
county fixed effects are not included, most variation in my distance proxies occurs
across counties within a state, and so I must assume that the level of unobserved fac-
tors affecting recidivism is uncorrelated with average distance. When I include both
state-admission quarter and county fixed effects in the set of control variables, the
identification assumption is a conventional parallel-trends assumption on the mini-
mum or average distance to prisons. Under this assumption, counties within a state
close to or far from the affected prison would have had similar trends in recidivism
except for the induced change in the average distance to facilities.
Potentially confounding factors generally take two forms. The first is cross-county
heterogeneity. Counties closer to prisons historically or closer to the facilities which
open or close over my sample period may have different unobservable characteristics
affecting recidivism. For example, a more politically connected county may be able
to successfully petition to have prisons sited nearby to stimulate job creation and
may also receive social programs which affect the rate of recidivism. Again, in the
fixed-effects model, violations would require such unobservable characteristics to be
changing over time in a way systematically correlated with the changes in distance
induced by prison openings and closures.
In Figures 1·3 and 1·4 I show that the changes in distance induced by prison
opening and closure are uncorrelated with the levels of county population and county
unemployment, which suggests that the induced changes in distance are approxi-
mately random according to baseline observable characteristics. Each dot represents
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a county in a treated state, with the X-axis representing the county population or
unemployment and the Y-axis representing the change in the average distance to fa-
cilities from that county before and after the event. Figure 1·3 confirms that openings
and closure do not occur in such a way to reduce the average distance from cities and
lengthen it from smaller counties; Figures 1·4 shows that the same is true for counties
with differing rates of unemployment. These figures suggest that my results are not
biased by county heterogeneity to the extent that counties differ in underlying trends
in recidivism in ways correlated with these observable characteristics.
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Female Prison Closings
Notes: Each dot represents a county-quarter observation of a county in a state with a prison event
of the type indicated by the chart heading in that quarter. The x-axis denotes the county
population, while the y-axis denotes the change in average distance to state prison facilities from
that county as induced by the prison event. Average distance is weighted by facility capacity.
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Unemployment Rate in Percentage Points
Female Prison Closings
Notes: Each dot represents a county-quarter observation of a county in a state with a prison event
of the type indicated by the chart heading in that quarter. The x-axis denotes the unemployment
rate of the county in that year, while the y-axis denotes the change in average distance to state
prison facilities from that county as induced by the prison event. Average distance is weighted by
facility capacity.
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The second potentially confounding factor is the change in average prison quality
induced by prison openings or closures. In particular, consider if the true model is
Recidivismi =βDistActDisti + βQualPrisonQualityi +Xiγ + ui (1.5)
where βQual > 0. Then my reduced form estimate of equation 1.4 will be biased if
cov(ProxyDistc, P risonQualityi|Xi) 6= 0.
In the model where Xi includes both state-time and county fixed effects, such a cor-
relation requires both that the opening or closed prisons are systematically different
in quality from prisons more generally and that the average prison quality that in-
mates experience is different across counties in a state. Because I do not observe
prison facility assignment and recidivism in the same dataset, I cannot directly con-
firm whether or not closing or opening facilities are themselves associated with higher
or lower rates of recidivism. However we may consider facility age as a characteristic
which can summarize quality, assuming that older facilities are of lower quality and
thus are associated with higher rates of recidivism. In particular, opening facilities
are necessarily newer, and in Chapter 2 of this dissertation I find that older prison
facilities are more likely to close. Thus, the prison events I study are likely to induce
a change in the average quality of institutions across a state.
However, because I include state-time fixed effects in Xi,
cov(ProxyDistc, P risonQualityi|Xi) 6= 0
would require that inmates within the same state are differentially likely to go to
a high or low quality prison according to their county of conviction. In the case
that inmates are equally likely to be assigned to facilities across their state, the
expected change in PrisonQualityi is the same for all inmates across a state, and
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so the inclusion of state-time fixed effects will account for any potential bias from
this source. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show that this is a plausible assumption. If instead
inmates are not approximately randomly assigned but rather are more likely to be
in facilities close to their home counties, the average experienced prison quality may
change differentially across counties in a way correlated with average distance. The
bias induced by this type of quality change is likely to upward bias my results if only
prison closings are studied, and downward bias my results if only prison openings
are studied. Closures will increase ProxyDistc for counties close to the event, and
openings will decrease it. However both events will tend to increase PrisonQualityi
for inmates in nearby counties, and thus the covariance between the two terms and
the total bias will have opposite signs in the two cases. Because I include both types of
events in my analysis, and in fact observe slightly more closures, the net effect of any
bias arising from this source is likely weakly upward. Both because inmates appear
to be approximately randomly assigned to facilities across their state and because the
bias from these two event types are signed in opposition, I consider it to be unlikely
that this source of bias explains my results.
In addition to these assumptions that distance changes are uncorrelated with
confounding factors, I require an exclusion restriction to interpret my results as the
effect of actual, experienced distance and not an effect on all inmates of the average
or minimum distance itself. Formally, I assume that in the model
Recidivismi =βDistActDisti + βProxyProxyDisti +Xiγ + ui (1.6)
βProxy = 0 and there is no direct effect of my distance instruments. The main threat
to this exclusion restriction is the role of general deterrence. I discuss this issue more
in Section 1.7.
Finally, if I allow for the possibility that the effect of distance may be heteroge-
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neous, then I require some additional assumptions to interpret my estimated coef-
ficient as an average treatment effect. For my average distance instrument, a con-
ventional monotonicity assumption is not satisfied, even when county fixed effects
are included.1 I therefore instead make the assumption that compliance with the
instrument is uncorrelated with individual treatment effects. This assumption allows
for the level of recidivism propensity to be endogenous to facility assignment, but
the treatment effect of distance itself must be unrelated to the assignment rule. The
random assignment of inmates to facilities will satisfy this assumption; a violation
would include the possibility that a group of inmates with a known large effect of dis-
tance on behavior are placed such that being held close to home is prioritized, while
all others are randomly sited. Finally, I note that the minimum distance instrument
mechanically satisfies the conventional monotonicity assumption when county fixed
effects are included; therefore, the estimates using minimum distance will be a valid
LATE even if compliance with the instrument is correlated with the treatment effect.
1.5 Reduced-Form Results
I estimate the following regression equation to obtain a reduced-form estimate of the
effect of distance:
Recidivismicgar =βProxyDistcga + δs(c)ga + γ1Xi + γ2Zcr + εi
where Recidivismicgar is an indicator equal to 1 if offender i from county c, of gender
g, admitted in quarter a and released in quarter r is re-incarcerated in the same state
within 1 or 3 years. ProxyDistcga is a distance measure for inmates of gender g from
1To understand why, consider a county whose inmates can be sent to one of three prisons before a
prison closure. Suppose the prison at the middle distance closes, inducing an increase in the average
distance to facilities. This event will cause an increase in the share of inmates sent very far, but
also an increase in the share who are sent very close. That is, some inmates actually experience a
shorter distance after the event which increased the instrument.
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county c admitted in quarter a. δs(c)ga is a time fixed effect at state-gender-admission
quarter level. Xi is a vector of individual controls for race; Hispanic; education
category; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction; violent, property,
or drug offense type; release type dummies; and the log of the sentence length. Zcr are
county characteristics at the time of release, consisting of log distance to the largest
county in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to other counties in
the state; the log county population; the quarterly employment to population ratio
and log earnings for the relevant gender across all education levels and for the non-
high school educated; and county unemployment. I also estimate models where I
replace the county characteristics Zcr with county fixed effects αcg:
Recidivismicga =βProxyDistcgy(a) + αcg + δs(c)ga + γXi + εi.
In all cases, I cluster standard errors at the county level.
I show here my results using 1-year recidivism as my primary outcome, which
allows me to include the largest sample of individuals, given that I require data
coverage for a significant period of time after inmate release. In particular for the
regressions with county fixed effects, including the longest possible time range in my
analysis allows me to exploit the maximum number of identifying prison openings or
closures. The use of 1-year recidivism as an outcome is reasonable considering the
hazard of returning to incarceration is highest within the first twelve months after
release Yang (2017b). However, most of my results are robust, if more imprecisely
estimated, when relying on 3-year recidivism as an outcome. In all cases, recidivism
is measured as whether an individual is re-admitted to prison for any reason within
1 or 3 years after release, as established by the exact dates of release and admission.
Again, I caveat that I can only observe re-incarceration within the same state, and
not incarceration in the federal system or other states.
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I estimate the reduced form model among a sample of releases from state-level
incarceration between 2000 and 2014 from the NCRP. I restrict my sample of analysis
to at most one prison spell-release observation per offender. I impose this restriction
to avoid over-representation of repeat offenders. For each offender, I choose the first
prison spell in the data associated with a new conviction as opposed to a return to
custody due to a parole or probation violation. I focus on new convictions to ensure
that the variables associated with the offense type and sentence are associated with
the correct prison spell. These restrictions do not limit my analysis to first-time
offenders only, because offenders may have been incarcerated for a felony before the
beginning of my sample period.
My reduced form results, as seen in Table 1.6, suggest that increased distance be-
tween inmates’ homes and the facilities where they are incarcerated generally reduces
the rate of recidivism for men but may not have an effect for women. Each column in
the table represents a regression of 1-year recidivism on average log distance including
progressively more controls. For men, the point estimates are consistently negative,
though the statistical significance varies by the exact specification. Taking the speci-
fication including county fixed effects and individual-level controls, men’s recidivism
decreases by 3.3 percentage points when the average distance to prisons doubles, and
this result is at the border of being significant at the 5% level. For women, across
most specifications, the estimated effect of distance is a reasonably precise zero. As
seen in the bottom panel of the table, when pooling the genders together and includ-
ing a gender interaction with treatment, we can reject that the effect is identical for
men and women only for the full specification with county fixed effects. Replacing
the average log distance with the minimum distance or using 3-year recidivism as the
outcome lead to qualitatively similar conclusions.
Finally, I draw on the findings of Oster (2019) to understand the degree to which
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Table 1.6: Prison Distance Effect on 1-Year Recidivism, Reduced
Form Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men Only
Average Log Distance 0.0185 -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗ -0.00633 -0.0165 -0.0327∗
(0.0115) (0.00374) (0.00550) (0.00498) (0.0189) (0.0176)
Oster Bias-Adjusted Coefficient -0.0563 0.1311 -0.3619 -0.3212
Observations 2716250 2716250 2716033 2698908 2716179 2698978
R-Squared 0.000809 0.0558 0.0580 0.102 0.0642 0.115
Adjusted R-Squared 0.000809 0.0548 0.0570 0.101 0.0624 0.113
Women Only
Average Log Distance 0.00477 -0.00647∗∗ -0.00155 -0.00178 0.00937 0.00735
(0.00542) (0.00273) (0.00380) (0.00372) (0.00635) (0.00642)
Oster Bias-Adjusted Coefficient 1.9246 0.1433 1.1326 0.2592
Observations 409864 409864 409822 407742 409626 407522
R-Squared 0.000135 0.0580 0.0604 0.0875 0.0711 0.107
Adjusted R-Squared 0.000133 0.0524 0.0548 0.0820 0.0605 0.0933
Full Sample
Average Log Distance 0.0185 -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗ -0.00583 -0.0165 -0.0322∗
(0.0115) (0.00374) (0.00560) (0.00505) (0.0189) (0.0176)
Average Log Distance * Female -0.0138∗ 0.00689∗∗ 0.00403 -0.000335 0.0258 0.0372∗∗
(0.00825) (0.00318) (0.00363) (0.00329) (0.0200) (0.0188)
Observations 3126114 3126114 3125855 3106650 3125805 3106500
R-Squared 0.00231 0.0575 0.0597 0.101 0.0664 0.115
Adjusted R-Squared 0.00231 0.0559 0.0581 0.0993 0.0635 0.111
State-Gender-Time FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls No No Yes Yes No No
Individual Controls No No No Yes No Yes
County-Gender FE No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Each number in this table represents the coefficient on the average log distance to state
prison facilities from a linear regression of an indicator for re-incarceration within the same state
within one year on this measure along with additional controls as indicated in the bottom panel.
Average log distance to facilities is weighted by facility capacity. Regressions are estimated among
the sample of prison releases from state-level incarceration 2000-2014 from the National
Corrections Reporting Program, restricted for each offender to the first observed prison spell
associated with a new conviction. The county controls are log distance to the largest county in the
state; the population-weighted average log distance to other counties in the state; the log county
population; the quarterly employment to population ratio and log earnings for the relevant gender
across all education levels and for the non-high school educated; and county unemployment. The
individual controls are race; Hispanic; education category; age and age squared at admission; prior
felony conviction; violent, property, or drug offense type; release type dummies; and the log of the
sentence length. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses, with stars
indicating statistical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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my control variables may be informative about the degree of selection into the dis-
tance treatment. From only including state fixed effects to including the full set of
county and individual controls, the R2 approximately doubles, suggesting that the
control variables I include are meaningful predictors of the recidivism outcome. I note
that for men, nearly all of the specifications with controls produce a point estimate
more negative than the baseline specification, while those for women produce point
estimates are always higher. This patterns suggests that if anything, for men the bias
generated by selection into treatment is likely to be positive, or towards zero.
In the row “Bias-Adjusted Coefficient” I report the result of adjusting the coeffi-
cient in that column according to the formula:
β∗ = β̃ − δ
[
β̊ − β̃
] RMAX − R̃
R̃− R̊
where β̊ and R̊ are the coefficient and R-squared from the “short” regression in
column 2, β̃ and R̃ are those from the regression with controls, and β∗ is the bias-
adjusted coefficient. I assume δ = 1 (selection on unobservables is equal to selection
on observables) and Rmax = 1 (we could fully predict recidivism with a full set of
controls). I consider the state-time FE to be the baseline specification. The results
of this calculation for women are not particularly informative, given that the sign
and significance of the coefficient is highly sensitive to the choice of controls. For
men, with the exception of the specification with individual and county controls but
no county fixed effects, if we believe that selection into the distance instrument is on
unobservables is correlated with selection on observables, then the adjusted coefficient
is actually larger in magnitude. Thus, the negative estimated effect is unlikely to be
solely explained by selection at the county level.
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1.6 Two-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimation
I now employ a a formal two-sample instrumental variables strategy to recover esti-
mates of the parameter βDist from Equation 1.1. Additionally, a two-sample strategy
provides a framework for adjusting the standard errors to incorporate the fact that
the distance proxy measures are a noisy estimate of our true treatment of interest.
Finally, I can exploit the fact that I have two potentially valid instruments for actual
distance, in the form of the average and the minimum, and construct an over-identified
GMM estimator for the effect of distance which will allow me to test the validity of
my instruments.
1.6.1 TS2SLS Estimation
I begin a simple two-sample two-stage least squares model restricted to only the set
of control variables I am able to include in both datasets:
Recidivism1,ica =βDist ̂(ActLogDist1,cgy(a)) + γ1X1,i + γ2Z1,c + ε1,i







The county-level controls are the same as in the reduced-form models. I restrict
the set of individual controls to be age and age-squared at admission; race-ethnicity
category dummy variables; violent, property, or drug offense indicators; a prior felony
indicator; and the log of the sentence length.
Conventional TSIV and TS2SLS asymptotics are derived under the assumption
that the set of control variables in both samples are identical. However, in this case we
have two important controls variables for the second stage which cannot be included
in the first stage: county fixed effects and admission year fixed effects. County fixed
effects cannot be included because they are co-identified with the instrument in the
first stage, and we only have a subset of national counties represented in the first
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stage. The limited overlap in admission time between the two samples similarly makes
meaningful identification of admission time fixed effects in the first stage difficult. If
we allow these variables to matter in the second stage but continue to omit them in
the first stage, the model becomes:
Recidivism1,icy =βDist ̂ActLogDist1,cgy + γ1X1,i + γ2Z1,c
+ α1,cg + δ1,s(c)ga + ε1,i







To meaningfully estimate this model, I make the assumption that conditional on
the the control variables, these fixed effects are uncorrelated with the distance proxy
in the first-stage regression. Mathematically, in the infeasible first-stage equation:










I assume that ∀g,∀c,∀y, cov(DistInst2,cy, α̃∗2,cg) = 0 and cov(DistInst2,cy, δ̃∗2,sgy) = 0.
See Appendix A.1 for proof of why this assumption is sufficient but not necessary to
continue to apply TS2SLS procedures with missing first-stage controls.
Intuitively, this assumption requires that inmates’ distances from home should
not vary systematically across county or across time, except to the extent that the
distribution of facilities varies. This assumption seems relatively plausible given that
assignment to specific facilities is usually made at a state bureaucratic level rather
than by, for example, the sentencing judge. An example violation of this assumption
would be if inmates from particular counties which happen to be close to prisons on
average are given special treatment and located close to home, while all other inmates
are randomly allocated.
One additional limitation of this analysis is that the cross-sections of facility as-
33
signments do not cover the same geographic or time range as the recidivism panel.
Both Oklahoma and Florida are geographically large and have a sizeable prison pop-
ulation, making it meaningful to analyze the issue of distance in these states on their
own. However, we must be mindful that both the assignment rule and the treatment
effect of distance found in these states may not be indicative of the national average.
For all analyses in this section, I present results for Florida and Oklahoma alone,
along with results using both of these states in the first stage and the national data
in the second stage.
Table 1.7 shows results of the simple TS2SLS procedure described above, with
average log distance instrumenting for actual log distance from home while incarcer-
ated. In the top panel, the same set of controls are imposed in both stages, and in
the bottom panel I include the full set of fixed effects and individual controls from
Section 1.5 in the second stage. For each panel, the first column represents the re-
duced form similar to the analysis in Section 1.5, the second column represents the
relevant first stage analogous to Tables 1.4 and 1.5, and the third column contains
the TS2SLS results. In the third column, standard errors are adjusted according to
Pacini and Windmeijer (2016). The reduced form and second stage regressions are
estimated within the same NCRP sample as in Section 1.5 and the first stage is es-
timated within the Florida and Oklahoma supplemental data sources among the set
of inmates in prison at the time the data was collected.
The Florida and national results generally confirm the findings of Section 1.5
and further suggest that the reduced form coefficients with log average distance as
the instrument are a reasonable substitute for the structural coefficient. These results
suggest that doubling a male inmate’s distance from home will increase his propensity
to be re-incarcerated by approximately 3 percentage points. An interesting point
raised by these results is the heterogeneity between the found effect in Florida and
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Table 1.7: Prison Distance Effect on 1-Year Recidivism, TS2SLS Es-
timation with Single Instrument
Florida Oklahoma All States
Reduced First Second Reduced First Second Reduced First Second
Form Stage Stage Form Stage Stage Form Stage Stage
Same Controls Both Stages
Average Log Distance -0.0341∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ -0.00761 1.057∗∗∗ -0.00327 0.997∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.120) (0.00743) (0.0633) (0.0153) (0.0680)
Predicted Log Distance -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.00720 -0.00328
(0.0140) (0.00704) (0.0153)
Observations 225505 82070 225505 53731 18539 53731 2725691 100609 2725691
County and State-Year FE in Second Stage
Average Log Distance -0.0144 0.887∗∗∗ -0.0692 1.057∗∗∗ -0.0310∗ 0.997∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.120) (0.0648) (0.0633) (0.0177) (0.0680)
Predicted Log Distance -0.0163 -0.0655 -0.0311∗
(0.0286) (0.0614) (0.0179)
Observations 225400 82070 225400 53731 18539 53731 2708376 100609 2708376
Notes: Each vertical panel in this table represents a TS2SLS estimation where the missing
treatment variable is distance between an inmate’s county of conviction and their incarcerated
facility, the instrument is the average log distance to state facilities, and the outcome variable is
re-incarceration within 1-year. County and individual controls are included in all regressions.
Average log distance to facilities is weighted by facility capacity. The first stage is estimated using
data covering inmates from Florida and Oklahoma. The sample of Florida inmates is sourced from
the OBIS database publicly available from the Florida Department of Corrections and reflects
inmates as of April 2019. The sample of Oklahoma inmates is sourced from data obtained by the
Center for Investigative Reporting via public records requests and reflects inmates as of July 2017.
The reduced form and second stage are estimated among the sample of prison releases from
state-level incarceration 2000-2014 from the National Corrections Reporting Program, restricted
for each offender to the first observed prison spell associated with a new conviction. In the top
panel and the first stage of the second panel, the county controls are log distance to the largest
county in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to other counties in the state; the
log county population; and county unemployment, and the individual controls are in all
regressions: race; Hispanic; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction; violent,
property, or drug offense type; and the log of the sentence length. In the reduced form and second
stage of the second panel, the county controls are county fixed effects, and the individual controls
are in all regressions: race; Hispanic; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction;
violent, property, or drug offense type; release type dummies; and the log of the sentence length.
Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses, with stars indicating statistical
significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in the second stage are
adjusted according to Pacini and Windmeijer (2016).
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Oklahoma. In fact, in Florida we find a negative effect for both genders and in
Oklahoma for neither gender.
Table 1.8 repeats this analysis, but uses both the average log distance and the
minimum log distance as instruments in the first stage. In general, I estimate very
similar results as when I using only average distance. When adding the minimum
distance instrument to the specifications which already include the average distance,
the minimum has relatively weak predictive power in both the reduced form and the
second stage. The fact that I obtain nearly identical point estimates for the effect
of doubling distance from home across the just-identified and over-identified TS2SLS
models in the national sample (a decline of 3.1 vs 2.7 percentage points), suggests that
my instruments are likely to be valid, and that the complier populations affected by
each instrument have similar treatment effects. Therefore, my prior assumption that
compliance with the average distance instrument was uncorrelated with treatment
effect appears plausible.
1.6.2 GMM Estimation and Overidentification
To formally exploit the multiple plausible instruments for realized distance from home
I construct, I follow the suggestion of Pacini and Windmeijer (2016) and estimate the
overidentified model by two-step GMM. In contrast to the just-identified case, the
GMM estimator is not numerically identical to the TS2SLS estimator, though the
two have the same limiting distributions.
I construct the GMM estimator for βDist as follows. To simplify the notation,
let yi be the recidivism of inmate i, ActDisti be the distance treatment, zi be the
vector of distance proxies, and xi be the vector of control variables, including county
controls, and si1 and si2 are indicators for which sample the observation is from. The
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Table 1.8: Prison Distance Effect on 1-Year Recidivism, TS2SLS Es-
timation with Multiple Instruments
Florida Oklahoma All States
Reduced First Second Reduced First Second Reduced First Second
Form Stage Stage Form Stage Stage Form Stage Stage
Same Controls Both Stages
Average Log Distance -0.0421∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ -0.0104 1.052∗∗∗ -0.0173 0.924∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.110) (0.00779) (0.0577) (0.0133) (0.0854)
Minimum Log Distance 0.00285 0.0668∗∗ 0.00127 0.00375 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0439∗
(0.00209) (0.0270) (0.000907) (0.0107) (0.00578) (0.0245)
Predicted Log Distance -0.0228∗∗ -0.00703 0.00664
(0.0112) (0.00699) (0.0157)
Observations 225505 82070 225505 53731 18539 53731 2725691 100609 2725691
County and State-Year FE in Second Stage
Average Log Distance -0.0146 0.805∗∗∗ -0.248∗ 1.052∗∗∗ -0.0298 0.924∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.110) (0.137) (0.0577) (0.0199) (0.0854)
Minimum Log Distance 0.0000545 0.0668∗∗ 0.00360∗∗ 0.00375 -0.000378 0.0439∗
(0.00168) (0.0270) (0.00144) (0.0107) (0.00219) (0.0245)
Predicted Log Distance -0.00632 -0.0295 -0.0268∗
(0.0152) (0.0491) (0.0150)
Observations 225400 82070 225400 53731 18539 53731 2708376 100609 2708376
Notes: Each vertical panel in this table represents a TS2SLS estimation where the missing
treatment variable is distance between an inmate’s county of conviction and their incarcerated
facility, the instrument is the average log distance to state facilities, and the outcome variable is
re-incarceration within 1-year. County and individual controls are included in all regressions.
Average log distance to facilities is weighted by facility capacity. The first stage is estimated using
data covering inmates from Florida and Oklahoma. The sample of Florida inmates is sourced from
the OBIS database publicly available from the Florida Department of Corrections and reflects
inmates as of April 2019. The sample of Oklahoma inmates is sourced from data obtained by the
Center for Investigative Reporting via public records requests and reflects inmates as of July 2017.
The reduced form and second stage are estimated among the sample of prison releases from
state-level incarceration 2000-2014 from the National Corrections Reporting Program, restricted
for each offender to the first observed prison spell associated with a new conviction. In the top
panel and the first stage of the second panel, the county controls are log distance to the largest
county in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to other counties in the state; the
log county population; and county unemployment, and the individual controls are in all
regressions: race; Hispanic; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction; violent,
property, or drug offense type; and the log of the sentence length. In the reduced form and second
stage of the second panel, the county controls are county fixed effects, and the individual controls
are in all regressions: race; Hispanic; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction;
violent, property, or drug offense type; release type dummies; and the log of the sentence length.
Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses, with stars indicating statistical
significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in the second stage are
adjusted according to Pacini and Windmeijer (2016).
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moment conditions are:
E [(yi − (ziΠ + xiγ2)βDist − xiγ1) zi ∗ si1] = 0
E [(yi − (ziΠ + xiγ2)βDist − xiγ1)xi ∗ si1] = 0
E [(ActDisti − ziΠ− xiγ2) zi ∗ si2] = 0
E [(ActDisti − ziΠ− xiγ2)xi ∗ si2] = 0















where σ̂2RedForm and σ̂
2
FirstStage are the estimated variance of the error term from the
reduced form and first stage respectively.
I test for the validity of the instruments by conducting a Hansen test of the
over-identifying restrictions. A large value of the J-statistic indicates a rejection of
the model and may suggest that at least one of my instruments is not valid. Of
course, I may also reject the model if there are heterogenous treatment effects. In
particular, consider the possibility that facility assignment is endogenous along the
dimension of a treatment effect. That is, administrators make an effort to assign
inmates most likely to be negatively affected by distance (for example, mothers) to
closer facilities. In such a situation, the two instruments may in fact estimate different
LATE effects, although this may raise concerns about the monotonicity assumption
regarding average distance.
The result of conducting this GMM estimation for men’s 1-year recidivism in
Florida and Oklahoma is shown in Table 1.9. I continue to find that increased distance
is associated with a decline in recidivism for men when distance is proxied by the log
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average distance to facilities; this result is significant in Florida by not Oklahoma. I
note that in both cases, overidentification test rejects the validity of the instruments.
This rejection is not surprising, given that the log average and log minimum distance
have different signs on their estimated coefficients even in the TS2SLS model. Again,
this could reflect heterogeneoous treatment effects, if inmates likely to be hurt by
increased distance are always placed in the closest facility. I do note that in the full
national sample, the minimum and average distance have the same signed coefficients,
and so it is less likely that the overidentification test will reject in this case.
1.7 Evidence in Support of Specific Channels
My results in the previous sections have established a negative relationship between
the average distance to facilities and recidivism for male inmates. These results
are counterintuitive within the context of prior literature on this topic, which has
emphasized that visitation and social ties deteriorate with distance, leading to worse
inmate outcomes. Here, I provide some suggestive evidence that social ties may
deteriorate, but that the breaking of criminal ties with distance and increased specific
deterrence are likely to be more important factors, generating the overall negative
relationship. I also confirm the interpretation of my finding as the effect of inmates’
actual, experienced distance from home, by ruling out general deterrence as the lone
mechanism.
1.7.1 General Deterrence vs. Experience with Distance
A general deterrent effect of distance represents the dominant threat to my exclusion
restriction. Changes in the average distance to facilities may reduce recidivism, even
among inmates whose own distance from home has been unaffected by the change.
Such inmates may anticipate an increased chance that they will be placed far away
the next time they are incarcerated, reducing criminal behavior as a result. While
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Table 1.9: Prison Distance Effect on 1-Year Recidivism, GMM Esti-
mation
Florida Oklahoma
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Coefficient on Log Distance -0.0310∗∗∗ 0.00650 -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.00984 0.0626 -0.009800
(0.00486) (0.00656) (0.00412) (0.00684) (0.0335) (0.00684)
First-Stage Coef on Average Distance 0.918∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0237) (0.0431) (0.0421)
First-Stage Coef on Minimum Distance 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.000185
(0.00427) (0.00440) (0.00597) (0.00562)
Observations 310521 310521 310521 73051 73051 73051
J-Statistic 38.52 6.047
P-Value of JStat 5.42e-10 0.0139
Notes: Each column in this table represents a two-sample GMM estimation where the treatment
variable is distance between an inmate’s county of conviction and their incarcerated facility, the
instruments are the average log distance to state facilities and the log distance to the closest
facility, and the outcome variable is re-incarceration within 1-year. County and individual controls
are included in all regressions. Average log distance to facilities is weighted by facility capacity.
The observations identifying the first stage are sourced using data covering current inmates in
Florida and Oklahoma. The sample of Florida inmates is sourced from the OBIS database publicly
available from the Florida Department of Corrections and reflects inmates as of April 2019. The
sample of Oklahoma inmates is sourced from data obtained by the Center for Investigative
Reporting via public records requests and reflects inmates as of July 2017. The observations
identifying the second stage treatment effect are a sample of prison releases from state-level
incarceration 2000-2014 from the National Corrections Reporting Program, restricted for each
offender to the first observed prison spell associated with a new conviction. The county controls
are log distance to the largest county in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to
other counties in the state; the log county population; and county unemployment, and the
individual controls are race; Hispanic; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction;
violent, property, or drug offense type; and the log of the sentence length. In the reduced form and
second stage of the second panel, the county controls are county fixed effects, and the individual
controls are in all regressions: race; Hispanic; age and age squared at admission; prior felony
conviction; violent, property, or drug offense type; release type dummies; and the log of the
sentence length. Stars indicate statistical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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a negative relationship induced by general deterrence would still be of interest, such
a relationship has different policy implications than an experiential effect of distance
on inmates.
To rule out general deterrence, I first show that changes in the average distance
to facilities are not systematically associated with the rate of new admissions to
prison. General deterrence predicts that an increase in distance within a county
should have a strong negative impact on criminal behavior and thus prison admissions,
regardless of potential offenders’ personal experience with distance and incarceration.
In particular, potential first-time offenders will only respond to a general deterrent
effect, as they have never personally been exposed to distance and thus are unaffected
by any experiential affect.
To explore this relationship, I estimate at the county-quarter level
AdmitRatecga = βProxyDistcga + δs(c)ga + γZca + εcga
and






where Admissionscga is the number of admissions of offender from county c of gender
g in quarter a, from the NCRP. I construct the admit rate for all admissions, first-time
admissions, and admissions of ex-offenders. The outcome ProxyDistcga is defined as
in Section 1.4, δs(c)ga are state-gender-admit quarter fixed effects, Zca are the same set
of county-quarter controls as in Section 1.4, and αcg are county-gender fixed effects
which replace the county controls.
As shown in Table 1.10, the results of this estimation are somewhat noisy, but I
do not find a negative relationship between distance and new admissions to prisons
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in my preferred specification. Admissions do decline with increased distance when
only controlling for county characteristics, albeit with a smaller response for first-
time offenders. However, when I control for cross-county heterogeneity with county
fixed effects, I find a positive relationship between distance and admissions, and for
first-time offenders, I cannot reject that the effect is zero. This result supports the
conclusion that capacity changes which increase average distance do not cause decline
in recidivism only through exerting a deterrent effect on the general population of
potential offenders.
Table 1.10: Prison Distance Effect on Prison Admissions per Capita
All Admissions First-Time Admissions Repeat Admissions
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Men Only
Log Average Distance -0.0572∗∗ 0.165∗ -0.0258∗ 0.0813 -0.0314∗ 0.0837∗
(0.0210) (0.0679) (0.0101) (0.0439) (0.0128) (0.0351)
Observations 246624 251200 246624 251200 246624 251200
Mean Outcome 0.696 0.339 0.357
Women Only
Log Average Distance -0.00156 -0.00385 -0.000189 0.000257 -0.00138 -0.00411
(0.00258) (0.00719) (0.00128) (0.00409) (0.00152) (0.00413)
Observations 245896 250458 245896 250458 245896 250458
Mean Outcome 0.110 0.0643 0.0458
County Controls Char FE Char FE Char FE
Notes: Each number in this table represents result of a linear regression at the county-quarter level
of the ratio of prison admissions to county population on average log distance to prison facilities,
along with county controls as indicated in the bottom panel. Average log distance to facilities is
weighted by facility capacity Prison admissions from a county are measured from the National
Corrections Reporting Program, covering the years 2000-2015. The county characteristics are log
distance to the largest county in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to other
counties in the state; the log county population; the quarterly employment to population ratio and
log earnings for the relevant gender across all education levels and for the non-high school educated;
and county unemployment. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses, with
stars indicating statistical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
My finding that the crime rate does not decrease in response to a change in the
average distance to facilities directly contradicts the findings of Bedard and Helland
(2004) for women in the 1980s. The fact that a great deal of the variation exploited
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in the prior study came from the introduction of the first female facility in the state
may explain these disparate findings. Bedard and Helland interpret such an event
as a large increase in expected distance, as women were likely held in local jails
before the introduction of a state facility. If the change from no state facilities to
one state facility is more salient for potential first-time offenders than a change in
the composition among many facilities, this difference in the source of variation may
produce different behavioral responses.
I next show that time exposed to distance strengthens the negative relationship
between distance and recidivism, again contradicting general deterrence. If the decline
in recidivism is caused by general deterrence alone, an increase in the time exposed to
distance should not increase the decline in recidivism. Under general deterrence, only
expectations about the next period of incarceration should matter, and all inmates
have the same expected distance at the next time of incarceration. Alternatively, if
the relationship is driven by inmates’ actual experience with being placed far from
home, I expect the treatment effect to increase with the time incarcerated, as a longer
prison spell increases the probability the inmate will ever be placed in a far-from-home
facility and also the time over which criminal ties deteriorate, for example. To test
this hypothesis, I repeat my main reduced-form specifications from Section 1.4, but
include measures of time under incarceration and the interaction of time exposed
and log average distance. I estimate the model with both county characteristics and
county fixed effects and include the full set of individual controls in all regressions.
The results of this estimation for men’s 1-year recidivism rates are shown in Table
1.11. For three out of my four measures of exposure time, I find that the negative
effect of distance increases with time exposed to distance from home. In fact, the base
effect of distance is small and not significant in the fixed effects models. These results
suggest that an inmate’s personal experience with distance from home is responsible
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for the relationship I find, rather than a general deterrent effect.
Table 1.11: Heterogeneous Effects of Distance on Men’s 1-Year Re-
cidivism by Exposure Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Log Distance 0.00824 -0.0238 0.0429∗∗∗ 0.0123 -0.00516 -0.0362∗ 0.0299∗∗ 0.00625
(0.00639) (0.0191) (0.0135) (0.0212) (0.00518) (0.0198) (0.0122) (0.0224)
Months Served 0.00228∗∗∗ 0.00226∗∗∗
(0.000649) (0.000662)
Dist * Mo Served -0.000692∗∗∗ -0.000689∗∗∗
(0.000144) (0.000147)
Log Months Served 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0705∗∗∗
(0.0235) (0.0254)
Dist * Log Mo Served -0.0198∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗
(0.00493) (0.00534)
Months Sentenced 0.000000111 6.73e-08
(7.54e-08) (7.30e-08)
Dist * Mo Sent 3.72e-09 1.25e-08
(1.43e-08) (1.37e-08)
Log Months Sentenced 0.0352∗∗ 0.0418∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0175)
Dist * Log Mo Sent -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0113∗∗∗
(0.00315) (0.00366)
Observations 2872082 2872182 2828098 2828155 2872082 2872182 2872082 2872182
County Controls Char FE Char FE Char FE Char FE
Notes: Each column in this table represents the result of a linear regression of an indicator for
re-incarceration within the same state within one year on the average log distance to prison
facilities, the indicated measure of incarcerated time, and the interaction of distance and time,
along with additional individual controls and county controls as indicated in the bottom panel.
Average log distance to facilities is weighted by facility capacity. Regressions are estimated among
the sample of prison releases from state-level incarceration 2000-2014 from the National
Corrections Reporting Program, restricted for each offender to the first observed prison spell
associated with a new conviction. The county characteristics are log distance to the largest county
in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to other counties in the state; the log
county population; the quarterly employment to population ratio and log earnings for the relevant
gender across all education levels and for the non-high school educated; and county unemployment.
The following individual controls are included in all regressions: race; Hispanic; education
category; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction; violent, property, or drug
offense type; release type dummies; and the log of the sentence length. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are in parentheses, with stars indicating statistical significance as follows: ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.7.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
I now explore heterogeneous effects to provide suggestive evidence as to whether dis-
tance affects inmate outcomes through weakening social ties or changing criminal
ties. Resources from social networks are likely to improve both inmates’ baseline eco-
nomic status and the payoff from legal employment as opposed to criminal behavior,
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predicting a positive interaction between distance and recidivism. Although clearly
contradicted by the aggregate negative relationship I estimate, this mechanism may
still exist, though outweighed by other factors in the aggregate. All else equal, inmates
with stronger pre-existing social ties likely experience a stronger recidivism-increasing
social ties effect than other inmates. Therefore a positive interaction between distance
and proxies for the likelihood of relying on social ties, such as youth, may be inter-
preted as evidence that social ties do deteriorate with distance.
Distance may also impact the strength of criminal ties. If distance weakens crimi-
nal ties to the home county, then distance should reduce recidivism more for inmates
who were part of a criminal network before incarceration; I proxy for the inmate
having been part of a criminal network by the offense type. If criminal tie forma-
tion during incarceration is facilitated by distance, thus increasing recidivism, we
should expect that recidivism for inmates convicted of network-facilitated offense
types should increase with distance more than for other inmates.
Table 1.12 shows the results of repeating my analyses from Section 1.4 over the
sample of men, but including indicators for race and age categories. Odd numbered
columns include the full set of individual controls along with county characteristic
controls, and even numbered columns replace the county characteristics with fixed
effects. In columns (1)-(4), I show that the effect of distance does not vary greatly by
race: the interaction between indicators for Black or Hispanic have relatively small
point values across specifications.
In columns (5)-(8) I show that young inmates only experience about half of the
decline in recidivism with distance as other inmates, consistent with a greater dete-
rioration of social ties for this group. As the young are more likely to rely on social
support after release, this positive interaction coefficient could indicate that with in-
creased distance, the deterioration of social ties tends to offset any beneficial effect of
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Table 1.12: Heterogeneous Effects of Distance on Men’s 1-Year Re-
cidivism by Race and Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Log Distance -0.00418 -0.0322 -0.00694 -0.0351∗ -0.0119∗∗ -0.0408∗∗ -0.00462 -0.0340∗
(0.00522) (0.0198) (0.00510) (0.0198) (0.00492) (0.0200) (0.00545) (0.0198)
Black 0.0399∗∗ 0.0487∗∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0144)




Dist * Hispanic 0.00733∗ 0.00623∗
(0.00423) (0.00352)
Under 25 -0.0923∗∗∗ -0.0905∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0339)
Dist * Under 25 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗
(0.00721) (0.00723)
Over 45 0.0419∗ 0.0403∗
(0.0217) (0.0218)
Dist * Over 45 -0.00594 -0.00561
(0.00438) (0.00439)
Observations 2872082 2872182 2872082 2872182 2872082 2872182 2872082 2872182
County Controls Char FE Char FE Char FE Char FE
Notes: Each column in this table represents the result of a linear regression of an indicator for
re-incarceration within the same state within one year on the average log distance to prison
facilities, an indicator for the demographic characteristic, and the interaction of distance and this
indicator, along with additional individual controls and county controls as indicated in the bottom
panel. Average log distance to facilities is weighted by facility capacity. Regressions are estimated
among the sample of prison releases from state-level incarceration 2000-2014 from the National
Corrections Reporting Program, restricted for each offender to the first observed prison spell
associated with a new conviction. The county characteristics are log distance to the largest county
in the state; the population-weighted average log distance to other counties in the state; the log
county population; the quarterly employment to population ratio and log earnings for the relevant
gender across all education levels and for the non-high school educated; and county unemployment.
The following individual controls are included in all regressions: race; Hispanic; education
category; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction; violent, property, or drug
offense type; release type dummies; and the log of the sentence length. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are in parentheses, with stars indicating statistical significance as follows: ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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distance for this group, even if the total effect of all factors still decreases recidivism
rates. The effect of distance for inmates over 45 is not meaningfully different than
the effect on the rest of the population. I further note that a similar logic may apply
to women as to the young; as women are more likely to rely on family after release,
any criminogeneic effect of distance due to the deterioration of ties may be stronger
for them, balanced by the beneficial effects we see dominate for men.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.13 I show that recidivism decreases more with
distance for inmates initially convicted of an economically-motivated offense. This
table follows a similar format, but instead included indicators for the crime type
of the initial release and whether the offender was released on probation or pa-
role. Economically-motivated offenses are identified as offense types with “robbery,”
“fraud,” “extort,” “theft,” “embezzlement,” “stolen property,” or “trafficking” in the
description. These inmates may have been in a more precarious economic state before
incarceration, and thus are less likely to rely on social or economic ties upon which
they can rely after release. Therefore, if social ties do weaken with distance and thus
tend to increase recidivism, I expect this force to be less important for this group
of inmates and predict a more negative relationship between distance and recidivism
for this group as the forces of deterrence and weakened criminal ties are less coun-
teracted the social ties channel. The negative estimated coefficient on the interaction
thus supports the weakening of social ties with distance.
As shown in columns (3) and (4), recidivism decreases more with distance for
inmates initially convicted of an offense which indicates they were part of a criminal
network. Network offenses are identified as an offense type with “conspiracy” or
“trafficking” in the description. I note that when separating these offenders from
all others, the treatment effect on those not convicted of a network offense becomes
statistically insignificant, though still quite large in magnitude. This result suggests
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Table 1.13: Heterogeneous Effects of Distance on Men’s 1-Year Re-
cidivism by Conviction Type and Conditional Release
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Log Distance -0.00186 -0.0305 -0.00240 -0.0313 0.0107 -0.0191
(0.00537) (0.0196) (0.00545) (0.0195) (0.00662) (0.0198)
Econ Motivated Offense 0.0371∗∗ 0.0385∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0157)
Dist * Econ Offense -0.00888∗∗∗ -0.00908∗∗∗
(0.00336) (0.00318)
Network Offense 0.0721∗ 0.0734∗
(0.0394) (0.0391)
Dist * Network -0.0191∗∗ -0.0193∗∗
(0.00823) (0.00819)
Conditional Release 0.142∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.0436) (0.0492)
Dist * Cond Release -0.0261∗∗∗ -0.0239∗∗
(0.00930) (0.0105)
Observations 2872082 2872182 2872082 2872182 2872082 2872182
County Controls Char FE Char FE Char FE
Notes: Each column in this table represents the result of a linear regression of an indicator for
re-incarceration within the same state within one year on the average log distance to prison
facilities, the an indicator for initial conviction type or for conditional release, and the interaction
of distance and time, along with additional individual controls and county controls as indicated in
the bottom panel. Average log distance to facilities is weighted by facility capacity. Regressions
are estimated among the sample of prison releases from state-level incarceration 2000-2014 from
the National Corrections Reporting Program, restricted for each offender to the first observed
prison spell associated with a new conviction. The county characteristics are log distance to the
largest county in the state; the population- weighted average log distance to other counties in the
state; the log county population; the quarterly employment to population ratio and log earnings
for the relevant gender across all education levels and for the non-high school educated; and county
unemployment. The following individual controls are included in all regressions: race; Hispanic;
education category; age and age squared at admission; prior felony conviction; violent, property, or
drug offense type; release type dummies; and the log of the sentence length. Standard errors
clustered at the county level are in parentheses, with stars indicating statistical significance as
follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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that the breaking of criminal ties with increased distance meaningfully contributes to
the total negative effect between distance and recidivism.
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) I show that the decline in recidivism with distance
is exclusively associated with inmates released on probation or parole. This group
has a lower threshold for measured recidivism, as they may be re-incarcerated for
technical violations which do not require a new criminal conviction procedure. The
impact of distance on recidivism is indistinguishable from zero for inmates uncondi-
tionally released, but among conditional releases the total measured effect is large and
more precisely estimated than for the whole population. The conditions placed on
this group of inmates often include requirements to return to the home county, seek
employment, and engage in rehabilitative counseling. These conditions may help this
group of inmates rebuild social or economic ties which may have deteriorated with
increased distance. Therefore, unconditionally released inmates may be more affected
by the criminogenic effect of weakened ties, leading to an aggregate null effect.
1.7.3 Alternative Outcomes
Table 1.14 shows the effect of distance on the length of time inmates serve and whether
they are released with conditions. I estimate the same reduced-form regressions as in
Section 1.4 with alternative outcome measures. The individual and county controls
are again the same as in Section 1.4, except in the share of sentence served regressions,
the control for sentence length is omitted. The results of the first four columns show
that inmates serve slightly shorter sentences with increased distance. Conditional
on the initial sentence length, doubling the distance from home decreases inmates’
time served by 16.7 percent. I find that inmates are no more likely to be released
under conditional release when distance from home is farther, though this effect is
not precisely estimated.
Estimating the effect of distance on a number of other measures of recidivism, I
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Table 1.14: Effect of Prison Distance on Men’s Time Served and
Release Conditions
Log Months Share of Conditional
Served Sentence Served Release
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Average Log Distance -0.0284 -0.167∗ -0.0724∗∗∗ 0.0147 0.00346 0.0678
(0.0174) (0.0650) (0.0182) (0.0749) (0.00775) (0.0644)
Observations 2660366 2660406 2660366 2660406 2716033 2716179
County Controls Char FE Char FE Char FE
Notes: Each number in this table represents the coefficient on the average log distance from a
linear regression of the indicated outcome on this measure along with additional individual
controls and county controls as indicated in the bottom panel. Average log distance to facilities is
weighted by facility capacity. Regressions are estimated among the sample of prison releases from
state-level incarceration 2000-2014 from the National Corrections Reporting Program, restricted
for each offender to the first observed prison spell associated with a new conviction. The county
characteristics are log distance to the largest county in the state; the population-weighted average
log distance to other counties in the state; the log county population; the quarterly employment to
population ratio and log earnings for the relevant gender across all education levels and for the
non-high school educated; and county unemployment. The following individual controls are
included in all regressions: race; Hispanic; education category; age and age squared at admission;
prior felony conviction; violent, property, or drug offense type; release type dummies; and the log
of the sentence length (except when the outcome is share of sentence served). Standard errors
clustered at the county level are in parentheses, with stars indicating statistical significance as
follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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find no effect on new convictions or on the composition of crimes committed. Table
1.15 shows these results for men and for 1-year recidivism. The top panel shows
outcomes for the full set of releases. The lack of an effect on the probability of receiving
a new criminal conviction is consistent with the heterogeneous effect results that the
full decline is associated with inmates released on probation or parole. However,
recidivism declines across a variety of offense types. I interpret these unconditional
results with caution given that the decline in recidivism is not present among new
convictions, as re-admissions associated with a revocation of conditional release are
assigned the conviction details of the initial offense rather than the reason for the
probation or parole violation.
In the lower panel, I show the results estimated within the sample of inmates
who were admitted to prison under a new conviction within one year, as this is the
only set of inmates for which a change in sentence, convicted offense, or county of
conviction can be observed. Among convictions, my results are generally insignificant,
suggesting that conditional on re-offending the type and severity of criminal activity
is generally unaffected by distance.
1.8 Counterfactual Analysis
I now conduct a simple counterfactual analysis to assess the magnitude of these treat-
ment effects. I calculate the predicted change in the 1-year recidivism rate under two
hypothetical re-assignment rules: re-assigning all inmates to the closest or farthest
state prison facility. These counterfactual approximate the ability to maximize or
minimize the effect on recidivism through distance while holding the current spatial
distribution of state prison facilities constant. I repeat the TS2SLS estimation with
all available controls, but now allow the treatment effect of distance to vary by sen-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































each inmate, I then calculate the change in their predicted recidivism propensity as
this treatment effect multiplied by the difference between the log of their actual or
baseline distance and the log of the distance to the nearest or farthest men’s state
prison facility, holding sentence length and network status constant. The capacity
or security level of each correctional facility was not taken into account. For the
Florida and Oklahoma state samples, the baseline distance was the log distance to
the currently assigned facility. For the national sample, the baseline distance was the
predicted log distance from the first stage regression, using average log distance as
an instrument. The average changes to the predicted recidivism propensity for the
specified populations are shown.
Table 1.16 shows the results of this counterfactual analysis. For the national
estimation sample, I estimate that 1-year recidivism would have been 4.3 percentage
points lower if all inmates experienced the maximum possible distance between their
home county and a state prison facility. This change to the 1-year recidivism rate
can be compared to th 16.6% baseline rate observed in the estimation sample, as
shown in Table 1.1. As expected given the heterogeneous treatment results shown in
the prior section, reassigning inmates to different facilities has the largest effect on
inmates with long sentences and those convicted of network offenses. In the national
sample, I predict a three-times larger effect on inmates with a network offense than
other offenders. I do not notice any consistently different pattern of counterfactual
recidivism rate by race across my subsamples. Therefore, racial differences in the
distance from home during incarceration do not appear to be a contributor to racial
inequality in recidivism.
I interpret these results with caution given that my regression equation and this
counterfactual analysis both assume that the treatment effect of distance is constant
with log distance. My treatment effects are estimated primarily from changes in
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Table 1.16: Predicted Change in 1-Year Recidivism Rate, Men
Florida Inmates Oklahoma Inmates National Releases
Closest Farthest Closest Farthest Closest Farthest
Facility Facility Facility Facility Facility Facility
1-Year Recidivism 0.154 -0.061 0.094 -0.039 0.085 -0.043
White Inmates 0.145 -0.062 0.085 -0.038 0.068 -0.040
Black Inmates 0.162 -0.061 0.108 -0.042 0.096 -0.045
Hispanic Inmates 0.152 -0.056 0.120 -0.040 0.098 -0.047
Network Offense 0.215 -0.099 0.186 -0.060 0.179 -0.093
No Network Offense 0.147 -0.057 0.090 -0.038 0.066 -0.033
3-Year or Shorter Sentence 0.086 -0.033 0.063 -0.027 0.076 -0.039
More than 3-Year Sentence 0.162 -0.065 0.096 -0.040 0.095 -0.049
Notes: Each number in this table represents the expected change in the 1-year recidivism rate from
changing each individual’s distance from to the distance to the closest or farthest adult general
population correctional facility in their state, as estimated by taking the mean over the specified
population of the change in distance this would induce multiplied by the marginal effect of
distance. The marginal effect of distance was estimated from a TS2SLS regression with average log
distance to state facilities as the instrumental variable, using the full set of control variables
described in prior sections. The effect of distance was allowed to vary by sentence length and
whether the conviction was for a network offense. For the Florida and Oklahoma state samples,
the baseline distance was the log distance to the currently assigned facility. For the national
sample, the baseline distance was the predicted log distance from the first stage regression, using
average log distance as an instrument. The capacity or security level of each correctional facility
was not taken into account.
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the average distance of generally less than 10 miles relative to a baseline average
distance of approximately 150 miles in the national sample. If the effect of distance
is highly non-linear, especially for relatively short distances, then I may misstate the
counterfactual change in recidivism by extrapolating my regression coefficient. The
predicted increase in recidivism when assigning inmates the distance to the closest
facility does appear to induce a perhaps implausibly large increase in the recidivism
rate, especially for the Florida subsample where the predicted recidivism rate doubles
under this counterfactual.
1.9 Conclusions and Discussion
In this project, I use a novel instrumental variable strategy to establish a causal
negative effect of distance from home on criminal recidivism. My research is the
first to use national data to address this question and the first to use an empirical
strategy which is robust to the potential endogeneity between the level of recidivism
propensity and facility assignment. I estimate that doubling the average inmate’s
distance from home will increase his probability of re-incarceration within one year
by 3.3 percentage points, relative to a mean of 16.6%. The decrease in recidivism
from increased facility distance is larger for inmates who were admitted to prison for
a crime requiring a criminal network, suggesting that criminal ties deteriorate with
distance, and the decrease is smaller for young offenders and women, suggesting that
social ties also deteriorate, as these groups are the most likely to rely on family for
financial support upon release.
An important limitation of my study is that I only observe re-incarceration within
the same state for released offenders. Because I am unable to observe outcomes
outside of ongoing criminal behavior, I cannot speak to any relationship between
distance during incarceration and the quality of life for those who do not re-engage
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in crime. While distance may be beneficial in decreasing recidivism, it may also have
detrimental effects on other outcomes. For example, ex-offenders may be less likely to
be incarcerated but may be more likely to live in an unstable housing situation. The
distance of an inmate from home is also likely to have important effects on individuals
besides the inmate himself, both in terms of the increased monetary and time costs of
visitation with distance, and in terms of the emotional costs on family members such
as children who visit less often. Such impacts are outside the scope of my analysis.
Therefore, I hesitate to interpret my findings as evidence that increasing the typical
inmate’s distance from home is likely to be welfare improving in the aggregate.
This paper highlights the complex effects incarceration has on future criminal
behavior. While prior work has focused on the negative repercussions of separating
inmates from family, my results suggest that the social networks of offenders in their
home communities may in fact be conducive to criminal behavior. Thus, distance
actually has a rehabilitative effect for many inmates. Given the limitations discussed
above, my results do not necessarily suggest a clear policy response, as moving inmates
farther from home on average may have negative effects unstudied here. However,
the consistent negative relationship between distance and recidivism across many
different groups of inmates suggests that re-assigning inmates to nearby facilities,
without other rehabilitative policies, is unlikely to encourage desistence from crime.
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Chapter 2
Rural Prisons as Place-Based Policies
2.1 Introduction
One of the most dramatic trends in the United States over the last few decades has
been the incredible growth in the prison population. By 2007, the United States
incarceration rate was more than five times the 1970 rate (Neal and Rick, 2016).
This massive expansion necessitated the construction of many new prison facilities,
at both the federal and state level, and by 2005 approximately 65% of prisoners were
detained in facilities constructed in the last 25 years (United States Department of
Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics., 2017). In contrast
to earlier decades when prisons were seen as an undesirable addition to an area, in
the 1990s and 2000s many rural areas actively bid to host new prisons as a local
development strategy (Eason, 2010; Glasmeier and Farrigan, 2007). However, the
combination of a decline in the incarceration rate beginning in 2007 (Neal and Rick,
2016) alongside state budget constraints has resulted in more prisons closures than
openings in the 2000s. The local economic effect of these closures is unknown. In
this project, I study the effect of rural prisons as a place-based policy, considering
job creation in the local labor market. I also specifically consider the effects of prison
closures, unique in the local prison impact literature, allowing for the study of the
potential long-term effects of a discontinued place-based policy. My results have direct
relevance for future policy as the United States incarcerated population continues to
shrink, and also more generally for our understanding of the potential for direct public
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employment provision as a feasible place-based policy for impacting local economies.
To address these questions, I employ a generalized difference-in-difference strategy
to estimate the employment effect of prison openings and closures on rural US counties
from 1980-2015. My primary outcomes of interest are annual measures of employment,
allowing me to fully exploit the timing of prison openings and closures. I differ
from prior studies of local prison economic impact by considering a broader time
range, relying primarily on annual-level outcomes, examining closings in addition
to openings, and defining my prison treatment in terms of the prison size. I use
a propensity-matched control group to study prison openings and an ever-treated
control group to study prison closings. My results show that prison openings and
closures had a strong effect on government employment in the county, consistent with
a direct gain or loss of public sector jobs associated with the prison. I also find
some evidence that in particularly small counties, the opening of a large prison in
the 1990s may have crowded out manufacturing jobs. Upon prison closure for prisons
in the 2000s, I do find private sector job losses in the healthcare sector, which likely
directly serve the prison, but find no evidence of spillover effects or of the return
of any previously crowded out jobs. I find little difference in the employment effect
on men and women. Additionally, the non-prisoner population does not appear to
respond to prison opening, but may shrink in response to prison closure.
Overall, my results do not support prisons as an effective local development strat-
egy in rural places. While prisons directly provide local jobs which are lost in the
case that the prison closes, this increase in employment does not appear to spur an
increase in local demand large enough to affect private employers more generally and
may have actually crowded out other employers in some cases. Prison closures do
not appear to have caused an overall economic decline in their hosting communities,
which may be a reassuring finding given the current decline in the US prison popu-
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lation which makes future closures likely. I caveat this statement by acknowledging
that my analysis is at the county level, and prison closures may be responsible for re-
allocation of private employment within a county. Although prisons do employ more
men than women, I find no evidence that aggregate employment effects are greater
for men than women, suggesting that prison siting does not affect men’s employment
and wages differentially from women’s.
This study also further enhances our understanding of local labor markets and
the potential impact of place-based economic policies. Previously studied place-based
policies have primarily consisted of special economic zones and similar policies (Neu-
mark and Simpson, 2015). The siting of prisons in rural communities is quite a
distinct policy from those designed to attract private-sector employers, yet the in-
tended effect on the local economy is similar. Spatially reallocating public jobs, in
this case prison employment, to disadvantaged regions may appeal to policy-makers as
a low-cost way to provide a local fiscal stimulus. This paper assesses the effectiveness
of such a policy in stimulating local growth and employment, both directly through
public employment and indirectly through the private sector. Further, because I ob-
serve both prison openings and closures over the study period, I can estimate any
long-term effects after the policy is no longer in effect.
The success or efficacy of place-based policies is generally evaluated on their ability
to generate jobs. Considering jobs in the private sector in the US from 1980-2000,
Moretti (2010) finds that an additional 1.6 jobs in non-tradable sectors are created
in response to a job creation in the tradable sector, with no loss in other tradable
industries. Jones and Yang (2018) suggest that local multiplier effects may have
been smaller in the US during the recession of 2008-2009. Here I consider the less-
studied phenomenon of the potential local multiplier effects of public-sector jobs.
Both Faggio and Overman (2014) and Jofre-Monseny et al. (2018) find that increases
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in public sector employment in Europe have a much smaller local multiplier effect;
job creations in the non-tradable sector are offset by job losses in the tradable sector.
Zou (2018) also estimates the local economic impact of a change in public sector
employment in the US, here arising from the contraction of the military between
1988-2000, and finds that while private sector employment fell in response to public
sector job loss, population changes absorbed most of the impact on the wage and
overall welfare. These disparate results suggest room for further study of this question
to understand whether the public vs private job creation distinction is important or
whether country-level differences are responsible. My analysis further differs from
much of the literature on local multipliers by deriving my exogenous increase in
employment from the natural experiment of prison siting and closure rather than the
more common shift-share approach and by focusing exclusively on rural areas of the
US from 1990-present.
This project further contributes to the interdisciplinary literature evaluating the
local impact of prison openings. While there is little economic literature considering
this topic, the local impact of prisons has been discussed broadly in the sociology
and criminology literature, with mixed findings. Studies by Glasmeier and Farrigan
(2007) and Eason (2017) find that in at least some cases, prisons do have a positive
economic impact for the hosting community, as measured by reductions in the poverty
rate, the unemployment rate, the receipt of transfer payments, and earnings from
state government sources. Nearly all of these studies consider changes in outcomes
over a 7-10 year period rather than annual changes and rely on some combination of
difference-in-difference and propensity score matching to identify the control group.
The only study of this topic in economics, Chirakijja (2018), finds that prisons opened
in the 1990s decrease property values in the census tract where the prison was sited
and reduce the income in the local census tract, primarily due to a change in the
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immediate neighborhood’s composition. However, the effect on the broader county is
a moderate increase in state government employment and no effect on private sector
employment, suggesting no multiplier effect beyond the mechanical increase in prison
employment. This chapter expands upon this literature in two key ways. First,
in addition to the initial prison siting, I study prison closings which are important
from a policy perspective as they have become more common than prison openings.
Second, by considering an empirical specification which accounts for the wide variety
in prison size, focusing on the rural counties most likely to experience an aggregate
economic effect from prisons, and taking advantage of annual measures of employment
by industry, I am able to study potential spillover and crowding-out effects in the
private sector which prior studies have not directly considered.
This work also contributes to the broader literature considering the economic and
social impact of mass incarceration, a literature summarized in detail in Chapter 1.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the consequences of stricter sentencing
policies and high incarceration rates, and the consequences of relaxing these policies
and reducing the prison sector, by considering the effect these trends have on local
rural economies.
2.2 Context
2.2.1 Expansion and Contraction
The construction of prisons in the US expanded rapidly in the late 20th century. As
can be seen in Figure 2·1, construction increased in the 1980s, reaching its peak in
the early 1990s. This construction was concentrated primarily in rural US counties.
The prison construction boom was also associated with the increased construction of
private prisons, though I limit my project here to the study of publicly-operated pris-
ons. This expansion in prison construction was necessitated by the massive increase
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in prisoner populations over this same time period. Neal and Rick (2016) attribute
the majority of the this massive increase in the prison population over 1985-2005
to significant changes in sentencing and incarceration policies. Two of the most im-
portant laws governing these changes were the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control
Act, which revised the federal sentencing system along with bail and forfeiture proce-
dures and provided grants to states for anti-crime efforts, and the 1994 Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act, which provided financial incentives for states to
adopt “truth in sentencing” laws (Bosworth, 2010). In practice, both laws increased
the typical sentence associated with a conviction for the same crime (Bosworth, 2010;
Neal and Rick, 2016). A significant literature has developed in economics assessing
the impact of these stricter sentencing rules on offenders themselves. Most relevantly
for this project, such laws increased prisoner populations, and thus necessitated the
construction of new facilities for reasons unrelated to local economic conditions.
The method of choosing sites to house these new prisons varies widely from state
to state. A 1992 review of state siting procedures and criteria (Ammons et al., 1992),
recounts state procedures as diverse as state authorities choosing a site unilaterally
(Michigan) to states actively soliciting competing bids from local authorities hoping
to host a new facility (Texas). Common criteria for site selection include relative
proximity to a population center, utility provision, lot size, ability to convert an
existing facility like an unused hospital, weak local economic conditions, and local
support; proximity to the offender population is almost never prioritized. Therefore,
within a given state the location of a new prison’s siting is generally not related to
that particular location within the state having a relatively high crime rate generating
the need for that prison.
Since its peak in 2007, the incarceration rate has fallen (Neal and Rick, 2016),
leading to a reduced need for prison space. From 2007 through the present, more
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public prisons have closed than new prisons have opened in each year. A timeline
of national prison closures can be found in Figure 2·2. The timing of these closures,
peaking in 2009 and remaining strong thereafter, strongly suggests that the combina-
tion of a shrinking prison population with recession-era state budget constraints likely
precipitated many closures. Again relevant to identifying the effect of prison presence
on local economies, reasons for prison closure reported in public press include de-
clining prisoner populations (see for example Jouvenal 2012, state budget constraints
(see for example Pera 2012), and declining facility quality (see for example Riddle
2008). Empirically, in the prison sample I construct for this project, I find that older,
smaller, and more relatively overstaffed facilities are more likely to close. Just as
rural prison openings were met with hope of a local stimulus effect in the 1990s, the
announcement of closure has been met in many areas with fears of job loss and local
economic deterioration (Jouvenal, 2012).
2.2.2 Prisons as Employers
Prison jobs have been seen as desirable, both for an individual and for the hosting
community, as a source of employment in a public sector job immune to the business
cycle and accessible to those without a college degree. Prison jobs may appeal in
particular to those who seek blue-collar public sector jobs such as a fire fighter, police
officers, or similar, but work as a correctional officer typically has a shorter waiting
list (Kauffman, 1988). Prison employees are organized in 38 states, whether through
national unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO or through state-level independent orga-
nizations such as the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (Page, 2011).
While prisons employ a variety of personnel including administrative workers and
social workers, correctional officers responsible for general security represent the ma-
jority of public prison employment (United States Department of Justice. Office of
Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics., 2017). While correctional officers in
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federal prisons are generally required to have a college degree or significant experience,
correctional officers in state prisons generally are not (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor, 2017; Bureau of Prisons U.S. Department of Justice, 2018). As
an occupation, correctional officers are roughly as numerous as paralegals or postal
mail carriers, and among individuals without a college degree, correctional officers
earn approximately 20% more than those employed in other occupations on average.1
This description primarily categorizes employment in public prisons, and employ-
ment in private prisons has been associated with lower pay and a more difficult work
environment (Bauer, 2018; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
2017). Despite the fact that a vast majority of prisons do house exclusively male
inmates, positions in prisons (even as correctional officers) are available to women
by law. However, prisons may represent an extremely hostile environment for female
employees, with women reporting harassment and assault from both inmates and fel-
low employees, even when working in administrative roles (Dickerson, 2018). Prison
employees are disproportionately non-college educated males, the group which has
experienced relative wage losses in recent decades, and so we may expect changes
to this industry employing primarily this group to have important consequences for
employment patterns by gender.
2.2.3 Prisons as Place-Based Policies
Place based policies seek to achieve an economic or equity goal through geographic
targeting—in contrast to person based policies which target a population of interest
(Kline and Moretti, 2014). I characterize rural prisons as place-based polices given
that state and local policy-makers frequently state a belief that siting a prison in a
1As estimated from a regression of log weekly or hourly wage earnings on an indicator on employ-
ment in occupation 3800 “Sheriffs, Bailiffs, Correctional Officers, and Jailers” or 3700 “First-Line
Supervisors of Correctional Officers” while controlling for sex, race, nativity, age, education, state,
and urbanicity estimated within the 2005 Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current
Population Survey.
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disadvantaged area will have local economic benefits, not just for those directly em-
ployed by the prison but in fact for the community as a whole. Popular press coverage
of large prisons in small towns often characterize these facilities as “promis[ing] to
pump jobs and revenue back into the ailing economy” (Jouvenal, 2012) or “lifting ...
spirits and reigniting [the] economy” (Kilborn, 2001). In a coarse cross-county regres-
sion, Table 2.1 shows that, in fact, a county’s distance to population centers is not
a particularly good predictor of whether it will host a new prison. Rather, the local
unemployment rate and the pre-existence of a prison are much stronger predictors.
This finding suggests that at least at a broad level, new prison site choices are not
made solely to minimize the distance between facilities and the inmate population
and do respond to economic factors.
Expenditure on Special Economic Zones and similar policies is often justified by
an expectation of agglomeration economies in private industry. The economic ratio-
nale for using prisons to spur development is less clear, but prisons may be considered
a fiscal stimulus in the form of local employment. The increase in local labor demand
induced by the introduction of a new employer may have a multiplier effect by increas-
ing local demand for non-tradable goods and services and thus increase employment
in these industries; however any increase in local wages might also reduce employment
in local firms producing tradable goods (Moretti, 2010). If geographic mobility is low
or if ensuring the economic health of a particular geography is desirable, a state may
be interested in subsidizing rural employment through such a policy.
Introducing a public employer is appealing because it is relatively low-cost; if em-
ployees must be hired somewhere to provide the public good, they might be hired
where local development is desired, perhaps even at lower wages than in urban area.
However, at least in the case of prisons, the cost of rural siting is non-zero. Siting
prisons rurally increases the distances between inmates and their home communi-
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Table 2.1: Predicting Prison Opening in Following Decade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Already Prison Host 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0349∗∗∗
(0.00822) (0.00838) (0.0102) (0.0104)
Log Median Household Inc -0.0190 -0.0335 -0.0194 -0.0284
(0.0181) (0.0218) (0.0197) (0.0241)
Log Median House Value 0.00629 -0.0319∗∗ 0.0149 -0.0118
(0.00999) (0.0125) (0.0108) (0.0132)
Unemployment Rate 0.493∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0885) (0.105) (0.0894) (0.108)
Log Miles to State Pop Center -0.0150∗∗∗ -0.0221∗∗∗ 0.00515 -0.0113
(0.00427) (0.00458) (0.00777) (0.00863)
Log Avg Miles to State Population 0.0148∗ -0.00160 0.000904 -0.00369
(0.00789) (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0149)
Pop Density (1,000 per km2) -0.0987∗ -0.0137∗∗∗ -0.0186 -0.123
(0.00518) (0.00531) (0.0775) (0.0813)
Rural -0.0358∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗
(0.00667) (0.00706)
Constant 0.184 0.810∗∗∗ 0.0364 0.491∗∗
(0.135) (0.174) (0.144) (0.197)
Observations 9397 9397 6740 6740
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No Yes
County Sample All All Rural Rural
Notes: Each column represents a regression of an indicator for whether a county had a prison
opening over the course of a decade regressed on the listed county characteristics measured at the
beginning of the decade. Observations are at the county-decade level. The three decades included
are 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2015 Standard errors in parentheses with stars signifying
statistical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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ties, imposing costs on both the prison system (for example, by increasing inmate
transportation costs) and on the incarcerated population (for example, by decreasing
visitation). See Chapter 1 of this dissertation for a discussion of the potential impact
of distance from home on inmates.
One oft-cited concern about many place-based polices that prison employment is
likely exempt from is the concern about targeting the correct population, or whether
the policy is merely increasing the wages of those already likely to be employed. Given
that prisons employ a high percentage of non-college educated men, a group experi-
encing relative wage losses in recent decades (Autor et al., 2008), direct employment
by prisons does likely target the intended population. Whether any private-sector
spillover effects similarly benefit the intended population is an empirical question.
Considering rural prisons as place-based policies informs my empirical analysis
as follows. First, I restrict focus to prisons in rural areas; urban prisons are rarely
discussed using the same local employment growth language above, and prisons are
unlikely to have noticeable stimulus effects in larger economies. Second, I separate the
measured employment effect into jobs directly provided by the prison itself, and jobs
arising from spillovers into private sector industries. Without a beneficial spillover
to wages or employment in the private sector, it is more difficult to justify locating
prisons in areas far from inmate populations, given potential increased costs. Third,
given the open question of place-based polices’ ability to continue to spur growth
after the policy’s end and the declining US prison population providing natural case
of the removal of such a policy, I consider whether prisons have long-term positive or




2.3.1 Prison Locations, Openings, and Closings
My primary source for the timing of prison openings and closings is the Census of
State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities (hereafter CACF) conducted by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics approximately every five years from 1979-2005. 2 The
CACF contains information regarding the name of the facility, address, county, year
of completed construction, year the facility was converted to a prison, prison capacity,
inmate counts, and employment totals for correctional facilities.
I construct a comprehensive dataset of correctional facility operation, opening, and
closure between 1980 and 2015 as follows. I combine information about institutions
across all years of the CACF, and compare the set of institutions in the 2005 CACF
to current state government websites to establish which prisons remain open, which
have closed, and if any new prisons have opened. For prisons which first appear in
the CACF after 1979 and which record an opening year in at least one round of the
CACF which is consistent with their appearance in the data, I take this year to be
the facility’s opening year. For prisons which opened since 2005 or which do not
have an applicable opening date recorded in the CACF, I obtain prison opening years
from government sources or from public news coverage of the prison event. I obtain
closing years for facilities which are not currently open and capacity and the sex of
the inmate population for newly opened prisons from similar sources. I exclude from
my analysis prisons for which I cannot document opening and closing years consistent
with their presence in the CACF. Finally, I restrict all analysis in this project to the
facilities identified as serving the general correctional population, as other types of
correctional facilities (such as drug treatment centers) are inconsistently recorded in
2A round of the CACF was also conducted in 2012. However, this round contains only a limited
number of variables and thus I do not rely on it in my analysis.
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the CACF and are generally much smaller than general population facilities.
In Table 2.2, I show descriptive statistics from three CACF years. The vast
majority of prisons are operated by state governments, but the number of private
prisons increased dramatically during the 1990s. Prisons located in rural counties are
more often higher-security and male-only institutions. The demographics of prison
employees have changed over time, with a fall in the proportion male among total em-
ployees. Men remain the majority of employees and are more overrepresented among
correctional officers than among other prison jobs. Not shown here, the proportion of
women among correctional officers is smaller in male-only, higher security institutions
and larger in privately operated institutions.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics from the Census of State and Federal
Adult Correctional Facilities
All Prisons Rural Prisons
1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005
Number of Prisons 742 1077 1120 337 495 528
Federally Operated 49 76 93 16 33 44
State Operated 685 932 961 317 421 443
Privately Operated 8 64 64 4 39 41
Max Security 187 300 342 93 129 155
Med Security 325 451 434 145 228 227
Min Security 230 326 344 99 138 146
Percent Male Inmates Only 86.25% 84.87% 85.27% 89.61% 89.70% 90.34%
Mean Capacity 763.89 1043.02 1054.53 745.01 981.74 1015.57
Mean Inmates 761.49 1075.48 1148.54 737.42 1011.47 1085.58
Mean Employees 297.87 353.76 309.69 288.60 325.51 302.44
Percent Employees Male 75.01% 66.12% 66.69% 76.85% 66.74% 67.04%
Percent COs Male 83.72% 75.95% 75.48% 85.07% 75.36% 75.41%
Percent COs Black 20.99% 23.11% 24.04% 17.23% 20.12% 19.51%
Notes: Statistics calculated from the 1990, 2000, and 2005 Census of State and Federal Adult and
Federal Adult Correctional Facilities. Employee composition is incomplete in 2000 and 2005 and
therefore the means shown reflect a subset of prisons.
Figure 2·3 shows the geographic distribution of these changes over my three pe-
riods of interest: 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2015. For the period 2000-2015,
among rural counties, I identify 30 counties with only prison openings, 32 counties
71
with only closures, 3 counties with changes in both directions, and 289 counties with
prison presence but no closure. Over this same time period, 12 states have usable
within-state variation within their rural counties in exposure to prison closings, and
18 have variation in prison openings.
2.3.2 County Economic Outcomes and Characteristics
My primary data sources for county-level annual economic outcomes are the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Earnings and the Quarterly Workforce Indicators. The
QCEW provides a long time series of employment outcomes such as employment
levels and earnings by industry at the county level as far back as 1975, which make
these data ideal for comparing the employment effect of prisons across time periods.
However, these statistics are not reported by gender, so they do not allow the analysis
of whether any employment effect varies by gender. The QWI does report employment
and earnings for education and gender sub-groups, but are only widely available across
states beginning in 2000. The QWI reports employment on a quarterly basis, which
I convert to annual by taking the mean value across non-censored quarters for each
industry category studied. Further, in the QWI separate estimates are produced
for private establishments only and private establishments combined with state and
local (but not most federal) government employment; state and local government
employment can thus only be inferred by subtracting the private employment count
from the total employment count. In contrast, the QCEW explicitly provides annual
employment and establishment totals separately by the type of owner. Because of
these different limitations, I conduct analyses using both data sources to compare
effects over time and by demographic group.
A number of potential outcomes and county characteristics–such as employment
by county of residence and detailed demographics–are not available at the county
level on an annual basis but are available from decennial Census and annual American
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Community Survey data. I measure these variables at four points in time. For 1980,
1990, and 2000 measures I rely on the Decennial Census summary tables from these
years, aggregated at the county level. For 2015 measures I rely on the 2013-2017 ACS
summary table, aggregated at the county level.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
My primary method of analysis is a generalized difference-in-difference model which
fully exploits the timing of prison openings and closings along with annual variation
in employment. More precisely, I estimate the equation
yi,st = α + βPi,t + δst + γi + εist (2.1)
where yi,t is the outcome variable for county i in state s in year t, Pi,t is the prison
treatment level of county i in year t, δst is a state-specific year fixed effect, and γi is a
country-level time invariant fixed effect. In analyses that include only prison openings,
I define Pi,t as employment in adult general population correctional institutions ever
opened in the county, divided by population in the base year. In my analysis of
prison closings, I define Pi,t as the cumulative employment loss due to closures of
adult general population correctional institutions since the base year though time
t, divided by county population in the base year. When outcome yi,st is defined
as the employment level also adjusted by population in the base year, by estimated
coefficient β has the interpretation of the number of jobs lost (gained) when one prison
job is lost (gained) due to a prison closure (opening). My main specifications are also
limited to the sample of rural counties, and standard errors are clustered at the county
level. I include outcomes up to five years before and five years after the time period of
interest, subject to data availability. For regressions using the QCEW and studying
prison events 1980-1990, data from 1976-1995 is included. For regressions using the
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QCEW and studying 1990-2000, data from 1986-2005 is included. For regressions
using the QCEW and studying 2000-2015, data from 1996-2017 is included. For
regressions using the QWI and studying 2000-2015, data from 2000-2017 is included.
In each regression I include only counties in states with at least one rural county with
a relevant opening or closure during the time period. To explore the potential for a
dynamic impact and ensure there are no differential trends between counties soon to
have a prison close and others, I also estimate an event-study format of this model:
yi,st = α +
4∑
−4
(β−j∆Pi,t−j) + β−5Pi,t−5 + δst + γi + εist. (2.2)
∆Pi,t is the first difference in prison treatment over the previous year. The omitted
category is the value of the prison treatment variable five or more years in in the
future.
Using this specification with state-time fixed effects, I estimate the treatment
effect of a prison by comparing changes in counties within a single state with different
changes in the level of prison presence. My empirical strategy allows for the fact that
states which opened or closed more prisons may follow different trends at the state
level than other states. Because the vast majority of institutions are operated by
state governments, factors that may drive state level trends in prison construction
or closure, such as crime rates and state budget constraints, are likely related to
state level employment trends, and thus these fixed effects control for important
potentially confounding factors. With these fixed effects included, the identification
assumption is that counties with changes in prison openings or closing would have
followed similar trends as other counties in the same state which are included in
the estimation sample, in the absence of prison changes. However, prisons are not
randomly assigned to counties within a state, and the identification assumption may
be violated if the choice of which county within a state to host the new prison or
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the choice of which existing prison to close is associated with factors which influence
local economic outcomes. Potential violations include prisons being located in regions
with high expected future unemployment or if prisons in particularly economically
depressed counties are more or less likely to be closed.
To mitigate this potential threat to identification, I choose samples of counties
to be included in the analysis such that treated and untreated counties are more
likely to be similar and follow similar counterfactual trends. I choose two distinct
approaches for openings and closings so that the control group in each case reflects
a set of counties which are in a sense eligible for the relevant treatment. When
considering prison closings, I define the control group as the set of counties with an
operating prison at the start of the analysis period. For prison openings, I employ
propensity score matching to chose a set of counties without a prison opening during
the time period to serve as the control group. For analyses including both types of
prison treatment over the full time period 1990-2015, I include a county in the control
group if it was selected as a match in either time period or ever had a prison over the
analysis period.
I construct a propensity score-matched control group for prison openings for each
of three time periods, 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2015 as follows. I first choose
a set of predictors of prison treatment from a large number of candidate demographic
and economic characteristics following Imbens and Rubin (2015). 3 Drawing from
3The set of candidate characteristics are: population density; share of population in correctional
institutions; share of population under 18; share of population over 65; share of population foreign;
share of population without a high school diploma; share of population with a college degree; share of
household heads female; share of household heads black; share of household heads hispanic; share of
population on public assistance; share of population living below poverty line; log of mean household
income; share of employment in the construction, manufacturing, retail, service, personal recreation,
education or health, and public administration industries; share of employment in farm, service,
protection, other white collar (professional and administrative), and other blue collar (production
and manual labor) occupations; unemployment rate; log of total employment; log of median house
value; percent of housing units occupied and owner occupied; log of owner occupied and renter
occupied units; percent of housing units mobile homes; percent of housing units single-family; percent
of housing units in buildings with 2-4 units; percent of units less than 20 years old; percent of units
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these candidates, I include each first-order variable in a separate logit regression
among all rural counties predicting ever-treatment in the sample period. I calculate
the likelihood ratio statistic for each variable, and select the variable with the max-
imum value for inclusion in the propensity score. I then repeat this process, adding
each variable individually to the model on top of those already selected for inclusion,
until no first-order variable excluded from the propensity score has a likelihood ratio
statistic greater than 1. I then repeat this process again over first-difference terms
and then second-order terms, with a higher threshold for inclusion of 2.71 for 1990
and 1980 and 3.84 for 2000. I choose a more restrictive threshold for inclusion for
2000 because there are relatively few treated counties over this time period, and I
want to avoid over-identifying treatment status. Once the county characteristics are
selected, I generate propensity scores as the predicted values from a logit regression
among rural counties of ever-treated status on this set of characteristics. After gen-
erating a propensity score for each county, I construct the control group by choosing
for each treated county the two untreated rural counties in the same state with the
closest propensity scores, choosing with replacement.
In Tables 2.3 and 2.4 I show summary statistics which confirm that my preferred
choices of control groups for the prison opening and prison closing treatments are
indeed more similar in start-of-period characteristics than the broader set of rural
counties. According to Table 2.3, counties with a prison opening were generally less
educated, more racially diverse, had more female household heads, had more of the
population living below the poverty line, and already had a larger correctional pop-
ulation. However, the propensity score matched samples of counties are much more
with 0-1 and 2-3 bedrooms; percent of units with plumbing. All characteristics are measured from
the decennial census summary files. The first-difference terms are the changes in each one of these
characteristics between the census prior to the base year and the base year. The first-order variables
are these characteristics as measured in the base year. The second-order terms are all the possible
two-way interactions between these terms and the square of all first-order terms.
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similar to the treated counties on all of these dimensions. Table 2.4 shows that rural
counties with a prison in 2000 were denser and had higher minority populations, a
less educated population, and higher poverty rates than other rural counties. How-
ever, prison counties had larger economies among rural counties, as measured by the
employment level and total earnings. While prison counties and non-prison counties
differ, I find a much smaller difference between prison counties which did and did not
experience a prison closing. Part of the improvement in the covariate balance for both
opening and closings arises because because my methodology ensures similar states
are represented among the treatment and control group to account for the fact that
prison contraction and expansion has not occurred evenly across states; for example,
there are more prisons located in the South than other regions (Eason, 2010).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Employment Effects of Prison Closure
Figure 2·4 shows the effect of prison closures on public and private employment from
the estimation of equation 2.2. Government employment declines, with the timing
directly lining up with the closing of the prison. The point estimates suggest that for
every prison job lost, approximately 0.75 government jobs are lost in the county by five
years after the prison closure. I cannot rule out a 1-for-1 loss of public jobs, consistent
with the direct loss of prison jobs and no other effect on government employment.
Figure 2·4 also shows the employment effect on private sector employment. The
overall trend and point estimates suggest that around 0.5 private sector jobs are lost
when a prison closes, with the timing of the decline coinciding with the decline in
public employment, supporting that this is a causal effect of the prison. Despite the
overall downward trend and large point estimate, the estimates are quite noisy, and





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Rural Counties by Prison Closing
Treatment
All Rural Counties 2000 Prison Counties
Prison Non-Prison Closing No Closing
Demographic Characteristics
Mean Household Income 41, 022.54 40, 957.81 42, 211.47 40, 905.77
Pop Density (per sq km) 19.96 16.16∗ 29.93 18.98∗∗∗
Proportion No HS Diploma 0.27 0.24∗∗∗ 0.27 0.27
Proportion College Degree 0.13 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14 0.13
Proportion Under 18 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Proportion Over 65 0.16 0.17∗∗∗ 0.15 0.16∗
Proportion Black 0.11 0.06∗∗∗ 0.16 0.11∗
Proportion Hispanic 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05
Proportion Below Poverty Line 0.16 0.15∗∗ 0.15 0.16
Proportion on Public Assistance 0.04 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04 0.04
Proportion Foreign 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Proportion Correctional Population 0.06 0.00∗∗∗ 0.05 0.06
Proportion Female Hhld Heads 0.28 0.26∗∗∗ 0.29 0.28
Economic Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 0.07 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06 0.07
Mean Weekly Wage 468.66 442.11∗∗∗ 484.33 467.13
Employment Level 12, 639.23 7, 808.61∗∗∗ 17, 708.15 12, 141.39∗∗∗
Observations 401 1648 41 360
Notes: Statistics are derived from county-level summary tables for the 2000 Decennial Census.
Prison presence and closure is established from the Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional
Facilities and review of local news articles and government websites. The “Prison” column shows
the mean value among rural counties with a prison in my sample opened by 2000. The “No
Prison” column contains the mean value among all other rural counties. The “Closing” column
contains the mean among counties which had a prison in 2000 that closed by 2015. The “No
Closing” column contains the mean among counties with a prison in 2000 which was still open by
2015. Stars next to the the mean values in the “No Prison” or “No Closing” columns indicate the
results of a t-test comparing the mean between this and the corresponding group at the following
significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
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Notes: Each graphs shows the coefficients on annual leads and lags of employment in general
population correctional institutions from a regression of employment of the specified population on
these variables along with county and state-year fixed effects. The omitted category is prison
employment five years in the future. Prison and total employment are both divided by the 2000
non-prison population. The estimation sample is restricted to rural counties with a public adult
correctional institution in 2000. The regressions are estimated using annual QWI employment
counts from 2000-2017. Only counties with data for all years in the estimation sample are
included. The shaded region represents a 95% confidence interval for each coefficient, with
standard errors clustered at the county level.
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The timing of any job losses related to prison closure also differs for private and
public employment. In the public sector, job loss associated with the prison closure
appears to begin 2-3 years prior to the official prison closure, consistent with a gradual
transition of inmates and employees out of the facility. Further, most of the employ-
ment loss does occur between year -1 and 0, and the trends do not diverge after the
prison closure, as we would expect if the decline was solely driven by the loss of prison
jobs. In the private sector, counties facing an imminent prison closure do not show
differential employment trends prior to the closure, supporting the plausibility of the
parallel trends assumption. The full amount of the (statistically insignificant) decline
occurs on and after the official closure year.
Because two-thirds of prison employees are men as shown in Table 2.2, prison
closures may have differential effects on employment by gender. Figure 2·5 shows the
results of repeating the event study analysis separately for men and for women. Prison
closings have a similar effects on the government employment of men and women,
which decline similarly around the time of the prison closure and remain relatively
flat afterwards. However, the impact of private employment differs slightly by gender.
The private sector employment of women declines statistically significantly, starting
at the time of the prison closure and continuing afterwards. While never statistically
different from zero, for men, private employment dips slightly in the years after the
closing but recovers slightly later. The time path of men is also estimated with less
precision than that of women, and so I cannot reject that the two time paths are the
same.
I next estimate equation 2.1, the simple difference-in-difference model, to obtain
specific point estimates. Using both the QWI and QCEW, I cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the effect of a prison closure on total employment in the county is a
job loss of exactly the number of employees of the prison. The first panel of Table
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Notes: Each graphs shows the coefficients on annual leads and lags of employment in general
population correctional institutions from a regression of employment of the specified population on
these variables along with county and state-year fixed effects. The omitted category is prison
employment five years in the future. Prison and total employment are both divided by the 2000
non-prison population. The estimation sample is restricted to rural counties with a public adult
correctional institution in 2000. The regressions are estimated using annual QWI employment
counts from 2000-2017. Only counties with data for all years in the estimation sample are
included. The shaded region represents a 95% confidence interval for each coefficient, with
standard errors clustered at the county level.
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2.5 shows the effect of prison closure on government, private, and total employment
as measured by the QWI. The results are qualitatively similar to the conclusions
drawn from the previously discussed figures. In the next panel of Table 2.5 I show
the results using employment counts from the QCEW. Overall, the QCEW results
further support the estimation of a negative employment shock upon the prison clo-
sure, primarily concentrated in the government sector. In the QCEW, any impact
on the private sector is estimated with more noise, and so I can rule out neither an
effect of zero nor an effect equal to that estimated in the QWI.
Table 2.5: Effect of Public Prison Closings 2000-2015 on Employment
QWI QCEW
Total Government Private Total State Gov. Private
All Employment -1.008 ∗∗∗ -0.583 ∗∗∗ -0.425 ∗∗ -1.497 ∗∗∗ -1.231 ∗∗∗ -0.364
(0.282) (0.153) (0.207) (0.302) (0.433) (0.247)
Male Employment -0.461 ∗∗∗ -0.274 ∗∗∗ -0.186
(0.176) (0.076) (0.127)
Female Employment -0.548 ∗∗∗ -0.309 ∗∗∗ -0.239 ∗∗
(0.126) (0.100) (0.094)
Observations 3132 3132 3132 3850 2398 3806
Notes: Each number in this table shows the coefficient on employment in general population
correctional institutions from a regression of employment of the specified population on public
prison employment along with county and state-year fixed effects. Prison and total employment
are both divided by the 2000 non-prison population. The estimation sample is restricted to rural
counties with a public adult correctional institution in 2000. The QWI estimation includes years
2000-2017. The QCEW estimation includes years 1996-2017. Only counties with data for all years
in the estimation sample are included. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county
level, with stars signifying statisticical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.5.2 Comparing to Previous Studies of Prison Openings
Table 2.6 shows the result of applying my empirical approach to prison openings from
1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2015. In both the 1980s and 1990s, I find a null effect
on total employment. Public employment increases by slightly less than the number
of jobs in the prison in both periods. This growth is offset by a decline in private
sector employment, although this decline is only statistically significant in the 1990s.
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For openings in the 2000s, the results are most consistent with the only effect being a
direct gain of prison jobs; however these results are noisy due to the relatively small
number of prisons opened in this period.
Table 2.6: Effect of Public Prison Openings 1980-2015 on Employment
QCEW QWI
Total State Gov. Private Total Government Private
Prison Openings 1980s -0.068 0.843 ∗∗∗ -0.763
(0.630) (0.192) (0.502)
[5260] [2000] [6860]
Prison Openings 1990s 0.216 0.769 ∗∗∗ -0.447 ∗∗
(0.244) (0.042) (0.226)
[6760] [5140] [6700]
Prison Openings 2000s 0.832 ∗∗∗ 0.422 0.066 0.367 ∗∗∗ 0.326 ∗∗∗ 0.041
(0.186) (0.254) (0.399) (0.109) (0.055) (0.112)
[1980] [1584] [1958] [1296] [1296] [1296]
Notes: Each number in this table shows the coefficient on employment in general population
correctional institutions from a regression of employment of the specified population on public
prison employment along with county and state-year fixed effects. Prison and outcome
employment are both divided by the base year non-prison population. The estimation sample
sample includes all rural counties with a public adult correctional institution opening between
1980-1990, 1990-2000, or 2000-2015, as indicated in the row heading, and comparison rural
counties propensity-score matched to a county with a prison opening. The estimations for the
1980s include years 1976-1995. The estimations for the 1990s include years 1986-2005. The QCEW
estimation for the 2000s includes years 1996-2017. The QWI estimation for the 2000s includes
years 2000-2017. Only counties with data for all years in the estimation sample are included.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county level, with stars signifying statisticical
significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The number of observations for each
regression is in square brackets.
My results suggest that prisons have an positive effect on public employment
upon opening, though the effect on total employment is mitigated by crowding out of
private employment, and that upon closing, both public and private sector jobs are
lost. In comparison, prior studies of prison openings (Glasmeier and Farrigan, 2007;
Chirakijja, 2018) have found a modest positive economic effect largely resulting from
the direct effect of prison employment and no spillover, either positive or negative, to
the the private sector. The most important differences between my approach and that
of prior studies are an exclusive focus on rural counties and the parameterization of the
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treatment as proportional to the prison size. In Appendix B.1 I show the sensitivity of
my results to changes to the sample, to the use of state time trends instead of state-
time fixed effects, and to parameterizing treatment as the number of prisons and
the outcomes variables as log employment. My qualitative conclusions are robust to
changes to the specification. The most notable change across specifications is that the
private sector job loss in the 1990s loses statistical significance when prison treatment
is not defined in terms of the relative prisons size, though all point estimates are still
negative.
My results suggest that the presence of a new prison in the 1990s had a different
effect on local private sector employment than later closings. To explore the statistical
significance of these differences, I estimate a regression which includes all prison
treatment over the full period 1990-2015:
yi,st = α + βPi,t + δst + γi,POST + εist. (2.3)
Here, Pi,t is the level of prison employment in time t, and so the estimated β will
reflect the impact of both openings and closings. In this regression I include data
from 1986-2017 and include all ever-treated and propensity-matched counties in the
sample. I include separate county fixed effects for the pre- and post-2000 status to
maintain comparability to results already shown and to ensure that any estimated
coefficient of βPost is identified from changes in prison status in the post period rather
than overall changes to counties pre- and post-2000.
To test whether prison closings have a differential effect of prison openings, I
estimate regressions including two prison treatment terms: Pi,t as just defined and
Ci,t which reflects the total employment of closed prisons in county i from 1990
through t. Therefore the coefficient on this closings term estimates whether the effect
of a closing is different than the mirror effect of the opening. Because closings are
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reflected by a decline in Pi,t and an increase in Ci,t, job losses upon prison closure are
reflected by a positive coefficient β but a negative βClose.
The regression model is:
yi,st = α + βPi,t + βCloseCi,t + δst + γi,POST + εist (2.4)
To test if the effect of prison presence is different after 2000, I run
yi,st = α + βPi,t + βPost (Pi,t × Postt) + δst + γi,Post + εist (2.5)
where I interact the prison treatment variable with an indicator for post-2000. Finally,
I run a horse-race regression including both the prison closing term and the post-
2000 interaction term in an effort to understand whether any differences in the causal
effect arise from differences between openings and closings or changes over time.
Accordingly, I estimate:
yi,st = α + βPi,t + βCloseCi,t + βPost (Pi,t × Postt) + δst + γi,Post + εist (2.6)
The results of estimating these equations are presented in Table 2.7. Columns
represent the estimation of equations (2.3)-(2.6) as labeled, with each panel estimating
the impact for a different employment sector. As expected, prison presence has a
positive effect on government employment in all periods, with a larger effect upon
closing. Although the point estimates imply that prison presence after 2000 had
a negligible or positive effect on private employment, I cannot reject that prisons
had a negative effect on private employment across all time periods and openings
vs closings. Overall, the results are consistent with a story that prison presence has
a positive effect on government employment, with the loss upon closure potentially
larger than the loss upon opening, but a negative effect on private employment in the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5.3 Private Sector Employment Effects by Industry
Here, I explore the effect on private sector employment separately by industry. As
proposed by Moretti (2011), an increase in labor demand can increase employment
in local firms producing non-tradable goods and services through a local aggregate
demand effect, but may also crowd out employment in firms producing tradable goods
by increasing the equilibrium wage. I investigate both whether this pattern is observed
upon prison opening and whether the reverse is observed upon a a prison closure. The
primary tradable industry I consider here is manufacturing. The non-tradable service
industries I consider are retail trade, food services and accommodation, finance and
real estate, and health care.
One complication of this analysis is that both the QCEW and QWI censor em-
ployee counts if the number of employees is small or the industry is dominated by a
single employer. I consider a number of approaches to dealing with this data limita-
tion: restricting my analysis to a balanced panel of counties with no missing values
in the industry, estimating an unbalanced panel model using all available employ-
ment observations and ignoring missing values, replacing missing values with zeros,
replacing missing values with the mean value for the county in non-missing years, and
constructing a minimum and maximum bound of the estimated effect by replacing
missing values with the mean county value when the treatment prison has not yet
opened and with zero after the prison’s opening and vice-versa. I do not show the
results of each of these approaches separately here, but I note that in all cases, the
results lead to qualitatively similar conclusions. The lone exception is the bounding
exercise for the QCEW in the health industry, which provides an uninformatively
wide bound as approximately 1/3 of observations are censored in this industry in the
QCEW. Finally, I note that prison presence does not predict the likelihood of a county
having a missing value of employment in any industry over any time period in either
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the QCEW or QWI. In the tables which follow in this section, I show the results for
restricting the regression sample to the set of counties for which a balanced panel can
be constructed. I also do not show results for openings in the 2000s here because the
already small sample of treated counties combined with this data limitation leads to
noisy and uninformative results.
In Table 2.8 I show the result of estimating equation 2.1 using employment by
industry as the outcome. I find distinctly different patterns of industry effects upon
prison opening and prison closure. Overall, these results show that at least for the
sample of rural counties, the private sector contraction upon a 1990s prison opening
is driven by job loss in manufacturing, consistent with a possible crowding out effect
described by the local multipliers literature. The bounding exercise described above
suggests an average effect of 0.12-0.24 manufacturing jobs lost for every prison job
gained in the county, with the lower bound statistically different from zero. Upon
prison closure, the additional private sector job losses are concentrated in health
care, with no mitigation by jobs regained in manufacturing. Due to the high degree
of censoring of health employment in the QCEW, the bounding exercise using this
dataset cannot rule out either a null effect on health employment nor an effect as large
as 0.5 health jobs lost for every prison job lost, but due to the greater data availability
in the QWI, the bounding exercise in this dataset confirms a point estimate of 0.13
health jobs lost with ever prison job lost. The concentration of these job losses
in a service sector is consistent with the predictions of the local multiplier effects
literature, but the fact that job losses appear to be specifically concentrated in health
care suggests these jobs are directly related to the provision of services to the prison
rather than an aggregate demand effect. The lack of any positive effect on employment
on opening or a decline on closing in other non-tradable sectors like retail, recreation,
or other services suggests that the presence of a prison did not stimulate local demand
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upon opening or cause a decline upon closure.
Table 2.8: Effect of Public Prisons on Employment by Industry
Finance and Food Service
Manufacturing Retail Real Estate Health and Accomodation
Prison Openings 1980-1990
QCEW Employment -0.037 0.132 0.001 -0.056 ∗ -0.098
(0.115) (0.110) (0.021) (0.033) (0.109)
[6260] [3500] [5120] [6020] [3620]
Prison Openings 1990-2000
QCEW Employment -0.133 ∗ -0.012 -0.011 -0.054 -0.053
(0.068) (0.051) (0.015) (0.064) (0.048)
[5700] [4280] [4300] [2200] [3180]
Prison Closings 2000-2015
QCEW Employment -0.057 -0.026 -0.058 -0.467 ∗ -0.005
(0.173) (0.044) (0.058) (0.252) (0.046)
[3212] [3718] [2882] [990] [2090]
QWI Employment 0.009 -0.043 -0.028 -0.134 ∗ -0.037
(0.188) (0.037) (0.027) (0.073) (0.033)
[2898] [3132] [2628] [3114] [3060]
Notes: Each number in this table shows the coefficient on employment in general population
correctional institutions from a regression of employment in the specified industry on public prison
employment along with county and state-year fixed effects. Prison and outcome employment are
both divided by the base year non-prison population. The 1990s Openings estimation sample
includes all rural counties with a public adult correctional institution opening between 1990-2000
and comparison rural counties propensity-score matched to a county with a prison opening. The
2000s Closings sample includes all rural counties with a public adult correctional institution in
2000. The QWI estimation includes years 2000-2017. The QCEW estimation includes years
1986-2005 for the 1990s estimation and 1996-2017 for the 2000s estimation. Only counties with
data for all years in the estimation sample are included. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the county level, with stars signifying statisticical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The number of observations for each regression is in square brackets.
In Table 2.9, I confirm that the private provision of health care to the prison itself
explains the private sector job losses at prison closure. I here categorize states by
whether states deliver health care to their prisoners as determined by a Pew Center
survey: via direct provision of health care, private contractors, state university health
systems, or some combination (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2017). 4 Consistent with
4The states which contract health care are AL, AZ, AR, DE, FL, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, MA, MD,
ME, MO, MS, NM, TN, VT, WV, WY. The states which provide directly are AK, CA, HI, IA, NC,
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the health care sector effects of prisons arising as a result of the direct provision
of health services to the prison itself, I find private sector health care effects are
concentrated among states which contract out health care. Further, given that in the
1990s, only a handful of states privately contracted all health services (McDonald,
1995) it is unsurprising that this relationship between the private health sector and
public prisons only exists in later years, as during the earlier period of prison opening
these jobs would have been classified as government employment. The concentration
of private-sector effects in health likely also explains the stronger and more consistent
employment effects for women upon prison closure, given that nearly 80% of health
care employees are women.5 Table 2.9 also shows that the gender gap in private sector
employment is present only in states with privately contracted health care.
Finally, I provide some additional insight into the nature of the manufacturing
job losses observed upon prison opening. While not shown, I note that as with the
negative effect on total private sector employment, this result is specific to specifi-
cation where the prison treatment is defined in terms of prison size relative to local
population and not a count of institutions, suggesting that any manufacturing effects
are specific to large prison openings in relatively small counties. In Table 2.10, I show
results for prison openings with prison events divided into four groups according to
whether the opened prison was above or below the median size of prisons opened
during the decade (318.5 employees) and whether the county’s population size was
above or below the among treated counties in 1990 (21,417.5 people). According to
these results, only small counties where a large prison opened experienced manufac-
turing job losses. Further, within these size categories, the results are qualitatively
ND, NE, NV, NY, OH, OK, OR, SC, SD, UT, WA, WI. The states using a hybrid are CO, LA, MI,
MN, MT, PA, RI, VA. The states relying on public university health systems are CT, GA, NJ, TX
(The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2017). Results are not shown for states relying on university health
systems due to the small sample size.
5As measured nationally in the QWI in 2005.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Public Prison Closings 2000-2015 on Employment
by Health-Care Provision
QWI QCEW
Total Men Women Total
Private Sector Total Employment
Direct-Provision -0.552 0.825 -1.378 1.416
(2.582) (1.826) (1.122) (1.892)
[1098] [1098] [1098] [1298]
Contract-Provision -0.670 ∗∗ -0.317 -0.354 ∗∗∗ -0.718 ∗∗
(0.286) (0.191) (0.099) (0.358)
[972] [972] [972] [1210]
Hybrid -0.064 -0.007 -0.057 -0.087
(0.170) (0.129) (0.096) (0.228)
[738] [738] [738] [902]
Private Sector Health Employment
Direct-Provision -1.821 -0.179 -1.649 0.015
(1.220) (0.252) (1.030) (1.947)
[1080] [1062] [1080] [418]
Contract-Provision -0.273 ∗∗∗ -0.066 ∗∗∗ -0.207 ∗∗∗ -0.476 ∗
(0.041) (0.012) (0.035) (0.262)
[972] [972] [972] [440]
Hybrid 0.032 -0.020 0.053
(0.078) (0.014) (0.068)
[738] [720] [738]
Notes: Each number in this table shows the coefficient on employment in general population
correctional institutions from a regression of total or health private sector employment on public
prison employment along with county and state-year fixed effects. Prison and total employment
are both divided by the 2000 non-prison population. The estimation sample is restricted to rural
counties with a public adult correctional institution in 2000 and to the set of states providing
health care to prisons by the means specified in the row heading. The QWI estimations include
years 2000-2017. The QCEW estimations include years 1996-2017. Only counties with data for all
years in the estimation sample are included. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county
level, with stars signifying statisticical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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similar regardless of how employment and prison intensity is parameterized. While
this crowding out effect on manufacturing is a novel finding, I interpret this result
with caution given the large number of specifications and industries considered in this
paper. Not shown, the impact of the private sector closures on health employment
do not change according to the relative size of the prison and the county, supporting
that these health job losses are related to direct provision of the prison rather than a
spillover effect.
Table 2.10: Effect of Public Prison Openings 1990-2000 on Employ-
ment by Prison and County Size
Outcome: Employment/Population Outcome: Log Employment
Treatment: Employees of Opened Treatment: Open
Prisons/Population Institutions
Total Private Manufacturing Total Private Manufacturing
Below median prison size, 0.012 -0.432 0.218 0.053 ∗∗ 0.008 -0.066
below median county size (0.012) (0.739) (0.233) (0.023) (0.034) (0.070)
[4720] [4660] [3920] [4720] [4660] [3920]
Below median prison size, 0.002 -1.107 -0.347 0.007 0.012 0.026
above median county size (0.010) (1.277) (0.427) (0.029) (0.035) (0.043)
[4440] [4380] [3860] [4440] [4380] [3860]
Above median prison size, 0.006 -0.507 ∗∗∗ -0.238 ∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.071 ∗∗∗ -0.208 ∗∗∗
below median county size (0.007) (0.135) (0.083) (0.021) (0.025) (0.076)
[4620] [4560] [3760] [4620] [4560] [3760]
Above median prison size, 0.013 ∗∗∗ -0.046 0.016 0.036 ∗∗∗ 0.011 0.011
above median county size (0.003) (0.190) (0.102) (0.010) (0.012) (0.033)
[4680] [4620] [4060] [4680] [4620] [4060]
Notes: Each number in this table shows the coefficient on a measure of general population
correctional institution presence from a regression of a measure of employment in the specified
sector on public prison presence along with county and state-year fixed effects. Employment and
prison presence measures are specified in the vertical panel headings. Only treated counties in the
group specified by the row heading are included. The control group remains all
propensity-matched counties in all regressions. Employment data is sourced from the QCEW. The
estimations for the 1990s include years 1986-2005. Only counties with data for all years in the
estimation sample are signifying statisticical significance as included. Standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the county level, with stars follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In summary, prison openings generally did not stimulate any local positive eco-
nomic spillovers, with some evidence that openings in the 1990s may have crowded
out manufacturing jobs in less populous counties hosting a particularly large prison.
Prison closures in later decades resulted in further job losses in private industries
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directly supplying the prison, but do not appear to have had any general equilibrium
effects on employment in the county, either positive or negative.
2.5.4 Results from Census and ACS
Thus far, I have considered employment as determined by the location of the employer,
due to data availability at the annual level. Now I consider outcomes based on the
county of residence. For these analyses I rely on Census and ACS data tabulated at
the county level, which is available less frequently. Therefore, instead of estimating the
generalized difference-in-difference model described in Section 2.4, I instead compare
outcomes at the beginning and end of each of the three time periods by estimating
the regression model:
∆yi,s = βPi + δs + βXi,t−1 + εi,s (2.7)
where Pi is the prison treatment variable (the increase or decline in inmate or prison
employee counts per base year population), ∆yi,s the change in the outcome variable
(population or employment level per base year population), and δs is a state fixed
effect to control for state-level trends in the outcome. Xi,t−1 is a vector of base-
year economic and demographic controls, 6 and I estimate the model both with and
without these controls. For the prison closing regressions in this section, I include all
6 The control vector Xi,t−1 includes the following variables, as measured by the census in the
base year: population density; share of population in correctional institutions; share of population
under 18; share of population over 65; percent of population foreign; percent of population without a
high school diploma; percent of population with a college degree; percent of household heads female;
percent of household heads black; percent of household heads Hispanic; percent of population on
public assistance; percent of population living below poverty line; log of mean household income;
share of employment in the construction, manufacturing, retail, service, personal recreation, educa-
tion, health, and public administration industries; share of employment in farm, service, protection,
other white collar (professional and administrative), and other blue collar (production and manual
labor) occupations; unemployment rate; log of the employed population; log of median house value;
percent of housing units occupied and owner occupied; log of owner occupied and renter occupied
units; percent of housing units mobile homes; percent of housing units single-family; percent of
housing units in buildings with 2-4 units; percent of units less than 20 years old; percent of units
with 0-1 and 2-3 bedrooms; percent of units with plumbing.
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rural counties with a prison in 2000, even if not in a state with a rural prison closure,
to aid in identifying the effects of these base-year controls. For prison expansion in
the 1980s and 1990s, I compare county-level outcomes between decennial censuses.
For prison contraction in the 2000s, I compare county-level outcomes in the 2000
decennial census with estimates from the 2015 5-year ACS sample, which aggregates
information across the 2013-2017 ACS surveys. In the tables below, I show only the
estimated effect of prison openings before and closings after 2000, as the results for
openings after and closings before 2000 are imprecisely estimated.
I first explore effects on population, with the results shown in Table 2.11. I here
define the prison treatment as the number of inmates in the prison so that the results
are comparable to a one-for-one increase in the number of prisoners in the opened or
closed facility. In both the 1980s and 1990s, the effect on county population follows
a consistent pattern: the group quarters population, including prisoners, increases
significantly, while the rest of the population appears unaffected when controlling
for county characteristics. The effect on population upon closure is less clear. I
find a statistically significant population decline, but it appears to be concentrated
among the general population, rather than prisoners. I may not find a significant
effect on prisoners if underutilized prisons are more likely to be closed or if prisoners
are relocated to other facilities in the same county when possible. Therefore, prison
openings do not appear to draw non-inmate population into the county, but a prison
closure may induce a general population decline.
Next, I explore effects on the employment of residents of the hosting county. Table
2.12 shows the results of estimating equation 2.7 with the employment of residents
as the outcome. Here the prison treatment is again the number of employees of the
prison, to benchmark the results against a one-for-one increase in employment. The
first two columns show the effect of prison openings on the employment of residents.
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Table 2.11: Effect of Public Prison Opening and Closings on Popula-
tion
Prison Openings 1980s Prison Openings 1990s Prison Closings 2000s
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Total Population 0.143 0.302 ∗∗∗ 0.531 ∗∗∗ 0.818 ∗∗∗ -0.333 -0.841 ∗∗
(0.119) (0.103) (0.100) (0.081) (0.426) (0.380)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Non-Group Quarters Population -0.234 ∗∗ -0.098 -0.230 ∗∗ 0.051 -0.268 -0.582 ∗
(0.113) (0.093) (0.098) (0.076) (0.422) (0.352)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Group Quarters Population 0.378 ∗∗∗ 0.401 ∗∗∗ 0.760 ∗∗∗ 0.768 ∗∗∗ -0.065 -0.259
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.191) (0.201)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Male Population 0.266 ∗∗∗ 0.356 ∗∗∗ 0.631 ∗∗∗ 0.773 ∗∗∗ -0.305 -0.650 ∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.061) (0.056) (0.050) (0.250) (0.249)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Female Population -0.123 ∗∗ -0.053 -0.100 ∗∗ 0.045 -0.028 -0.191
(0.056) (0.046) (0.050) (0.039) (0.220) (0.173)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Base Year County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Each number in this table represents the coefficient on the change in prison employment
from a regression of change in the specified population on the change in public prison employment
arising from prison openings or closings as specified in the vertical panel heading, along with state
fixed effects and additional base-year control variables as indicated in the last row and described in
footnote 6. Population and prison employment are both divided by the beginning of decade
non-prison population. Changes during the 1980s and 1990s are measured between decennial
census years. Changes during the 2000s are measured as the change in the outcome between the
2000 decennial census as the 2013-2017 5-year American Community Survey average and the
change in prison employment between 2000 and 2015. The 1980s and 1990s Openings estimation
samples includes all rural counties with a public adult correctional institution opening during the
decade and comparison rural counties propensity-score matched to a county with a prison opening.
The 2000s Closings sample includes all rural counties with a public adult correctional institution in
2000. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county level, with stars signifying
statisticical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The number of observations
for each regression is in square brackets.
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Overall I find results quite similar to those estimated from the QCEW for employers
within the county. I find an increase in state government employment consistent with
the direct impact of hiring by the prison, but a decline in private sector manufacturing
employment consistent with a crowding out effect.7 Therefore, the total employment
impact on residents of the county is indistinguishable from zero. Further, the effect
on state government employment is significantly smaller than one-for-one and smaller
than the effect on employers estimated earlier, suggesting prisons employed many
commuters not residing in the county.
The last two columns show the effect of prison closures. Across both specifications,
I cannot rule out an overall null effect of prison closure on the employment of county
residents. For public sector employment, I estimate a relatively precise zero effect. My
results are consistent with the policy of many states to attempt to relocate lost prison
jobs to other facilities in the state, 8 which may mitigate the job losses experienced
by residents even if their jobs are no longer located within the county. Additionally,
some of the prison job losses are likely experienced by those who lived outside of the
county. Finally, I note that the more demanding specification for prison closings does
indicate some decline in total and private sector employment upon prison closure,
which may be driven by the population decline seen in Table 2.11.
2.6 Conclusions and Discussion
Overall, these findings suggest that rural prisons were at best a misguided choice
of local development strategy. While the introduction of a prison does induce a
7As before, the negative impact in manufacturing is specific to an empirical specification where
the prison treatment is defined in terms of prison size relative to the local population.
8See for example, the Florida’s Corrections Secretary statement that “We are committed to
placing as many affected staff as possible in vacant positions for which they are qualified” upon
the announcement of plans to close several state correctional facilities (Pera, 2012) and Virginia
officials’ claim that they will be able to place about half of prison employees displaced by the closure
of Mecklenburg Correctional Center at new jobs within the prison system (Jouvenal, 2012).
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Table 2.12: Effect of Public Prison Opening and Closings on Employ-
ment of Residents
Prison Openings 1980s Prison Openings 1990s Prison Closings 2000s
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Total Employment -0.340 -0.179 -0.153 0.076 -0.658 ∗∗ -0.867 ∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.195) (0.163) (0.140) (0.297) (0.267)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Total Labor Force -0.420 ∗ -0.284 -0.193 0.016 -0.604 ∗ -0.715 ∗∗
(0.238) (0.207) (0.174) (0.152) (0.322) (0.291)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
State Gov Emploment 0.277 ∗∗∗ 0.233 ∗∗∗ 0.134 ∗∗∗ 0.149 ∗∗∗ -0.022 0.048
(0.035) (0.037) (0.028) (0.031) (0.053) (0.056)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Private Emploment -0.359 ∗∗ -0.330 ∗∗ -0.260 ∗∗ -0.123 -0.312 -0.581 ∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.145) (0.119) (0.109) (0.217) (0.206)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Employment by Industry
Manufacturing Employment -0.156 ∗∗∗ -0.179 ∗∗∗ -0.077 -0.097 ∗ -0.012 -0.137 ∗
(0.059) (0.062) (0.049) (0.050) (0.096) (0.079)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Health Employment -0.048 ∗ -0.025 -0.052 ∗∗ -0.021 0.006 -0.018
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.060) (0.061)
[359] [359] [387] [387] [406] [406]
Base Year County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Each number in this table represents the coefficient on the change in prison employment
from a regression of change in labor force or employment in the specified industry on the change in
public prison employment arising from prison openings or closings as specified in the vertical panel
heading, along with state fixed effects and additional base-year control variables as indicated in the
last row and described in footnote 6. Outcome and prison employment both divided by the
beginning of decade non-prison population. Changes during the 1980s and 1990s are measured
between decennial census years. Changes during the 2000s are measured as the change in the
outcome between the 2000 decennial census as the 2013-2017 5-year American Community Survey
average and the change in prison employment between 2000 and 2015. The 1980s and 1990s
Openings estimation samples includes all rural counties with a public adult correctional institution
opening during the decade and comparison rural counties propensity-score matched to a county
with a prison opening. The 2000s Closings sample includes all rural counties with a public adult
correctional institution in 2000. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county level, with
stars signifying statisticical significance as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The
number of observations for each regression is in square brackets.
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mechanical increase in public sector employment, there are no substantive positive
spillovers to the private sector. In fact, in particularly small counties experiencing
the introduction of a particularly large prison, perhaps those areas most expecting
an economic boost from the prison, prison openings may actually have crowded out
manufacturing employment, even in the long-term. Further, my results also suggest
that many of these new prison jobs were taken by commuters from outside of the
county, diluting the local economic impact even further. Prison openings also did not
increase the local non-prisoner population. On a more optimistic note, given ongoing
criminal justice reform, future prison closures are likely and future openings less so,
and these results suggest that such closures should not result in a deep local economic
decline despite popular fears.
My findings also have relevant implications for the study of local labor markets.
Previous studies of private sector shocks to local labor demand in the US find a
positive multiplier effect, and prior studies of public sector demand shocks in other
countries find at least some positive effect on non-tradable industries even if it is
counteracted by losses in tradable industries. In contrast, I find no evidence of any
positive effect on non-tradable industries and in some cases a negative effect on the
tradable industry. One potential explanation for these disparate results is that prisons
are a unique industry. If the presence of a prison itself is a discouragement to new
firms locating in the county, prisons may by their very nature inhibit positive economic
changes from taking hold. Finally, I note that most prison closures occurred during




The Gender Bonus Gap: Evidence from
Young American Workers
3.1 Introduction
One of the most important economic transformations over the past half century has
been the dramatic convergence in education, labor force participation, and earnings
between men and women (Blau and Kahn, 2006). At the same time, jobs in the
United States have increasingly relied on performance pay to compensate and incen-
tivize workers (Lemieux et al., 2009), both through objective measures such as piece
rates and through subjective measures such as discretionary bonuses. Most prior
studies of performance pay and the gender wage gap have focused on gender differ-
ences in the taste for competitive workplaces as the primary or sole explanation for a
potential relationship, but do not find that accounting for performance pay participa-
tion explains much if any of the overall gender wage gap (Manning and Saidi, 2010;
McGee et al., 2015). However, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997, I show that beyond lower rates of participation, women who participate
in performance pay earn a smaller reward for their participation than men. This wider
gender wage gap in performance pay jobs is difficult to explain by gender differences
in competitive tastes alone, and I propose gender differences in subjective evaluation
of on-the-job performance as a potential explanation.
This study relates to both prior research regarding the components of the gender
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wage gap, especially the role of job attributes, and the impact of the prevalence of
performance pay in the job market on the wage structure. Although women have
gained in labor market participation and experience over the past century and even
surpassed men in terms of higher education, the gap between male and female wages
has not been eliminated, and convergence in earnings has slowed since the 1980s
(Goldin, 2014; Blau and Kahn, 2016). Highly educated and high earning groups
demonstrate both the widest wage gap and the slowest convergence in recent decades
(Blau and Kahn, 2016). Gender earnings differences in high-income occupations result
in part from the impact of children and the resulting desire for flexible schedules or
more accommodating workplaces, as shown in studies of elite Master’s of Business
Administration graduates (Bertrand et al., 2010) and high-income occupations with
varying degrees of hours flexibility (Goldin, 2014).
Alongside these dramatic changes in the gender composition of the labor force, the
prevalence of bonuses and other forms of incentive pay has increased in the US labor
market, altering the way in which many employees are evaluated and compensated.
White, male workers rewarded for performance tend to experience a greater wage
premium for their productive characteristics, increasing wage inequality particularly
at the top end of the wage distribution (Lemieux et al., 2009). As a result, wages are
more dispersed in performance-pay jobs, and high-ability workers sort into such jobs.
However, black workers do not appear to experience the same increased earnings
rewards for productivity in performance pay jobs as white workers (Heywood and
Parent, 2012), suggesting that the impact of performance pay on earnings may differ
for groups potentially affected by bias or discrimination.
Regarding the potential relationship between performance pay and gender specif-
ically, a number of prior studies, primarily experimental, have explored potential
gender differences in the taste for participating in competitive pay schemes. Experi-
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mental results suggest that women are less likely to choose competitive, tournament-
based compensation over less competitive piece rates (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007),
although meta-analysis of many such experiments is less conclusive (Bandiera et al.,
2017). Even when women do opt out of competitive pay in the lab, laboratory ex-
periments may not capture the same competitiveness trade-off as performance pay
in the workplace. In particular, many experiments consider tournament pay as the
competitive scheme while a piece rate is the non-competitive comparison, while in
the labor market a piece rate itself would classify as performance pay, with a fixed
wage as the comparison. More directly comparing the choice between truly fixed and
performance-varying wages, an experiment utilizing randomized job postings does
suggest that women are more dissuaded than men from applying to jobs with indi-
vidually competitive performance evaluation (Flory et al., 2015).
A few more recent studies have attempted to quantify the relevance of these ex-
perimental results to aggregate labor market outcomes, and find limited support for
the importance of competitive tastes. Evidence from the British labor market finds
women only slightly less likely to work in positions with performance pay and find a
similar wage effect of performance pay for men and women. Under the assumption
that performance pay is a proxy for a competitive environment the therefore conclude
that the experimental findings of competitive attitudes have limited ability to explain
the overall gender wage gap (Manning and Saidi, 2010). McGee et al. (2015) consider
the US with data from the NLSY79 and NLSY97 and similarly find that the partic-
ipation gap between men and women is quite small and participation rates explain
almost none of the overall gender wage gap. In Spain, however, de la Rica et al.
(2015) find that despite similar rates of participation by gender and positive selection
of women into performance pay, the gender gap in earnings is wider within perfor-
mance pay jobs. They suggest that discrimination by performance pay employers as
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the most plausible explanation given the similar participation rates.
Additionally, much of this previous research focuses on differential tastes as an
explanation for performance pay’s role in the gender wage gap. However, if women
experience different returns to participating in performance pay schemes than men,
their participation and earnings in performance pay may differ even if tastes do not.
Given that performance rewards, especially bonuses, are often highly discretionary
and based on subjective criteria, manager biases may be reflected in earnings to a
greater degree within performance pay jobs. Further, performance pay may coincide
with other job attributes, such as hours flexibility, that affect the gender wage gap or
job choice, leading to an empirical relationship between the incidence of performance
pay and the wage gap beyond a direct impact of performance pay itself.
In this chapter, I consider simple theoretical models of bias in subjective evalu-
ation and differences in tastes to establish the relationship between gender and per-
formance pay under each of these two explanations in isolation. Utilizing data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, I examine women’s participation
and earnings in performance pay jobs in the US labor market. I find that women
experience a smaller earning increase from participation in performance pay relative
to men, even when controlling for underlying ability through the use of individual
fixed effects. Additionally, earnings in jobs awarding bonuses are more responsive
to weekly hours worked than other jobs, suggesting that performance pay may be a
component of the returns to long hours hypothesized as a source of a gender wage
gap in many occupations by Goldin (2014). Together these results make clear that
differences in the taste for competition alone cannot explain the full relationship be-
tween performance pay and gender; differences in subjective evaluation and other job




In this section, I consider a simple theoretical framework to establish the separate
implications of bias in evaluation and difference in tastes for the relationship between
performance pay and the gender wage gap. Of particular interest is how gender dif-
ferences in performance evaluation, rather than worker preferences over job types,
can influence both the rewards women earn in jobs which reward performance and
the rates of participation in such jobs. In environments where an employer’s sub-
jective evaluation of performance or the employee’s self-evaluation are important de-
terminants of bonus compensation, women’s earnings may be negatively affected by
employer bias, implicit or explicit, or gender differences in self-evaluation. Goldin
and Rouse (2000) shows that in the world of elite symphony orchestras, masking
the gender of an auditioning musician changes the gender composition of those se-
lected, suggesting that the gender of the performer affects the applicant’s evaluation
in this clearly subjective environment. In the broader job market, men and women
can be rewarded differently for the same attributes, such as personality character-
istics (Mueller and Plug, 2006). With information from a single law firm, Briscoe
and Joshi (2016) provide anecdotal evidence that the political preference of managers
might affect relative bonuses paid to women and men. Further, self-assessments of
performance can differ by gender, even when actual performance does not (Correll,
2001), a difference which could be reflected in performance bonuses based in part on
employee self-evaluation. Here, I specifically consider the possibility that employers’
subjective evaluation of men’s and women’s on-the-job performance may differ even
if the underlying ability of workers of both genders is observable at the hiring stage,
providing a channel for the employer’s biases to be reflected in earnings in perfor-
mance pay jobs but not in fixed wage jobs. Aside from issues of evaluation, women
may dislike participating in competitive environments more than men, which could
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create gender differences in both participation rates and patterns of selection into
performance pay. Separate models of each of these two potential explanations show
the potential for each to generate gender differences in performance pay earnings in
the absence of other factors, and the limits of considering a single explanation.
3.2.1 Bias in Subjective Evaluation
To demonstrate how employer bias can impact performance rewards, I present in this
section the model developed by MacLeod (2003) of optimal contracting under sub-
jective performance evaluation, to be later expanded to incorporate worker selection.
In the simplest version of this model, an agent works for a principal on a project,
which produces B if the project succeeds, and nothing if the project fails. The project
succeeds with probability λ according to the agent’s effort. After completion of the
project, both the agent and the principal receive private signals about the quality
of the agent’s performance, either acceptable (A) or unacceptable (U); these signals
may conflict. If the project fails, both receive signal U , but if the project succeeds,
the signal combination ts is observed with probability γts, where t is the principal’s
signal and s is the agent’s signal. The outcome B is not observable or contractible,
but the self-reported subjective signals ts are contractible, to reflect an environment
where subjective performance evaluation is the sole reward criteria. Possible con-
tracts consist of a payment Xts made by the principal and income Yts received by the
agent, where Yts ≤ Xts. Both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral. Therefore
the principal’s expected payoff from a contract is Π = λB − E(X), and the agent’s
is U = E(Y )− V (λ) where V (·) is a convex function representing the agent’s cost of
effort. The agent has an outside option which provides him with utility U0.
As shown by MacLeod (2003), the optimal contract for the principal to offer the
agent takes the form of a base wage w paid in all states, a bonus b earned by the
agent when the principal finds his performance acceptable, and penalty P paid by
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the principal (but not earned by the agent) when the agent thinks his performance
was acceptable, but the principal does not. The penalty ensures the principal does
not have an incentive to misreport her own signal about the agent to avoid paying
him a bonus. These payments take the form:
b =V ′(λ∗)/(γAA + γAU)
P =V ′(λ∗)/γAA
w =U0 + V (λ
∗)− λ∗V ′(λ∗)
with the optimal effort provided by the agent satisfying B = Cλ(λ
∗, α) where
C(λ, α) = U0 + V (λ) + αλV
′(λ)
is the principal’s cost of inducing effort level λ and α = γUA
γAA
represents the “bias” of
the principal against the agent.
Intuitively, to incentivize a given level of effort λ, the principal sets the incentive
payment, paid to the agent when her signal of the agent’s effort is acceptable, such
that the agent’s marginal cost of exerting this level of effort is equal to his benefit
from the expected bonus payment. The principal then sets the wage such that the
risk-neutral agent is indifferent between the incentive contract and the outside option
in expectation. The principal also agrees to an penalty to be paid if she disagrees
with the agent’s self-assessment, large enough to ensure that she will in fact prefer to
deliver the bonus payment when performance is acceptable. Given a contract of this
form, the principal chooses the optimal level of effort λ∗ to maximize profits.
The optimal level of effort for the principal to induce is a function of this bias ratio
α. In this model, the bias term represents the relative probability that the principal
is dissatisfied with the agent’s performance, conditional on the agent finding his own
performance acceptable. Increased bias in this model can arise either from an increase
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either from a fall in the principal’s likelihood of finding the agent’s performance ac-
ceptable holding the agent’s beliefs constant or from a reduction in the correlation
between the agent’s and principal’s signals. Therefore this model captures the role of
gender bias in subjective evaluation to the extent it impacts managers’ evaluations in
this way. For example, a manager may view the same behavior, such as an assertive
communication style, positively in male employees and negatively in female employ-
ees, and thus be less likely to evaluate women’s performance positively even if men
and women view their own performance similarly. However, potential other sources
of bias, such as differences in men and women’s self assessment independent of their
employers’ assessment, are not addressed here.
For λ∗ to be a unique solution for optimal effort, the second order condition
requires that Cλλ(λ, α) > 0; therefore by implicit differentiation, ∂λ
∗/∂α < 0. That is,
as the bias, or likelihood of conflicting evaluation, increases, the level of effort induced
by the principal falls. Based on this change in the induced level of effort, earnings of
the agent under the optimal contract are affected. The total expected compensation
of the agent in this contract is U0 + V (λ
∗), which is clearly increasing in λ∗ and so
falling as bias increases. However, the base wage payment U0 + V (λ
∗) − λ∗V ′(λ∗) is
actually falling in the optimal effort level, and so the base wage actually increases as
bias increases. Intuitively, as bias falls, the cost of incentivizing effort falls because
the penalty or cost of disagreement is incurred less frequently, and the principal
induces a higher level of effort by increasing the spread between the wage and the
bonus both by increasing the expected bonus payment and decreasing the wage.
Therefore, in this simple model of subjective evaluation, an increased level of bias
(or likelihood of employer-employee disagreement about performance quality) against
female agents would predict a lower expected wage among women participating in such
jobs compared to men. Further, the base wages of women in such jobs should actually
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be higher than men’s, but their average earnings from bonus rewards themselves
should be smaller. Additionally, if bias is primarily driven by a reduced likelihood of
finding employee performance acceptable (γAA+γAU is smaller for women than men),
then bonus awards, which occur with probability λ∗(γAA + γAU), will be less frequent
for women than for men.
3.2.2 Bias and Selection
The baseline model developed by MacLeod (2003) and presented above considers only
a single type of agent. However, given that the common taste-based explanation of
performance pay participation has important implications for the participation and
selection of individuals into performance pay, I now consider how bias in subjective
evaluation may induce selection patterns of participation and selection of individuals
into job types.
Consider an identical contracting framework with subjective evaluation, but now
individual i has ability ai, where underlying ability is observable to both the principal
and the agent. Agents’ abilities fall in the interval [a, ā], with a > 0. The ability
parameter increases the output of the project under the subjective contract to aiB
with B > 1, but also increases the agent’s outside option to U0i = ai. That is, ability
increases the agent’s productivity both inside and outside of the subjective contract.
Conditional on observing the agent’s ability, the optimal contract for the principal
follows the same framework as when all agents are identical. The bonus and penalty
are the same functions of optimal effort, but the baseline wage is now wi = ai +
V (λ∗i )−λ∗iV ′(λ∗i ). With ability now affecting the output, optimal effort is now defined
by aiB = Cλ(λ
∗
i ;α, ai) where C(λ, α, ai) = ai + V (λ) + αλV
′(λ).
The optimal contract varies with the agent’s ability. As before, from the second
order conditions for a unique solution to λ∗i , Cλλ > 0. Also clearly Cλa = 0. Therefore
it follows that ∂λ∗i /∂ai > 0: the optimal level of effort increases as ability (and
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therefore the potential reward to effort) increases. As a result, the expected earnings
of the agent in the performance pay contract ai+V (λ
∗
i ) increase with ability. Expected
bonus earnings λ∗iV
′(λ∗) also increase. The direction of the baseline wage in the
subjective contract is ambiguous without specifying a functional form of V (·) : ai
increases, but V (λ∗i )− λ∗V ′(λ∗i ) falls.
Proposition 1: There is some ability level a∗ such that the principal will find it
profitable to employ an agent in the subjective contract if and only if he has ability
above the threshold a∗. Agents are therefore positively selected into the performance




> 0. That is, the ability threshold, and thus the extent of
positive selection, increases with bias (for proof, Appendix C.1.2).
As before, bias, as modeled by the likelihood that the principal’s evaluation of
the agent will differ from the agent’s own, will affect the optimal contract provided
by the principal. Identically to the simple model, at each ability level, the expected
earnings increase from participation in performance pay V (λ∗i ) falls as bias increases,
because the optimally induced level of effort falls. Because the optimal contract for
each ability level is affected by the level of bias, the ability threshold for participation
is also affected.
Proposition 3: The direction of the impact of bias α on the average earnings
increase from participation among participants is ambiguous, but a negative impact
on the average earnings increase from participation is possible for some functional
form assumptions. (for proof, see Appendix C.1.3).
In this model with heterogeneous agent ability, when comparing a male and female
worker with the same ability level, here equivalent to the same earnings in the fixed-
wage job, the biased-against woman will benefit less from participating in performance
pay as in section 3.2.1. However, only higher-ability female workers participate. The
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direct effect of bias on incentives decreases the average return to performance pay,
while the selection effect raises it; the total impact on the average return to perfor-
mance pay participation conditional on participating will therefore depend on which
effect is larger. Importantly, if the extent to which bias weakens incentives is stronger
than the effect on selection, then this model could generate a lower average return to
performance pay participation among participants for women than men. The effect
of bias on the returns to performance pay for the marginal participant is similarly
ambiguous, with the decrease in incentivized effort and the increase in the ability of
the marginal participant acting in opposition.
3.2.3 Taste for Competition
The most commonly discussed explanation for a relationship between the gender
wage gap and performance pay has been women’s distaste for the competitive envi-
ronment of such workplaces. As a result of this distaste, women will select out of
performance pay jobs, negatively impacting their wages if performance pay jobs pay
higher wages. Intuitively, this implies that women will be less likely to participate in
performance-pay jobs on average but will also be positively selected into these jobs
on both observable and unobservable characteristics, implying higher wages for those
who do opt into competitive environments.
For a simple illustration of how differential tastes alone may affect wage pat-
terns, consider a Roy model with two sectors (Borjas, 1991). Let 0 denote the non-
performance pay sector and 1 denote the performance pay sector. The earnings of
worker i, with observable characteristics Xi in sector j are given as
















capturing the worker’s relative productivity in the two sectors unrelated to the ob-
servable characteristics Xi. Suppose the utility of worker i of gender g is
uij = lnwij − cig1{j = 1}wherecig
is individual i’s utility cost of participating in the competitive sector, or “distaste” for
working in performance pay. Let cig = c̄g + εic, εic ∼ N (0, σ2c ). Assume c̄F > c̄M so
that the average distaste for competition is higher among women, let εic be indepen-
dent of Xi, and let ρc1 and ρc0 be the correlation coefficients between εic and εi1 and εi0
respectively. Making the further assumption that σ20 < σ01 < σ
2
1 reflects the empirical
regularity that performance pay jobs show greater wage dispersion (see Lemieux et al.
2009) and assumes that skills in the two sectors are reasonably strongly correlated,
implying positive selection of workers into performance pay on unobservable ability.
A worker participates in a performance pay job if he or she gets more utility from the
job, that is when β1Xi + εi1 − cig > β0Xi + εi0.
The probability of worker i, with characteristics Xi, of gender g, participating in
a performance pay job is
Prob(j = 1|g,Xi) = 1− Φ (zig)





σ2c do not differ by gender, but that c̄M < c̄F , then clearly Prob(j = 1|g = M,Xi) >
Prob(j = 1|g = F,Xi). That is, conditional on a level of observable characteristics
and assuming a similar dispersion of potential earnings and tastes, men will be more
likely to participate in performance pay than women.
Now consider the wages of workers who chose performance pay jobs. The wage
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conditional on working in a performance pay job is















The expected wages of these same workers if they had worked in the other sector are















Both wages are increasing in zig (and thus c̄g) as long as σ
2
1 − σc1 > σ01 > σ20 + σc0,
true if taste is relatively weakly correlated with ability, or if higher ability individuals
are more likely to have low distaste for competition (σc1 < 0, σc0 < 0). Therefore,
among performance pay participants, the expected potential earnings in both sectors
will increase with the average level of distaste for participation, indicating greater
positive selection into performance pay. Further, conditional on their observable
characteristics, these workers experience an increase in earnings of









from choosing to participate in the performance pay sector. As long as taste is either
relatively weakly correlated with ability or more negatively correlated with ability
in the performance pay sector (σ21 + σ
2
0 − 2σ10 > σc1 − σc0), this earnings gain from
participation will be greater than the difference in mean wages between the two
sectors due to positive selection. This earnings premium increases with average cost
or distaste factor c̄g; as the distaste for working in competitive jobs increases, those
who do choose to participate must experience an even greater earnings reward as a
compensating differential.
While abstracting away from the particular features of a performance pay job vs a
fixed wage job, this model illustrates the limit of differential tastes alone to explain the
relationship between the gender wage gap and performance pay. If women as a group
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have a higher level of distaste for working in competitive environments than men, then
they will be less likely to participate in competitive jobs like those with performance
pay, and women who do participate will be more positively selected into performance
pay than men, in that they have both higher expected counterfactual earnings in the
fixed-wage job and experience larger increases in earnings from participation than the
average man who participates.
3.2.4 Summary of Theoretical Implications
Biased evaluation and gender differences in competitive tastes imply some similar
patterns regarding women’s participation in performance pay, but have quite different
implications for women’s earnings in such jobs. Both models predict lower rates of
participation in performance pay by women. In the biased evaluation model, the
fact that the bias weakens the effectiveness of incentives causes fewer women to be
profitably incentivized by the performance pay contract. In the taste model, a larger
distaste for competition among women results in fewer women than men benefiting
in terms of utility from participation the performance pay sector. Further, the bias
model can generate less frequent performance rewards, while the taste model does not
address this point. Both models predict that women who do participate will be more
positively selected into performance pay than men, in the sense that the expected
earnings in the fixed-wage sector of women who participate in the performance pay
sector will be higher than the earnings of participating men.
Bias in evaluation and gender differences in competitive tastes generate starkly
different predictions regarding the expected earnings benefit of women for participat-
ing in performance pay. Conditional on ability in the non-performance pay sector,
the model of gender differences in tastes predicts that women who participate in per-
formance pay should experience a larger increase in earnings from their participation
than similar men. However, bias in evaluation would cause a woman to experience a
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smaller increase in earnings from participating as compared to an otherwise-identical
man. However, the predictions are a bit more ambiguous as to the average benefit to
participation observed in the population. Again the taste model strongly predicts that
on average, women’s earnings should increase more than men’s from participation. In
the bias model, each individual woman receives a smaller increase for participation
than a similar man, which reduces the average earnings benefit, but women are posi-
tively selected into participation, which increases the average earnings benefit. If the
bias effect is stronger than the selection effect, then a negative gender difference in
the average return to participation is possible, in contrast to the taste model where
a negative gender difference is never predicted.
These two potential factors should be relevant for different subsets of performance
pay jobs. Clearly, the biased evaluation model discussed here is only relevant in sit-
uations where performance rewards are allocated according to subjective evaluation
or managerial discretion, and not when the performance reward is allocated accord-
ing to objective, observable criteria. Therefore, bias should affect compensation as
predicted by the model in types of performance pay where subjective evaluation is
likely common, such as bonuses, but should not be a factor when performance is eval-
uated objectively, as in commission jobs. However, objective and subjective types
of performance pay are both plausibly related to competitive environments in the
workplace. Commissions may require workers to compete with each other for clients
or customers, while bonuses may involve explicit or implicit comparison of employees
with one another. Therefore, gender differences in tastes can reasonably be expected
to affect all types of performance pay as predicted by the model, with women par-




The empirical analysis relies on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997 . In addition to providing demographic and economic characteristics of the
panel survey respondents, the NLSY97 contains information about the presence, type,
amount, and frequency of performance-related earnings in all years for all jobs. Al-
though the receipt of performance pay is recorded, the true indicator of interest,
whether performance rewards were available to the individual on the job, is not avail-
able. Therefore, I exploit the panel nature of the data and follow the method of
Lemieux et al. (2009) by identifying performance pay jobs as those where the indi-
vidual ever received performance pay while working in that job. This categorization
will obviously be an imperfect proxy for the availability of incentive pay and perfor-
mance rewards; jobs where rewards were available but unearned will not be captured,
and jobs where the rewards structure changed over time may be miscategorized in
some years. Overtime pay, tips, bonuses, commissions, incentive pay, and “other”
extra compensation are identified in the survey. I include bonuses, commissions, and
incentive pay as “performance pay”; overtime pay and tips are not included.
In the majority of analyses, I treat each worker-job-response year as a single
observation. Only observations where the worker was over 18 and not enrolled in
school are included. Self-employed, military, and public sector jobs are excluded, as
are jobs held for less than 13 weeks as of the time of the interview. Control variables
include education categories, quadratics in weeks experience and weeks job tenure,
race, union status, marital status, and industry, occupation, and year fixed effects. I
inflate or deflate earnings to 2010 dollars according to the CPI. Table 3.1 presents the
mean of many variables of interest by gender within this sample of worker-job-years.
Women are more likely to be educated, be married, and have children but less likely
to be in performance pay or work full time. In Figure 3·1, I also show the rates of
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participation in performance pay by the worker’s educational category. Participation
in performance pay increases with education through the Bachelor’s degree level,
beyond which the incidence depends on the type of degree awarded. This increase in
overall participation is primarily driven by an increased use of bonuses at higher levels
of education, with virtually no workers with a graduate degree earning commissions.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Observation
Male Female Total
Age 25.82 26.01 25.91
(0.0246) (0.0251) (0.0176)
Graduated HS 0.853 0.896 0.874
(0.00185) (0.00165) (0.00125)
At Least BA 0.163 0.253 0.207
(0.00193) (0.00234) (0.00152)
Graduate Degree 0.0285 0.0541 0.0409
(0.000870) (0.00122) (0.000743)
White 0.538 0.526 0.532
(0.00261) (0.00269) (0.00187)
Married 0.237 0.292 0.264
(0.00223) (0.00245) (0.00165)
Has Child 0.000930 0.0163 0.00838
(0.000159) (0.000682) (0.000342)
Years Tenure 2.544 2.444 2.495
(0.0143) (0.0139) (0.00996)
union 0.116 0.0894 0.103
(0.00167) (0.00154) (0.00114)
Full Time 0.804 0.691 0.749
(0.00208) (0.00249) (0.00163)
Performance Pay 0.314 0.274 0.295
(0.00243) (0.00240) (0.00171)
Bonus Pay 0.260 0.220 0.241
(0.00229) (0.00223) (0.00160)
Commission 0.0731 0.0603 0.0669
(0.00136) (0.00128) (0.000938)
Observations 36550 34441 70991
Notes: Mean value shown, with standard error of mean in parentheses
Many of the following empirical analyses exploit the panel nature of the dataset
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through the use of individual fixed effects, requiring the presence of a reasonable sam-
ple of individuals observed in both job types and several observations per individual
to estimate any impact of performance pay. Table 3.2 gives information at the worker
level about the number of observations per individual and worker-level participation
in performance pay jobs. The typical worker is observed 8-9 times in 4 jobs, and
around 50% of the sample for each gender is observed in both job types, enabling the
estimation of models with worker-level fixed effects.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics by Worker
Male Female Total
Number of Observations 8.673 8.565 8.621
(0.0764) (0.0751) (0.0536)
Number of Jobs 4.284 4.281 4.282
(0.0404) (0.0392) (0.0282)
Always in Perf Pay Job 0.0731 0.0552 0.0644
(0.00401) (0.00360) (0.00270)
Sometimes but not Always in Perf Pay Job 0.511 0.492 0.502
(0.00770) (0.00788) (0.00551)
Observations 4214 4021 8235
Notes: Mean value shown, with standard error of mean in parentheses
Table 3.3 lists the most commonly observed occupations among performance pay
jobs for both men and women. For both men and women, retail-related occupations
are relatively common among jobs that award performance pay across both commis-
sions and bonuses. However, we see relatively more representation of men in blue-
collar occupations such as laborers and truck drivers, while women in performance


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4 presents the average marginal effect of being female on participation in per-
formance pay for the female sample, estimated from a probit regression of an indicator
for a performance pay job on a female indicator and a set of worker and job control
variables. The marginal effects imply that the average women is approximately 5 per-
centage points less likely to participate in performance pay than a similar man when
controlling for personal characteristics, and 3.5 points less likely when also controlling
for job characteristics. This result is consistent with previous findings (McGee et al.,
2015; Manning and Saidi, 2010). Most previous studies have claimed such a finding as
support for women’s lower taste for competition, but as previously shown, differences
in performance evaluation could similarly lead women to avoid participating in such
jobs. Notably, when conditioning on participating in a performance pay job, women
are no less likely to receive a performance reward in a given period, as shown in the
lower panel.
Patterns of participation by gender also differ between bonus- and commission-
awarding jobs. When only controlling for personal characteristics, the gender gap in
participation is much wider in bonus jobs, though much fewer workers of both genders
participate in commission jobs. However, the estimated gender gap in bonus partici-
pation is highly sensitive to the choice of controls. In particular, a large portion of the
gender gap in participation can be explained by weekly hours worked, suggesting that
women may avoid participating in performance pay to avoid other job characteristics
likely to be associated with such jobs. The estimated gender gap among commission








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.2 Performance Pay and Wages
Next, I summarize the overall empirical relationship between the gender wage gap
and performance pay by estimating equations of the form
logwageij = αFemalei + ηPPj + δ (PPj × Femalei) +Xijβ + εij, (3.1)
where logwageij is the log of individual i’s effective hourly wage in job j inclusive
of performance earnings, PPj indicates a performance pay job, Xij is a vector of
individual and job characteristics. The results of these regressions are shown in Table
3.5. Consistent with previous findings, including an indicator for performance pay
appears to explain a small (less than 1 percentage point) portion of the residual wage
gap, both when all performance pay jobs are grouped together and when bonus and
commission jobs are considered separately. However the interaction terms between
the indicators for performance pay, bonus, and commission jobs and female are all
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the average earnings increase for
participation in performance pay is smaller for women than for men. With separate
indicators for bonus and commission jobs in a single specification, the results are
qualitatively similar, though the statistical significance of the gender difference in the
return to commission jobs is reduced.
Table 3.6 shows the extent to which this wider gender gap exists solely in perfor-
mance rewards themselves, or also in the base wage in jobs which award bonuses or
commissions. I again estimate equation 3.1, but alter the outcome variable to reflect
earnings from all sources except performance pay in the second vertical panel, and to
reflect only performance pay in the third panel.1 For bonus jobs, women’s earnings are
1To account for the large number of zeros values of performance pay earnings, in all regressions
where the outcome is such earnings, I take the inverse hyperbolic sine of earnings rather than the
log. The coefficient on female from these regressions can still be interpreted as the proportional































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10-12% lower in both the base wage earned in such jobs, and in performance earnings
themselves. For commission jobs, the pattern differs. Here, the gender gap in base
earnings is statistically indistinguishable from non-performance pay jobs, although
still economically meaningful in magnitude. However, the gender gap in performance
compensation is much wider, on the order of 20%.
Table 3.6: OLS Regression Results, by Performance Pay Type
Wages Less Performance
All Wages Performance Pay Pay Only




Bonus Pay 0.184∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.01000)
Bonus * Female -0.0473∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0376∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0150) (0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0219)
Observations 70969 17093 70969 17093 17093






Commission * Female -0.0684∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.0302 -0.0972∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0287) (0.0275) (0.0280) (0.0647)
Observations 70969 4749 70969 4749 4749
Jobs Sample All Commission All Commission Commission
Notes: Control variables include degree category, quadratics in work experience and job tenure,
union status, marriage status, presence of children, race, and industry, occupation, and year fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level, with symbols signifying
statistical significance as follows: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Because these regressions do not account for unobservable worker characteristics,
a portion of the estimated performance pay premium is almost certainly attributable
to selection of individuals into job types. High-ability workers likely sort into jobs
that reward their ability more, and so part of the estimated return to performance
pay captures the higher baseline productivity of these workers. Therefore, exploiting
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the panel nature of the available data, I add individual fixed effects to the regressions
to estimate the returns to performance pay, holding individual ability constant to the
extent this ability affects earnings in both job types similarly.
Table 3.7 presents the results of these fixed effects estimations. As shown in the
first vertical panel, the finding of an increased gender wage gap in performance pay
jobs survives the inclusion of individual fixed effects. I cannot reject that the fixed
effects estimate of the wider gap is the same as the OLS estimate. Both procedures
suggest that the gender gap in total compensation is approximately 5% wider in per-
formance pay jobs. When considering types of performance pay jobs separately, the
estimated gender gap appears to shrink for bonus jobs and increase for commission
jobs with the inclusion of fixed effects, though neither of these differences is statisti-
cally significant.
The second vertical panel repeats the analysis using only non-performance pay
earnings as an outcome. For both performance pay in general and bonus jobs specif-
ically, the result for base pay are similar to total compensation. The fixed effects do
push any gender differential in base pay in bonus jobs to statistical significance only
at the 10% level, but I cannot reject that the effect with and without fixed effects
is the same. For commission jobs, as suggested by Table 3.6, the gender wage gap
in non-performance pay earnings is not wider than other jobs. In fact, my results
suggest that after controlling for selection, neither men nor women earn more in base
pay in commission jobs than in other jobs; all additional earnings take the form of
commissions. However, the fixed effects results for base pay in commission jobs are
estimated with a great deal of noise, and so I can reject neither no additional gender
gap nor large effects.
These fixed effect results are not consistent with a taste-based explanation in iso-
lation. The women observed participating in both sectors benefit less on average than
126
Table 3.7: Fixed Effect Regression Results, by Performance Pay Type
Wages Less
All Wages Performance Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Performance Pay
Female -0.0519∗∗∗ -0.0468∗∗∗ -0.0450∗∗∗ -0.0381∗∗∗
(0.00830) (0.0110) (0.00824) (0.0109)
Performance Pay 0.219∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.0852∗∗∗
(0.00986) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.00937) (0.0102) (0.0103)
Perf Pay * Female -0.0570∗∗∗ -0.0559∗∗∗ -0.0518∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗ -0.0407∗∗ -0.0354∗
(0.0132) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0125) (0.0138) (0.0141)
Observations 70969 42520 70969 70969 42520 70969
Bonus Pay Only
Female -0.0601∗∗∗ -0.0577∗∗∗ -0.0588∗∗∗ -0.0562∗∗∗
(0.00827) (0.0117) (0.00825) (0.0117)
Bonus Pay 0.184∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.01000) (0.0108) (0.0107)
Bonus * Female -0.0473∗∗∗ -0.0450∗∗ -0.0332∗ -0.0376∗∗ -0.0360∗ -0.0238
(0.0139) (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0148)
Observations 70969 36721 70969 70969 36721 70969
Commissions Only
Female -0.0639∗∗∗ -0.0601∗∗∗ -0.0615∗∗∗ -0.0536∗∗
(0.00776) (0.0174) (0.00774) (0.0174)
Commission 0.319∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.0939∗∗∗ 0.0413+ 0.0284
(0.0201) (0.0211) (0.0226) (0.0190) (0.0213) (0.0228)
Commission * Female -0.0684∗ -0.0627∗ -0.0738∗ -0.0302 -0.0323 -0.0478
(0.0285) (0.0293) (0.0306) (0.0275) (0.0295) (0.0313)
Observations 70969 14992 70969 70969 14992 70969
Worker FE? No No Yes No No Yes
Worker Sample Full Switcher Full Full Switcher Full
Notes: Control variables include degree category, quadratics in work experience and job tenure,
union status, marriage status, presence of children, race, and industry, occupation, and year fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level, with symbols signifying
statistical significance as follows: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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men from participating in performance pay; if they also dislike the environment more
than men on average, we would expect only women who earn substantially more un-
der performance pay to be willing to participate, even among women only marginally
likely to participate. For a model of taste differences to fully explain earnings differ-
ence, we would need to allow distaste for competition to affect both participation and
performance under incentive compensation; however, such an explanation seems un-
likely to explain the gender gap in even the non-performance component of earnings
in bonus jobs.
3.4.3 Selection Bias
The fixed effects specifications control for a great deal of the selection into performance
pay by estimating the returns to performance pay within individuals observed in both
types of jobs. However, workers might also vary in terms of their individual expected
return to participating in a performance pay job, and the fixed effects only control for
individual characteristics which are rewarded similarly in both types of jobs. If the
group of individuals who switch between jobs is differentially selected by gender along
such characteristics, selection bias could still affect the estimation of the premium.
In particular, in the fixed effects model
lnwageijt = αi + ηPPj + δ (PPj × Femalei) +Xijtβ + εijt
the estimated η̂ represents the average return to performance pay among men, and
η̂ + δ̂ the average return to performance pay among women. Even in the absence of
differential treatment by gender, a negative estimate of δ could arise if women who
only sometimes participate would benefit less from performance pay than men who
only sometimes participate due to differential selection on any unobservable traits
compensated differently by performance pay jobs.
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Given that an individual cannot be observed in a performance pay job treated as
the opposite gender, definitively ruling out the negative selection of women on such
potential treatment effects is not possible. However, if performance-pay specific ability
is correlated with measurable characteristics then gender selection patterns along such
characteristics might suggest the gender difference in selection on potential outcomes.
First, I consider selection into performance pay participation according to education.
Figure 3·2 shows the distribution of educational attainment in bonus and commission
jobs by gender. Across both job types and genders, individuals participating in
performance pay are positively selected, except that those with graduate degrees are
much less likely to earn commissions. Visually, women appear slightly less selected
into performance pay, given that the decline in representation of less than high school
graduates and increased representation of college graduates is less dramatic for them.
However, the sample of women even in non-performance pay jobs has a higher level
of education than the male sample. Education may therefore be less predictive of
participation for women, but women who do participate do not have notably lower
education than men who participate.
I next explore selection along the dimension of scores on the Armed Forces Qual-
ifying Test, as a proxy for ability unobservable to employers. The AFQT includes
test results for arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and
mathematics knowledge. AFQT scores are calculated from the underlying Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test section results available in the NLSY97
following Altonji et al. (2009). The distribution of AFQT by gender and participa-
tion is shown in Figure 3·3. The patterns for AFQT are similar to the patterns for
education. Participants in bonus pay are strictly positively selected, while participa-
tion in commission jobs is less common at both the top and bottom of the distribution.
The difference between the distribution of participants and non-participants is less
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dramatic for women, primarily because the non-participant distribution for women is
higher. Again, ultimately this measure of ability is less predictive of participation for
women.
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Finally, in Figure 3·4 I directly compare at an individual level the distributions
of the productive characteristics of men and women who only sometimes participate
in performance pay, because this population identifies the fixed effects coefficient.
Women who sometimes participate have very similar education and AFQT distri-
butions to men who sometimes participate, and if anything have higher levels of
education. If relative productivity in performance pay is likely to be correlated with
these measurable traits, then it appears implausible that negative selection of women
into performance pay jobs drives the increased gender gap that I find.
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Figure 3·5 shows the distributional effects of performance pay for men and women.
For both bonus and commission jobs, the gender gap in the premium earned for
participating in performance pay is widest at the top of the income distribution. For
bonus jobs, I find that the relative benefit of participation is stable across the income
distribution for men, but actually decreases at the highest quantiles for women. This
pattern is somewhat surprising given that studies such as Lemieux et al. (2009) and
Heywood and Parent (2012) find the benefits of performance pay to be higher at high
quantiles, but could reflect the young age of this sample relative to other data sources
used to study performance pay, such as the Population Study of Income Dynamics.
Commission jobs in this sample follow a more conventional pattern, with both men’s
and women’s benefit of participation and thee gender gap increasing along the income
distribution.
3.5 Alternative Explanations
The fixed effects results in the previous section show women experience a smaller
earnings benefit from participating in performance pay as compared to men. As-
suming that potential selection bias and measurement error do not fully explain this
difference, the wider gender wage gap in performance pay relative to fixed-wage jobs
strongly suggests that aspects of these jobs affect men and women differently. As pre-
viously described, differences in tastes alone do not explain these lower earnings; the
potential role of bias in subjective evaluation is proposed as an alternative explana-
tion. However, other features of performance pay jobs may contribute to differences
in earnings beyond biased evaluation.
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Notes: each pair of numbers represents the coefficient and 95% confidence interval on the
interaction between an indicator for the specified gender and an indicator for participating in job
which awards performance pay from a quantile regression predicting log hourly wages. Control
variables include degree category, quadratics in work experience, marriage status, presence of
children, and race fixed effects.
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3.5.1 Mechanism for Returns to Long Hours
As compared to men, women more often choose jobs with lower hours requirements
or more flexibility in an effort to balance family obligations with job requirements;
the wage penalty associated with this choice of shorter weekly hours is an important
component of the gender wage gap in many occupations Goldin (2014). Even within
a job, subjective performance pay in particular may be a mechanism though which
employees working long hours are disproportionately rewarded. If so, the gender
wage gap within performance pay jobs could partially result from women within
performance pay jobs trading flexibility for earnings within a particular job, not just
in the choice of jobs.
To explore a potential relationship between performance pay and hours worked,
I estimate the elasticity of earnings with respect to hours in performance pay and
non-performance pay jobs through a regression of the log of weekly earnings on the
log of hours worked, along with other job and worker characteristics. I then add
indicators for performance pay, and interactions between performance pay, hours, and
gender to determine whether any relationship between weekly hours and performance
pay explains the relationship between performance pay and gender. Specifically, I
estimate:
logearningsij =αhloghoursij + αfFemalei
+ ηPPj + δh (PPj × loghoursij) + δf (PPj × Femalei)
+Xijβ + εij
where earningsij are individual i’s weekly earnings in job j, PPj indicates a perfor-
mance pay job, Xij is the same vector of individual and job characteristics used in the
main analysis. Weekly earnings rather than the hourly wage are used to avoid poten-
tial bias in the estimates of αh and δh which could arise from hours mismeasurement.
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In this specification, αh represents the elasticity of the hourly wage with respect to
weekly hours in non-performance pay jobs, and αh + δh represents the elasticity of
the hourly wage to weekly hours in performance pay jobs.
In Table 3.8, I ignore the gender component and test whether earnings in different
types of performance pay respond to weekly hours. As expected, across all jobs
without controls for performance pay, the elasticity of weekly earnings with respect
to hours is indistinguishable from one; earnings increase proportionally with hours.
However, including controls for performance pay and the interaction with weekly
hours shows that this elasticity varies significantly by job type. Performance pay
increases weekly earnings by approximately 20%, similar to the impact on the hourly
wage. When controlling for the interaction of weekly hours with performance pay,
performance pay actually has a negative direct impact on earnings, but the interaction
with hours is highly significant. The total return to performance pay is positive for
jobs with over 7.7 weekly hours, and so the returns to performance pay in most jobs
remain positive. Earnings in performance pay jobs are more responsive to weekly
hours than earnings in other jobs. More precisely, because α̂h + δ̂h > 1 (significant at
the 5% level), the hourly wage in performance pay jobs actually increases with weekly
hours, while the wage in non-performance pay jobs does not. This relationship could
either be evidence that performance pay offers a mechanism through which long hours
are rewarded, or could merely reflect that competitive, demanding workplaces which
reward long hours are more likely to be those offering performance pay.
The last four columns of Table 3.8 clarify that this result is specific to bonus-
awarding jobs; commission jobs do not reward weekly hours differentially from other
jobs. This result is unsurprising, since it seems unlikely that commissions earned
would change disproportionately with the hours worked, while bonuses may be based
on subjective criteria that could be affected non-linearly by hours.
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Table 3.8: Elasticity of Weekly Earnings to Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Weekly Hours 0.987∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗
(0.00792) (0.00790) (0.00820) (0.00784) (0.00815) (0.00787) (0.00795)
Performance Pay 0.201∗∗∗ -0.0626
(0.00715) (0.0794)
Perf Pay * Log Hours 0.0732∗∗∗
(0.0218)
Bonus Pay 0.170∗∗∗ -0.157+
(0.00753) (0.0894)




Commission * Log Hours 0.0111
(0.0410)
Observations 70969 70969 70969 70969 70969 70969 70969
Notes: Control variables include degree category, quadratics in work experience and job tenure,
union status, marriage status, presence of children, race, and industry, occupation, and year fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level, with symbols signifying
statistical significance as follows: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
In Table 3.9 I test whether this rewarding of long hours in bonus jobs explains
some of the increased gender wage gap. Comparing columns 3, a replication of the
results of the previous section using weekly earnings, and columns 5, where I control
for weekly hours in bonus jobs, shows that only a small fraction of the gender gap in
earnings from bonuses is explained by weekly hours. Women still early approximately
4% less than men in bonus pay environments relative to other jobs. Weekly hours
clearly have an important relationship with performance pay but do not account for
the full gender difference in performance pay earnings.
Although the relationship between performance pay and hours does not explain
the gender difference in earnings within such jobs, the existence of such a relationship
could have implications for the gender wage gap for this cohort in the future. During
the period studied, the sample is still quite young, and children may not yet be an
important consideration for the women included. However, as this cohort ages and
women increasingly require hours flexibility, the relationship between hours and earn-
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Table 3.9: Elasticity of Weekly Earnings to Hours and Bonuses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Weekly Hours 0.970∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗
(0.00784) (0.00783) (0.00783) (0.00815) (0.00815) (0.0129)
Bonus Pay 0.170∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ -0.157+ -0.110 0.0199
(0.00753) (0.00747) (0.0104) (0.0894) (0.0902) (0.134)
Female -0.0754∗∗∗ -0.0644∗∗∗ -0.0658∗∗∗ 0.140∗
(0.00775) (0.00827) (0.00828) (0.0591)
Bonus * Female -0.0460∗∗∗ -0.0385∗∗ -0.269
(0.0139) (0.0140) (0.178)
Bonus * Log Hours 0.0904∗∗∗ 0.0816∗∗∗ 0.0448
(0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0362)
Log Hours * Female -0.0597∗∗∗
(0.0165)
Bonus * LogHours * Female 0.0662
(0.0487)
Observations 70969 70969 70969 70969 70969 70969
Notes: Control variables include degree category, quadratics in work experience and job tenure,
union status, marriage status, presence of children, race, and industry, occupation, and year fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level, with symbols signifying
statistical significance as follows: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
ings could exacerbate the gender gap in performance pay earnings and participation.
3.5.2 Risk Aversion
Both illustrative models consider risk neutral agents who care only about the expected
wage in the chosen job, but in a real-life setting, uncertainty about earnings is likely an
important component of workers’ job choices. Experimental literature generally finds
that women are more risk averse than men on average (Bertrand, 2011). If women
sort out of higher-paying performance pay jobs not due to a taste for competition but
rather because they prefer a fixed-wage job even with lower wages to the uncertainty
of performance pay, this preference may explain women’s lower participation. Even
among performance pay jobs, women may sort into jobs or employers with less risk,
and potentially less reward, involved in the compensation scheme.
I exploit questions about risk aversion in the NLSY97 to test whether gender
differences in risk aversion explain either participation or earnings in performance
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pay. I define risk aversion as an indicator for whether an individual said they would
prefer to keep their current level of income as oppose to taking an alternative job
which would give them a 50% chance to double their income or a 50% chance to take
a 20% pay cut. 58% percent of men and 49% percent of women answered yes to this
question, suggesting women in this sample are slightly more risk averse.
In Table 3.10 I show that while risk averse individuals are less likely to participate
in performance pay of all kinds, controlling for risk aversion does little to explain
gender differences in participation given that the coefficient on female is not sensitive
to this control variable. The results in Table 3.11 are more complex. I do find that
risk averse individuals do earn about 5% less than others than those who are more
risk tolerant. I cannot reject that performance pay jobs do not reward risk tolerance
more than other jobs, although the point estimates suggest that they do. However,
even though the difference is not statistically significant, controlling for risk aversion
does appear to explain approximately 1/3 of the increased gender gap in performance
pay jobs, but none of the gender gap in non-performance pay jobs.
Table 3.10: Probit Regression of Performance Pay Participation and
Risk Aversion
All Performance Pay Bonus Pay Commission
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Probit Coef. on Female -0.149∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.105∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0250) (0.0329) (0.0348)
Probit Coef. on Risk Aversion -0.0641∗∗ -0.0421+ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0249) (0.0345)
Total Observations 70969 65431 70969 65431 70969 65282
Notes: Control variables include are category, aquadratic in work experience marriage status,
presence of children, and race fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
individual level, with symbols signifying statistical significance as follows: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
3.5.3 Home Production and Incentives
Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) propose a role for gender differences in home responsibil-
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Table 3.11: Risk Aversion and Earnings
All Performance Pay Bonus Pay Commission
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Female -0.0519∗∗∗ -0.0525∗∗∗ -0.0601∗∗∗ -0.0598∗∗∗ -0.0639∗∗∗ -0.0620∗∗∗
(0.00830) (0.00866) (0.00827) (0.00864) (0.00776) (0.00801)
Performance Pay 0.219∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.00986) (0.0122) (0.0104) (0.0127) (0.0201) (0.0253)
Perf Pay * Female -0.0570∗∗∗ -0.0414∗∗ -0.0473∗∗∗ -0.0323∗ -0.0684∗ -0.0465
(0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0285) (0.0291)
Risk Averse -0.0471∗∗∗ -0.0498∗∗∗ -0.0499∗∗∗
(0.00771) (0.00766) (0.00695)
Risk Averse * Perf Pay -0.0183 -0.0170 -0.0238
(0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0291)
Constant 0.275∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0835) (0.0839) (0.0830) (0.0812) (0.0815) (0.0823)
Observations 70969 65431 70969 65431 70969 65431
Notes: Control variables include degree category, quadratics in work experience and job tenure,
union status, marriage status, presence of children, race, and industry, occupation, and year fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level, with symbols signifying
statistical significance as follows: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
ities to lead to gender differences in incentive contracts in the workplace. Employers
may expect married women to work more hours in home production than men. If
increased home production increases the marginal cost of effort in the workplace,
then employers may expect it to be more costly to incentivize married women in
particular, and thus will offer them weaker and less rewarding incentive contracts.
These beliefs can lead to an equilibrium where women work more hours in the home
and fewer hours on the job than men. This problem may be more severe in jobs
where the variance in the outcome conditional on the level of effort is large, making
effort difficult to observe even if the outcome is contractible. Given that the NLSY97
sample is overwhelmingly young and childless, family constraints are unlikely to be
the primary reason for the wider gender gap in performance pay jobs in this sample.
Though not shown, when I do restrict the main empirical analysis to single workers
only and childless workers only, the results are similar to the results presented above.
140
3.5.4 Differential Performance in Performance-Pay Workplaces
Clearly, one potential explanation for the difference in performance earnings is a gen-
der difference in the actual performance response of workers to these bonus incentives.
If women perform less well in competitive environments or respond less strongly to
the same incentives despite similar ability, their earnings in performance pay jobs
would likely suffer relative to men. However, the model of bias under subjective con-
tracting in fact predicts such a difference in effort as a rational response of the agent
to the principal’s bias. If she knows the principal is biased in evaluation, the expected
reward from effort and thus the optimal level of effort will be lower. Therefore, even
if the worker’s effort or actual productivity could be observed, whether bias in eval-
uation causes differences in effort or underlying differences in effort cause differential
treatment would be difficult to establish. In any case, the NLSY97 contains no mea-
sures of actual on-the-job performance, making such a comparison impossible in this
sample.
Previous studies with the ability to measure performance have not found a decisive
gender difference in the response to incentives. In a meta-analysis of 18 experiments
on individual responses to incentives, Bandiera et al. (2017) fail to reject similar
gender responses to performance incentives. However, some individual studies (for
example, Gneezy et al. (2003)) have found a lower performance response to incentives
among women, especially when competing against men. Further, laboratory results
may not correspond directly into labor market outcomes, as individuals many respond
to performance incentives very differently in an experimental game as opposed to their
chosen career. In an actual labor market setting, Lavy (2013) does not find a gender
difference in teachers’ responses to a tournament incentive scheme, and further finds
that women’s performance response does not depend on the gender composition of the
comparison group of teachers. Given the limitations of the NLSY97 data, resolving
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this question is outside the scope of this study, but should be kept in mind when
interpreting results.
3.5.5 Proxy for Other Job or Workplace Characteristics
Jobs offering performance rewards likely differ in many ways from other jobs beyond
the presence of incentive compensation itself. In particular, awarding performance
pay requires employers to monitor the effort of employees and evaluate performance
(Lemieux et al., 2009), which could have consequences for employee outcomes beyond
reward amounts. For example, raises and promotions might be more frequent or more
responsive to perceived employee performance in these workplaces. Therefore, the
notion of performance pay used here might best be interpreted as an indicator for jobs
with increased employee evaluation and incentivization, rather than for performance
pay alone. For workplace features related to performance evaluation or a competitive
work environment, the impact of biased evaluation or differences in competitive taste
on gender differences in earnings should hold, leading to a similar interpretation of
the results with performance pay considered as a potential indicator of these job
characteristics. The association with performance evaluation more generally may
explain why some of the earnings difference between bonus and non-bonus jobs occurs
in the baseline wage and not the amount of the actual bonus payment earned, even
if differences in subjective evaluation are relevant for the earnings gap. Another
workplace feature potentially common to jobs with bonuses or subjective evaluation
may be frequent employer-employee negotiation over wages, raises, or promotions.
Studies of gender differences in negotiation suggest that women may be more hesitant
to negotiate, especially when the value of the subject of the negotiation was ambiguous
(Bertrand, 2011). If negotiations are more frequent in jobs awarding bonuses, this
could further explain the baseline wage difference observed.
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3.6 Conclusions and Discussion
This paper documents a number of empirical facts regarding the relationship between
performance pay and the gender wage gap for the NLSY97 sample. First, women ben-
efit less on average from participating in performance pay than men. For bonus jobs,
this lower average return appears to be in spite of women being more positively se-
lected into such jobs than men. Second, the relationship between performance pay
and earnings by gender differs by the type of performance pay awarded. In bonus
jobs, there is little difference in participation by gender conditional on weekly hours,
and some of the difference in performance pay earnings can be accounted for by the
wage in these jobs. In commission jobs, women participate less frequently, and gen-
der differences in performance pay earnings arise from receiving smaller commissions
when awarded. Finally, earnings in bonus but not commission jobs increase dispro-
portionately with weekly hours, which creates an effective wage penalty for workers,
often women, requiring flexible or shorter hours.
A difference in the average taste for competition fails to explain these empirical re-
sults; the potential for subjective evaluation to translate employer bias into lower earn-
ings in incentive contracts provides a potential alternate explanation. While women’s
lower earnings in performance pay is potentially consistent with biased subjective
evaluation, this story is less successful in explaining other empirical patterns. In par-
ticular, the gender gap in performance pay earnings is similar for bonuses (possibly
subjective) and commissions (almost certainly objective), although the components
of this gap are quite different. This result could suggest that subjective evaluation is
not a major component of the performance pay gender gap, that the “bonus” label is
not a good proxy for subjective evaluation, or that subjective evaluation matters for
bonus jobs but some other factor impacts commission jobs specifically. Another in-
consistency between the proposed model of subjective evaluation and these empirical
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findings lies in women’s lower wage in performance pay jobs; weaker incentives due to
biased subjective evaluation are predicted to lead to a higher wage despite lower total
compensation. Combined with the results on weekly hours, this result suggests that
the presence of bonuses may indicate a number of workplace characteristics which
may differentially affect men and women. Together, these findings confirm a role
for performance pay jobs, both bonuses and commissions, in the gender wage gap,
likely arising from some combination of gender differences in tastes, differences in
evaluation, and other job traits frequently occurring alongside performance pay.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Material for Chapter 1
A.1 TS2SLS Estimation with Differing Controls
Consider a simplified two sample model:
y1 = x1β + w1γ + u1
x1 = z1Πz + w1Πw + v1 x2 = z2Πz + w2Πw + v2
where y is the outcome variable, x is a vector including the endogenous regressors
and controls common to both samples, z is a vector including the instruments and
controls common to both samples, and w is a vector of additional controls. Suppose
we cannot observe w or y in sample 2, and we cannot observe x in sample 1.




































(X1 − X̂1)β + u1
)
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By assumption, u1 is orthogonal to both X̂1 and W1. It is therefore clear that




6= 0, or the predicted first stage error is
uncorrelated with the prediction itself. While this expression has mean zero within
sample 2 by construction, the error in the out of sample predictions may not have
mean zero. In particular, if the estimate of Πz suffers from omitted variable bias
within sample 2 and z and w are differentially correlated across the two samples, the
prediction of X̂1 will have a systematic error.




= 0 is the absence of
omitted variable bias in the first stage. If cov(z2, w2) = 0 and cov(z1, w1) = 0 and




→ E [ΠzZ1(Πw + v1)] = 0. Further, the
TS2SLS variance adjustments of Pacini and Windmeijer (2016), which are based on




Supplementary Material for Chapter 2
B.1 Robustness
In Table B.1, I show the results of altering my empirical strategy by changing the
control group, replacing the state-year fixed effects with linear state trends, and re-
parameterizing the outcome and treatment variables. For openings in the 1990s, I am
generally able to replicate the general results of previous findings. The specification
most similar to the analyses in Chirakijja (2018) and other studies is the propen-
sity score matched control sample including both urban and rural counties, with an
institution - log employment specification. In my estimation of this specification, I
find no effect on private or total employment, but I do confirm the effect on govern-
ment employment. The specifications shown in the rest of this paper are those in the
left-most vertical panel, and and the first row of each horizontal panel.
Most changes to the specification do not affect the main conclusions of the re-
gression analysis. Limiting to rural counties or the choice of control group between
ever-treated vs propensity-score matched among rural counties do not make much of
a qualitative difference to the results, nor does including a linear state-time trend in
place of the state-year fixed effects. For prison closings I confirm that the results are
relatively similar across specifications. When including urban counties in the analysis,
I no longer find an effect on total employment, likely due to prisons being a smaller
fraction of total employment in these counties.
The only change to the specification which alters the qualitative conclusion of the
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Table B.1: Effect of Public Prison Openings and Closings on Employ-
ment
Outcome: Employment/Population Outcome: Employment/Population Outcome: Log Employment
Treatment: Employees of Opened Treatment: Employees of Opened Treatment: Open or Closed
or Closed Prisons/Population or Closed Prisons/Population Institutions
State Fixed Effects State Time Trends State Fixed Effects
Total State Gov Private Total State Gov Private Total State Gov Private
Prison Openings 1980-1990
Propensity-Score Matched Rural Sample -0.068 0.843 ∗∗∗ -0.763 0.014 0.776 ∗∗∗ -0.723 -0.004 0.544 ∗∗∗ -0.037 ∗∗
(0.630) (0.192) (0.502) (0.497) (0.076) (0.476) (0.017) (0.135) (0.016)
[5260] [2000] [6860] [6855] [5480] [7020] [5260] [2000] [6860]
Ever-Treated Rural Sample 0.437 ∗ 0.638 ∗∗∗ -0.246 0.400 ∗∗ 0.654 ∗∗∗ -0.249 0.010 0.473 ∗∗∗ -0.011
(0.240) (0.170) (0.203) (0.201) (0.076) (0.189) (0.014) (0.138) (0.014)
[4340] [1920] [5900] [5814] [4878] [5970] [4340] [1920] [5900]
All Rural County Sample -0.107 0.889 ∗∗∗ -0.896 ∗∗∗ -0.128 0.826 ∗∗∗ -0.856 ∗∗∗ -0.009 0.514 ∗∗∗ -0.043 ∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.191) (0.214) (0.214) (0.085) (0.202) (0.012) (0.099) (0.013)
[39333] [16800] [51153] [51452] [42325] [52639] [39382] [16818] [51202]
Propensity-Score Matched All County Sample -0.428 0.757 ∗∗∗ -1.082 ∗∗∗ -0.354 0.757 ∗∗∗ -1.063 ∗∗∗ -0.005 0.255 ∗∗∗ -0.013
(0.294) (0.179) (0.251) (0.252) (0.077) (0.241) (0.010) (0.069) (0.011)
[9893] [4733] [12553] [12472] [10531] [12729] [9893] [4733] [12553]
Ever-Treated All County Sample -0.291 0.627 ∗∗∗ -0.971 ∗∗∗ -0.314 0.670 ∗∗∗ -0.962 ∗∗∗ -0.006 0.221 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗
(0.252) (0.169) (0.221) (0.226) (0.077) (0.210) (0.010) (0.074) (0.011)
[8640] [4240] [10920] [10819] [9489] [11042] [8640] [4240] [10920]
Prison Openings 1990-2000
Propensity-Score Matched Rural Sample 0.216 0.769 ∗∗∗ -0.447 ∗∗ 0.321 ∗ 0.719 ∗∗∗ -0.341 ∗∗ 0.030 ∗∗∗ 0.498 ∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.244) (0.042) (0.226) (0.170) (0.048) (0.151) (0.009) (0.067) (0.011)
[6760] [5140] [6700] [6780] [5950] [6775] [6760] [5140] [6700]
Ever-Treated Rural Sample 0.220 0.696 ∗∗∗ -0.353 ∗∗ 0.255 0.641 ∗∗∗ -0.342 ∗∗ 0.024 ∗∗ 0.374 ∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.179) (0.054) (0.156) (0.167) (0.055) (0.147) (0.010) (0.066) (0.012)
[7360] [5420] [7340] [7381] [6303] [7377] [7360] [5420] [7340]
All Rural County Sample -0.049 0.789 ∗∗∗ -0.733 ∗∗∗ -0.056 0.742 ∗∗∗ -0.731 ∗∗∗ -0.001 0.526 ∗∗∗ -0.044 ∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.040) (0.153) (0.167) (0.049) (0.153) (0.009) (0.067) (0.011)
[47280] [30600] [47000] [47547] [38475] [47457] [47280] [30600] [47000]
Propensity-Score Matched All County Sample -0.104 0.740 ∗∗∗ -0.763 ∗∗∗ -0.084 0.690 ∗∗∗ -0.744 ∗∗∗ 0.012 0.304 ∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.188) (0.046) (0.167) (0.181) (0.050) (0.164) (0.009) (0.055) (0.010)
[10620] [8100] [10500] [10660] [9368] [10643] [10620] [8100] [10500]
Ever-Treated All County Sample -0.274 0.704 ∗∗∗ -0.888 ∗∗∗ -0.230 0.657 ∗∗∗ -0.863 ∗∗∗ 0.003 0.253 ∗∗∗ -0.020 ∗
(0.183) (0.050) (0.162) (0.176) (0.051) (0.157) (0.009) (0.052) (0.010)
[13380] [10580] [13340] [13421] [11894] [13410] [13380] [10580] [13340]
Prison Openings 2000-2015
Propensity-Score Matched Rural Sample 0.832 ∗∗∗ 0.422 0.066 0.818 ∗∗∗ 0.676 ∗∗∗ 0.128 0.103 ∗∗∗ 0.349 ∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.186) (0.254) (0.399) (0.180) (0.139) (0.127) (0.039) (0.119) (0.048)
[1980] [1584] [1958] [1980] [1821] [1973] [1980] [1584] [1958]
Ever-Treated Rural Sample 0.759 ∗∗∗ 0.368 -0.040 0.779 ∗∗∗ 0.626 ∗∗∗ 0.125 0.076 0.263 ∗∗ 0.037
(0.240) (0.227) (0.337) (0.228) (0.161) (0.130) (0.049) (0.110) (0.062)
[4488] [3608] [4422] [4532] [4151] [4518] [4488] [3608] [4422]
All Rural County Sample 0.610 ∗∗ 0.407 ∗ -0.330 0.628 ∗∗ 0.644 ∗∗∗ -0.035 0.043 0.284 ∗∗ -0.002
(0.264) (0.229) (0.295) (0.264) (0.157) (0.156) (0.043) (0.111) (0.055)
[24684] [19030] [24354] [24768] [22401] [24689] [24684] [19030] [24354]
Propensity-Score Matched All County Sample 0.562 ∗ 0.383 ∗ -0.487 0.566 ∗∗ 0.616 ∗∗∗ -0.092 0.042 0.214 ∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.287) (0.213) (0.337) (0.283) (0.157) (0.183) (0.030) (0.072) (0.034)
[3454] [2816] [3388] [3454] [3177] [3430] [3454] [2816] [3388]
Ever-Treated All County Sample 0.582 ∗ 0.351 ∗ -0.429 0.607 ∗∗ 0.611 ∗∗∗ -0.047 0.031 0.196 ∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.304) (0.205) (0.313) (0.297) (0.157) (0.194) (0.031) (0.071) (0.039)
[9966] [8404] [9878] [10208] [9581] [10179] [9966] [8404] [9878]
Prison Closings 2000-2015
Ever-Treated Rural Sample 1.497 ∗∗∗ 1.231 ∗∗∗ 0.364 1.503 ∗∗∗ 0.787 ∗∗ 0.375 0.021 ∗ 0.083 -0.003
(0.302) (0.433) (0.247) (0.346) (0.385) (0.243) (0.013) (0.054) (0.012)
[3850] [2398] [3806] [3894] [3032] [3882] [3850] [2398] [3806]
All Rural County Sample 1.843 ∗∗∗ 1.289 ∗∗∗ 0.800 ∗∗∗ 1.889 ∗∗∗ 0.845 ∗ 0.840 ∗∗∗ 0.056 ∗∗∗ 0.099 ∗ 0.040 ∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.472) (0.201) (0.411) (0.436) (0.205) (0.013) (0.055) (0.013)
[17028] [8998] [16764] [17090] [13161] [17049] [17028] [8998] [16764]
Ever-Treated All County Sample 0.183 1.308 ∗∗∗ -0.791 0.262 0.718 ∗∗ -0.693 -0.011 0.080 ∗∗ -0.028
(1.574) (0.456) (1.448) (1.553) (0.349) (1.422) (0.017) (0.033) (0.017)
[10318] [7986] [10208] [10538] [9311] [10500] [10318] [7986] [10208]
Notes: Each number in this table shows the coefficient on a measure of general population
correctional institution presence from a regression of a measure of employment in the specified
sector on public prison presence along with county and state-time controls. Employment and prison
presence measures and the type of state-time control are specified in the vertical panel headings.
The estimation sample is specified in the row headings. Employment data is sourced from the
QCEW. The estimations for the 1980s include years 1976-1995. The estimations for the 1990s
include years 1986-2005. The estimations for the 2000s include years 1996-2017. Only counties
with data for all years in the estimation sample are included. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the county level, with signifying statistical significance as stars follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The number of observations for each regression is in square brackets.
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analysis is definition of treatment as institutions or prison size and the employment
outcome as logs or levels. The positive effect of increasing government employment
is almost entirely counteracted by a negative effect on the private sector only when
defining treatment in terms of the prisons size and outcome employment in levels.
Most prior studies which do not find an effect on the prison sector define treatment as
the number of presence of an institution and the outcome variable as log employment.
The choice to parameterize the outcome as employment per base year population
as or the log of employment reflects a different counterfactual trend assumption. The
first assumption reflects that counties with the same population will experience the
same change in the number of jobs; the second that counties with the same level of
employment in the sector will experience the same change. When considering the
whole public and private sector as I am here, it is unlikely that there is substantial
variation in the employment to population ratio, and thus practically in estimation
there is not much difference between the two assumptions. The definition of the
treatment variable reflects an assumption about whether employment responds in
proportion to prisons size or similarly regardless of size. Given the wide variety of
prison size relative to population, and considering that spillover effects, positive or
negative, are only likely to be observed, I consider a definition of prison presence which
takes into account facility size to be necessary to capture relevant effects. Further,
when treatment is defined in this way and the outcome variable is employment per
popuplation, β can be interpreted as total jobs gained or lost when one prison job is
gained or lost. Finally, I note that, though not shown here, even when the outcome
variable is defined as log employment, a statistically significant negative effect on the
private sector is found for prison openings in the 1990s as long as the treatment is
defined in terms of prison size.
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Appendix C
Supplementary Material for Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Propositions
C.1.1 Proposition 1
Suppose there are a continuum of agents with ability in the interval [a, ā], with a > 0.
The principal’s profit is
Π(ai) = λ
∗aiB − C(λ∗, α, ai).











Note that Π(0) = 0, and ∂Π
∂ai
(0) < 0. Therefore, for small enough ε, Π(ε) < 0. Because
limai→∞Π =∞, there consequently must be some ability level a∗ > 0 such that
Π(a∗) = 0.
Given the convexity of the profit function, if a∗ ∈ [aā],
∀a ∈ [a, a∗), Π(a) < 0
∀a ∈ (a∗, ā], Π(a) > 0
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and the principal will therefore find it profitable to employ agents with ability above
a∗ in the incentive contract.
C.1.2 Proposition 2
The marginally hired agent has ability a∗, defined by Π(a∗) = 0. The full expression
of this threshold condition as an implicit function of bias α is









Cα > 0. At the threshold level of ability λ
∗B − 1 = ∂Π
∂ai




the ability cutoff increases with bias. Biased-against individuals must have a higher
ability before they will be profitable for the principal to employ in the incentive
contract.
C.1.3 Proposition 3
Consider the set of individuals participating in the subjective evaluation contract,
with ai > a
∗. Each individual’s earnings increase from participating in performance
pay is V (λ∗), and so the average return to performance pay among those participating
is:
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The first term is negative due to ∂λ
∗
∂α
< 0; this term represents the loss in earnings
due to the optimal contract lowering the optimal level of effort as bias increases.
The second term is positive and represents the increase in positive selection: as
bias increases, only the most able individuals, who experience the highest returns
to performance pay, still participate. Therefore, without further assumptions on the
productivity of the subjective contract B and the functional form of the cost of effort
V (·), the direction bias’s impact on the average performance pay return is difficult to
determine.
As an example to illustrate that a negative impact on the average return is pos-
sible, consider a specific functional form of the ability distribution and cost func-







, and so the average return to performance pay takes the form

















B2k(ā2 + āa∗ + a∗2)
3(1 + 2α)2
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Taking the derivative with respect to α yields
∂
∂α




















Because B,k,α,ā > 0, then clearly ∂
∂α
E (V (λ∗(ai)|ai ≥ a∗) < 0 for this distribution of
ability and cost of effort function. Therefore, for at least some cases, of bias will have
a negative effect on the average return to performance pay among participants. That
is, the negative impact of bias on earnings at every level of ability is stronger than
the positive selection induced by the bias.
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